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General introduction. 
The present study is a preparatory and background study for the European 
Commission on legal questions related to the Commission's review of issues related 
to the telecommunications and the cable TV sectors as mandated by the Cable TV 
Directive and the Full Competition Directive. 1 
The Cable TV Directive and the Full Competition Directive mandate the 
European Commission to carry out, by 1 January 1998, an overall assessment of 
certain situations in the telecommunications and cable TV sectors, namely: the impact 
on the aims of the directives of-the situation where a single operator provides both 
telecommunications and cable TV networks and services2 and the situation with regard 
to remaining restrictions on the use of public telecommunications networks for the 
provision of cable television capacity3• 
The purpose of this study is to examine the scope of two legal instruments, 
which are available to the European Commission under the competition rules set out 
in the EC Treaty, in order to implement the results of its overall assessments in 
accordance with the provisions referred to above. On the one hand, it is examined to 
what extent Article ·86 EC as applied to individual undertakings can be used to 
implement the said results. On the other hand, the same analysis is made for Article 
90 EC which imposes obligations on the Member States and provides for specific 
powers of the European Commission. 
The study contains two main parts. In Part I, a general background study is 
made of the two legal instruments of EC competition law mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. Part II of the study builds on the findings and conclusions of Part I and 
examines the ways in which Articles 86 and 90 EC could be used as legal instruments 
in the context of the review conducted by the Commission of the telecommunications 
and cable TV sectors. In Part II, a graduated approach is followed describing the 
Throughout the study, the following references will be used for the liberalization directives adopted by 
the Commission pursuant to Article 90(3) EC: Commission Directive 88/723/EEC of 16 May 1988, 
competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment, O.J. 1988, L 131/73 ("Terminal 
Equipment Directive"); Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of28 June 1990, competition in the markets 
for telecommunications services, O.J. 1990, L 192/10 ("Telecommunications Services Directive"), as 
amended by Commission Directives 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994, satellite communications, O.J. 
1994, L 268115 ("Satellite Services Directive"), 95115/EC of 18 October 1995, abolition of the 
restrictions on the use of cable television networks for the provision of already liberalized 
telecommunications services, O.J. 1995, L 256/49 ("Cable TV Directive"), 96/2/EC of 16 January 
1996, mobile and personal communications, O.J. 1996, L 20/59 ("Mobile Services Directive") and 
96119/EC, full competition in telecommunications markets, O.J. 1996, L 74/13 ("Full Competition 
Directive"). 
See Article 2 of the Cable TV Directive. 
See point 9 of the Full Competition Directive. 
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different degrees of intervention which would be allowed under the said provisions of 
EC competition law. 
The present study examines the scope of legal instruments and does not purport 
to examine specific issues related to the current and anticipated evolution of the 
markets concerned or to any other technological or other developments in these 
markets. In particular, it does not deal at any length with the question of the definition 
of the relevant markets which is one of the starting points of any competition law 
analysis. On all of these issues, the study needs to be complemented by and read 
together with specific economic theory and analysis which the Commission was in the 
process of conducting at the time of writing of the present study. For this reason, it 
should be borne in mind when reading or using the present study that it is based on a 
number of assumptions which are sometimes expressed in an explicit manner in the 
text but which may also be implicit. 
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Executive summary 
The present study examines the scope of the legal instruments under EC 
competition law available to the European Commission to implement the results of the 
ongoing review of certain situations in the telecommunications and cable TV sectors 
which is mandated by the Cable TV Directive and the Full Competition Directive. 
More particularly, it examines the scope of Articles 86 and 90 EC as they could be 
applied by the European Commission (i) to a single operator which provides both 
telecommunications and cable TV networks and services and (ii) to remaining 
restrictions on the use of public telecommunications networks for the provision of cable 
television capacity. 
Part I of the study provides, following the existing case law and precedents, a 
background study of the scope of Articles 86 and 90 EC and the powers of the 
Commission under the said provisions. In Part II of the study the findings resulting 
from that background study are applied to the specific situations in the 
telecommunications and cable TV sectors which are the subject of the Commission's 
ongoing process of review. 
Article 86 EC applies to individual undertakings which hold a dominant 
position. It applies a fortiori to an undertaking which holds a double dominant position 
over both telecommunications and cable TV infrastructure. 
Although it has consistently been held that Article 86 EC does not prohibit 
market dominance as such but the abuse of such market dominance, the interpretation 
of the concept of "abuse" has gradually expanded its scope to encompass virtually any 
behaviour which strengthens the dominance, including not only the "direct" abusive 
exploitation of suppliers, customers and end-users but also conduct which only 
indirectly prejudices consumers by impairing the effective competitive structure. The 
case law of the Court of Justice makes clear that undertakings such as those with a 
double dominant position have a "special responsibility" not to allow their conduct to 
impair genuine undistorted competition. 
In particular, those undertakings cannot leverage their dominance into secondary 
markets, impede the emergence of new services, or strengthen their dominance through 
acquisitions and other types of (cooperative) transactions involving competitors or 
undertakings active in upstream or downstream markets. In addition, the notion of 
"abusive conduct" is interpreted in a broad manner as covering positive actions (for 
example, the granting of fidelity rebates or the implementation of tying practices), 
negative actions (for example, a refusal to supply or provide access) as well as failures 
to act (for example, failing to meet market demand or to develop new technologies or 
to implement technological innovations). The study provides a number of examples of 
how these principles can be applied by the Commission to the conduct of a dominant 
undertaking with a double dominant position and how they impose constraints on the 
\0603-00S.DVL [030] 
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undertaking's pricing, marketing, investment, innovation, expansion and access 
policies. 
It is submitted that the existing case law contains already a number of arguments 
which could be developed further by the Commission in order to compel undertakings, 
with the double dominant position described above, to take certain pro-active steps to 
eliminate anti-competitive (structural) circumstances. In particular, under the case law 
of the Court on "automatic abuses" (developed so far under a combined application of 
Articles 90 and 86 EC) and on unlawful extensions of a dominant position (used both 
under Article 86 EC and under Article 90 in conjunction with Article 86 EC), in 
combination with the account which is taken under competition law of evolutions in 
market circumstances and regulatory frameworks, the Commission could envisage 
qualifying as abusive a number of situations which are discussed in a graduated 
approach in the study. 
These situations include, in particular, the failure of the dominant undertaking 
to implement adequate separate accounts and appropriate cost allocation systems, which 
failure would make it impossible both for the undertaking itself and for the 
Commission to ensure that Article 86 EC is not infringed and would impede an 
adequate judicial review. In the context of the existing case law and practice, more far 
reaching structural solutions could also be constructed including an obligation on the 
dominant undertaking to proceed with a structural separation between the cable TV and 
telecommunications activities over which it is dominant as well as an obligation on the 
dominant undertaking to divest certain of those activities. Such a "structural" approach 
under Article 86 would also be consistent with the evolution which has occurred in the 
Commission's own administrative practice under Article 85 EC and the Merger 
Control Regulation, as shown by its tendency towards increased emphasis on structural 
market solutions to situations which risk foreclosing competition and the need to ensure 
a sufficient degree of openness of mar~ets. The precedents and technical rules 
developed in that administrative practice can also be used as practical guidance for the 
implementation of the structural measures described above. 
As far as the scope of the Commission's powers to impose a remedy for 
infringements of the competition rules is concerned, specific attention is given to the 
principle of proportionality which should be a principal guideline in any action under 
the competition rules to be undertaken in implementing the results of the ongoing 
process of review of situations in the cable TV and telecommunications sectors. 
Pursuant to Article 90(3) EC, the Commission has the power to adopt directives 
and decisions requiring Member States to comply with their obligation under Article 
90( 1) EC not to enact or maintain in force measures contrary to the Treaty, in 
particular Article 86 EC, in respect of undertakings to which Member States grant 
special or exclusive rights and public undertakings. These provisions are the principal 
legal basis for the power of the Commission which it has used to adopt directives 
aimed at liberalizing competition in the telecommunications sector and decisions aimed 
10603-00S.DVL [030] 
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at removing distortions of competition introduced by individual Member States in 
newly liberalized telecommunications markets. The latter directives imply that there · 
is still scope for further Commission action under Article 90(3) EC, in particular to 
ensure the effectiveness of the existing directives already adopted by the Commission 
under this provision and to ensure that Member States do not enact or maintain in 
force any measure which results in the de facto continuation of the special and 
exclusive rights which have already been abolished. 
' It is submitted that the Commission would remain within the line of reasoning 
it·has already applied in the existing Article 90(3) EC directives if it adopts a new 
directive in which it concludes, on the basis of economic and other evidence, that the 
maintenance in force by some Member States of restrictions preventing the use of 
telecommunications infrastructure for the provision of cable TV services, in ¢ticular 
through the continuation of special or exclusive rights for the provision of cable TV 
services, violates Articles 90(1), 3(g) and 86 of the Treaty. Based on the referenced 
line of reasoning, the Commission could base this conclusion on the "equality of 
opportunity" principle (recognized by the Court of Justice, in particular, in the context 
of the Terminal Equipment Directive) and on the doctrine of "the automatic abuse of 
a dominant position" as applied in the Cable TV and Full Competition Directives and 
as recognized in the case law. In particular, the Commission could argue that the 
maintenance of the foregoing rights and restrictions compels or induces the cable TV 
operator(s) to abuse the dominant position resulting from the special or exclusive 
rights, inter alia, by limiting the emergence of new audio-visual-telecommunications 
applicatio~s and multimedia services and holding back technical progress. 
In addition, regarding an undertaking holding double dominant positions in 
telecommunications and cable TV network infrastructures in a given Member State, 
it is submitted that the Commission could develop a line of reasoning derived from its 
reasoning in the existing Article 90(3) directives. Under this reasoning, it can be 
argued that the elimination of the restrictions on the use of cable TV infrastructure for 
the provision of telecommunications services, in combination with technological 
changes leading to the convergence of_ !he telecommunications and media sectors, 
resulted in the strengthening of the dominant position of the operator concerned in the 
telecommunications market, by making it more difficult for new entrants to enter this 
market, and thereby also resulted in the de facto continuation of this operator's 
exclusive rights over telecommunications infrastructures and services. This would be 
in direct conflict with the objectives pursued by the existing Commission directives. 
The Commission could complete this line of reasoning by introducing an 
argument based on a particular reading of the Court's judgment in Corbeau. Under this 
reasoning, it can be argued that the Member State had a duty, pursuant to Article 90(1) 
EC and under the principles of "effet utile" and equality of opportunity, to respond to 
the above mentioned regulatory and technological changes by taking steps to prevent 
the strengthening of the dominant position and the de facto continuation of the 
operator's exclusive rights. Under this reasoning, the requisite "measure" would 
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consist of the Member State's failure to ensure the effective application of the Cable 
TV and Full Competition Directives by failing to respond appropriately to the 
regulatory and technological changes thereby allowing the de facto continuation of 
exclusive rights. In line with the reasoning in the existing Article 90(3) directives, the 
Commission could conclude, on the basis of economic and other evidence, that the de 
facto continuation of the operator's exclusive rights compels or induces the operator 
to abuse its double dominant positions by, inter alia, limiting the emergence of new 
audio-visual-telecommunications applications and multimedia services. The reasoning 
in this respect would be very similar to the one which would need to be followed in 
order to justify measures such as structural separation and divestiture when Article 86 
EC is applied to individual underta_kings. 
Finally, pursuant to the Commission's powers under Article 90(3), the directive 
could indicate the specific objective to be achieved in eliminating the situation which 
is contrary to the Treaty rules, by ordering the Member States to provide for the 
removal of restrictions on the use of telecommunications infrastructure to provide cable 
TV services and to take certain measures to address the special problem posed by an 
operator doubly dominant in both telecommunications and cable TV infrastructures 
under a graduated approach (including structural separation and divestiture) described 
in the study. -. 
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I. Backi:round study of the rei:ulatory framework set out in the EC Treaty 
and in secondary lei:islation 
I.A Article 86 - Prohibition of "abuse of a dominant position" 
This part of the study focuses on the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position 
set out in Article 86 EC. It is intended to provide an·overview of the existing case law 
and administrative practice in order to examine in which circumstances the provision 
applies and could also be applied to structural market situations. 
I.A.l "Traditional" approach under Article 86 EC regarding abuses which have 
actually been committed: (i) abusive exploitation of suppliers. customers and 
end-users and Cii) affecting market structures 
Article 86 EC provides that "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States". Article 86 also sets out a non-exhaustive list of examples of 
practices which can be cgnsidered as "abusive". 4 
Article 86 has consistently been used and described as having three essential 
components. First, an undertaking must hold a dominant position in a substantial part 
of the Common market. Second, there must be an abuse or an abusive exploitation~ 
of a dominant position. T4ird, the abuse must affect trade between Member States. It 
is the second condition for application of Article 86 EC (i.e., the concept of 
"abuse/abusive exploitation") which will be developed further below. 
· By way of introduction, it must also be observed that, in cases dealing with the 
application of Article 86 EC to individual undertakings, it has consistently been held. 
both in the case law6 and in the literature, that Article 86 EC does not prohibit market 
6 
See, in particular, Case 6171, Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, [1973] ECR 215, 
in which it is stated at para. 26 that Article 86 "states a certain number of abusive practices which it 
prohibits. The list merely gives examples, not an exhaustive enumeration of the sort of abuses of a 
dominant position prohibited by the Treaty"; and the constant case law thereafter. 
The term "abusive exploitation", as used by several authors, is based on the French version of Article 
86 of the Treaty which provides that "{e]st incompatible avec le marche commun et interdit, dans La 
mesure ou le commerce entre Etats membres est susceptible d'en etre affecte, le fait pour une ou 
plusieurs entreprises d 'exploiter de (aeon abusive une position dominante sur le marche commun ou dans 
une partie substantielle de celui-ci" (emphasis added). 
See, in particular, Michelin v. Commission, [1983] ECR 3461. See also the recent judgment of 8 
October 1996 in Joined Cases T-24/93, T-25/93 and T-28/93, Compagnie Maritime Beige Transports 
SA and others v. Commission, not yet reported. In that case, the applications submitted in express 
words to the Court of First Instance that "Article 86 of the Treaty prohibits the abuse, by one or more 
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dominance as such but the abuse of such market dominance. 7 This principle is in fact 
based on the wording of Article 86 EC. It goes also back to the nature and the 
orthodoxy of the traditional system of control, as reflected in the case law and in the 
administrative practice of the European Commission, set out by Article 86 EC which 
has been conceived and used in the past as a "repressive system" rather than a 
"preventive system". 8 
Although "abuse/abusive exploitation" is an essential element for the application 
of Article 86, it results from the case law, as discussed below, 9 that there has been 
an evolution in the interpretation of the concept of "abuse" that has gradually expanded 
its scope and that there may still be room for further evolution in future cases. The 
discussion below does not provide an exhaustive examination of all types of abuses 
which have already been condemned in the past. It only mentions a first category of 
abuses which consists of the direct abusive exploitation of end-users, customers, and 
suppliers and will then focus on those abuses which consist of the affectation of the 
market structure(s) through exclusionary conduct and other types of conduct aimed at 
maintaining or strengthening the market power of the dominant undertaking. It is this 
latter large category of abuses, dealing with "structural market behaviour", "structural 
abuses" and "structural market circumstances", which must be examined in order to 
determine whether the current case law is sufficiently broad to cover situations such 
as the ones which are the specific object of the present study, i.e., situations in which 
an undertaking holds a dominant position both over telecommunications infrastructure 
and over cable TV infrastructure. 
I.A.l.l The "direct" abusive exploitation of suppliers. customers and end-users 
The abuses ·listed in ·Article 86 give already examples of practices and 
conducts which consist of a direct exploitation of the markets. In particular, it is an 
9 
undenakings, of a dominant position, but not the fact that one or more undenakings occupy a dominant 
position, be it individual or collective" (at para. 53). The Court of First Instance replied in evenly clear 
words that "whilst it is clear that merely occupying a dominant position cannot constitute an 
infringement o(Anicle 86 o(the Treaty, the argument has no bearing on this case, since the Commission 
penalized abuses of the dominant position and not the dominant position in itself' (at para 60; emphasis 
added). 
Notwithstanding this general principle, it may be noted that certain cases which are further discussed 
below contain language which, at least when read in isolation, could lead to another conclusion. For 
example, in Continental Can, cited above, the Court observed that "[i]fit can, irrespective of any fault, 
be regarded as an abuse if an undenaking holds a position so dominant that the objectives of the Treaty 
are circumvented by an alteration to the supply structure which seriously endangers the consumer's 
freedom of action in the market, such a case necessarily exists, if practically all competition is 
eliminated" (judgment at para. 29). 
Compare with the observations made by Advocate-General Dannon.in Case C-18/88, GB-INNO-BM, 
[1991] ECR 1-5941, Opinion at para. 44. 
See also the discussion in Section I.A.2 below for the concept of "automatic/necessary abuse" as 
developed in the context of the combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC. 
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abuse for a dominant undertaking to impose, directly or indirectly, unfair purchase or 
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions. Another basic example of a direct 
abusive exploitation of a dominant position is the charging to customers and consumers 
of excessively high prices which have no bearing with the costs. Additional examples 
of direct abusive exploitation of a dominant position which are directly relevant in the 
context of the present study will be further discussed in Section II.A.l below. 
I.A.l.2 The "indirect" abuse of a dominant position which consists in the 
affectation of the market structure(s) through exclusionary conduct and 
other types of conduct aimed at maintaining or strengthening the market 
power of the dominant undertaking 
By way of introduction to this section, it is important to recall the reasons 
given by the Court in its case law for including in the concept of abuse not only 
"exploitative abuses" which directly prejudice consumers and which are directly 
covered by the wording of Article 86 EC but also other abuses which affect the market 
structure. This "extension" of the concept of abuse is in fact based on the overall 
objectives of the competition rules as reflected in the EC Treaty as well as on the 
general objectives of the EC Treaty. In particular, it has been held that "[t]he 
prohibitions of Articles 85 and 86 must in fact be interpreted and applied in the light 
of Article 3 (j) of the Treaty, which provides that the activities of the Community shall 
include the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is 
not distorted, and Article 2 of the Treaty, which gives the Community the task of 
promoting 'throughout the Community harmonious development of economic activities'. 
By prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position within the market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States, Article 86 covers abuse which may directly 
prejudice consumers as well as abuse which indirectly prejudices them by impairing the 
effective competitive structure as envisaged by Article 3 (j) of the Treaty" (emphasis 
added) 10 . 
The foregoing language as used by the Court of Justice is very general and 
broad and could, when read in isolation of the rest of the case law, be interpreted as 
meaning that the interpretation of the competition rules and, in particular, Article 86 
EC can be stretched almost without any limitations so as to serve as a means for the 
full implementation of one of the basic activities of the Communities which is the 
establishment of a system of undistorted competition. However, it is necessary to 
examine the specific cases on abuse which have already been dealt with in the past to 
10 See, in particular, Joined Cases 6 and 7173, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, [1974] ECR 223, 
at para. 32. Note that the references to Anicles 3(t) and 2 of the Treaty are references to the provisions 
applicable at the time of the judgment before the Treaty on European Union. See also the discussion 
below and para. 25 of Continental Can, cited above, in which it is stated that "Anicles 85 and 86 seek 
to achieve the same aim at different levels, namely, the maintenance of effective competition within the 
common market". 
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see what the interpretation is that has so far been given to the concept of abuse in the 
case law. 11 
A distinction is made below between three classes of abuses: (a) "exclusionary 
abuses", (b) "abuses based on monopoly leverage or extensions of a dominant 
position", and (c) "structural abuses through strengthening of a dominant position". 
Although this distinction may appear to be a bit artificial in certain cases (since, in 
particular, certain cases could be classified in more than one of the categories used), 
it is submitted that it allows to understand better the scope of the application of the 
provisions of Article 86 EC. 
(i) "Exclusionary abuses" 
The first definition of "abuse" given by the Court of Justice in the context of 
cases dealing with exclusionary abuses is the following: "abuse is an objective concept 
relating to the behavior of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to 
influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the 
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through 
recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in 
products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the 
effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition" . Although the Court has attempted to clarify 
this concept further in subsequent cases, 12 there remains substantial doubt as to the 
precise meaning of the test set out by the Court which can only be clarified, in part, 
by looking at the specific practices which have been found to infringe Article 86 
EC. 13 
II 
12 
13 
The fact that there may be certain limits to the application of the competition rules can be illustrated 
by the recent developments about the Viho/Parker Pen case; Case C-73/95 P, Viho Europe BV v. 
Commission, judgment of 24 October 1996, not yet reported, in which the Court of Justice confirmed 
that, according to the "single economic unit theory", agreements between a parent cGmpany and its 
100% controlled subsidiary lacking any commercial autonomy do not fall within the scope of Article 
85(1) even if they are capable of affecting the competitive position of third parties. For a case in which 
it was submitted that Article 86 EC had certain limits and could not be used to fill in any lacunae in 
the Treaty or in the secondary legislation, see the Opinion of Advocate-General Warner in BP v. 
Commission (Case 77177, [1978] ECR 1513, at p. 1537). 
See, in particular, Case 85176, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR 461, at para. 91. In 
Michelin, the Court expressed this test in a slightly different manner by indicated that "Article 86 covers 
practices which are likely to affect the structure of a market where, as a direct result of the presence 
of the undertaking in question, competition has already been weakened and which, through recourse to 
methods different from those governing normal competition in products or services based on traders' 
performance, have the effect of hindering the maintenance or development of the level of competition 
still existing on the market" (Case 322/81, [ 1983] ECR 3461, at para. 70). In AKZO, the Court used 
the term "competition on the merits" (Case 62/86, [1991] ECR 3359, at para. 70). See also on the 
vague nature of the test spelled out by the Court of Justice, Valentine Korah, An introductory guide to 
EC competition law and practice, fifth edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994, at 4.3.1. 
See the discussion below. 
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The reasoning of the Court is also based on the concept of "special 
responsibilities" which need to be respected by undertakings in a dominant position.· 
In particular, Article 86 imposes "on an undertaking in a dominant position, 
irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, 14 a special 
responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
common market, in accordance with the general objective set out in Article 3 (j) of the 
Treaty. Thus Article 86 covers all conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position 
which is such as to hinder the maintenance or the growth of the degree of competition 
... 
still existing in a market where, as a result of the very presence of that undertaking, 
competition is weakened" . 15 In addition, "the actual scope of the special responsibility 
imposed on an undertaking in a dominant position must[. .. ] be considered in the light 
of the specific circumstances of each case, reflecting a weakened competitive 
situation". 16 This has further been developed in cases in which the Court co'hsidered 
that the fact that an undertaking is in a dominant position cannot deprive it of its 
entitlement to protect its own commercial interests when they are attacked, and whilst 
such an undertaking must be allowed the right to take such reasonable steps as it deems 
appropriate to protect those interests, such behaviour cannot be allowed if its purpose 
is to strengthen this dominant position and thereby abuse it. 17 
One of the classical examples of cases in which the above reasoning and test 
have been followed are the cases on rebate schemes implemented by dominant 
undertakings (in particular, those cases prohibiting the implementation of fidelity rebate 
schemes). 18 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
It is submitted that the reference by the Court to the wording "irrespective of the reasons for which it 
has such a dominant position" cannot be interpreted as meaning that the obligations resulting from the 
application of the competition rules cannot be different for undertakings which obtained their position 
on the basis of competition on the merits than for undertakings which hold such a position as a result 
of certain State action as is the case in the telecommunications sector. Rather, it can reasonably be 
considered that the Court intended to emphasize that undertakings which have been put in a dominant 
position by State action cannot argue that, for that reason, they are not subject to the provisions of 
Article 86 EC. See, in this respect, also the judgment in Telemarketing where the Court referred to the 
fact that for applying Article 86 it did not matter whether the dominant position was acquired on the 
basis of the merits or on the basis of certain State rights and regulations: "Anicle 86 of the EEC Treaty 
must be interpreted as applying to an undenaking holding a dominant position on a panicular market, 
even where that position is due not to the activities of the undenaking itself but to the fact that by reason 
of provisions laid down by law there can be no competition or only very limited competition on that 
market" (Telemarketing, cited and discussed below, at para. 18). 
See, in particular, Michelin, cited above, at para. 57. 
See Tetra Pak II, T-83/91, [1994] ECR Il-755, at para 115. 
See, in particular, Compagnie Maritime Beige Transports SA and others, cited above, at para. 107; and 
BPB Industries and British Gypsum v. Commission, Case T-65/89, [1993] ECR II-389, at para. 69. 
See the citations in the preceding footnotes. 
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(ii) Abuses based on monopoly leverage or extensions of a dominant position 
The discussion below will focus on those cases in which an undertaking in a 
dominant position was compelled, through the application of Article 86 EC and thus 
in order to eliminate the abuse concerned, to provide access to and/or to dispose of 
certain of its "assets" over which it had property rights. As will be illustrated below, 
these cases are generally based on the doctrine that an undertaking in a dominant 
position in one market is not entitled to extend that dominant position to another 
market and that'the undertaking concerned cannot impede, through its conduct, 
competition or commercial offerings in that secondary market. 19 
• Refusal to supply 
• 
The well known Commercial Solvents case is still one of the leading cases on 
refusal to supply under Article 86 EC. 20 The reasoning followed by the Court was 
that an undertaking in a dominant position, as regards the production of a raw material 
and therefore able to control the supply to manufacturers of derivatives, could not, just 
because it decided to start manufacturing the derivatives concerned (in competition 
with its former customers), act in such a way as to eliminate the competition of those 
former customers which in the case in question, would have amounted to eliminating 
one of the principal manufacturers of the derivatives. The Court concluded that an 
undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in raw materials and which, 
with the object of reserving such raw material for manufacturing its own derivatives, 
refuses to supply a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and 
therefore ·risks eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 86. 
The dominant undertaking was thus effectively compelled to continue to supply 
the raw materials to the customer concerned and could no longer decide independently 
on the manner in which it would dispose of the property rights which it held over the 
raw materials. Its conduct, which consisted of the withdrawal of the supplies to the 
customer concerned, was considered to be abusive under Article 86 EC since it 
constituted a risk that the customer would have been eliminated from the secondary 
market for the derivatives. 
• Extension of a dominant position through certain conduct 
Based on the reasoning in Commercial Solvents,21 the Court concluded in 
Telemarketing that an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 is committed where, 
19 In theory, these cases can be considered as a kind of subcategory of the general category of 
"exclusionary abuses" discussed in Section (a) above. 
20 Joined Cases 6 and 7173, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, [1974] ECR 223. 
21 Cited above. 
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without objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular 
market reserves to itself or to an undertaking belonging to the same group an ancillary 
activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its activities on 
a neighboring but separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition 
from such undertaking. 22 The conduct that was at issue in the case consisted of the 
refusal to sell television time on the RTL station for telephone marketing operations 
using a telephone number other than that of the RTL group so that independent 
Telemarketing activities outside this group became impossible and all undertakings 
were excluded from this market. 
• Refusal to license 
It is an established principle that EC competition law does not affect the 
existence of intellectual property rights but that it may impose limits on the exercise 
of such exclusive rights. In addition, it is now well established that a refusal to grant 
a license, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot 
in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 23 However, it is also clear that 
the exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, 
involve abusive conduct. 24 In particular, the owner of the intellectual property right 
should not impede the emergence of new services and products and should, at least in 
certain cases, not engage in monopoly leveraging25 . 
• Refusal to provide access to certain facilities 
The monopoly leveraging argument is -also one of the basic arguments 
underlying the Commission's decisions regarding access to essential facilities in which 
it ordered undertakings to provide to other parties access to their physical and other 
property. 26 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Centre beige d'etudes de marche-Telemarketing (CBEM) v. Compagnie luxembourgeoise de 
telediffusion and Information publicite Benelux SA, Case 311/84, [1985] ECR:3261, at para. 27. 
See, in particular, Ccrse 238/87, Volvo v. Veng, [1988] ECR 6223, at para. 8; and Joined Cases C-
241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Magill, [1995] ECR 1-743, at para. 49. 
Magill, cited above, at para. 50. 
See, in particular, the judgment of the Court of Justice in Magill at para. 56 in which the Court referred 
to Commercial Solvents (discussed above) and indicated that "the appellants, by their conduct, reserved 
to themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all competition on that 
market[ ... ] since they denied access to the basic information which is the raw material indispensable 
for the compilation of such a guide." 
For a summary of the doctrine on essential facilities and the Commission's interpretation of its 
application in the telecommunications sector, see the Draft Notice on access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector (Communication from the Commission on the application of the competition 
rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector - framework, relevant markets and 
principles, O.J. 1997, C 76/9). See also John Temple Lang, Fordham Int.L.J., Vol. 18, December 
1994, No 2 p. 437. 
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(iii) Structural abuses - "prohibited strengthening of a dominant position" 
In this section the focus is on those cases in which it was held that a dominant 
undertaking had strengthened its position (in particular, through the acquisition of 
another undertaking or through the establishment of structural links with a competitor) 
in a manner contrary to Article 86 EC and in which it was then required to undo that 
situation (in particular, through the disposal or divestiture of the interests which it had 
acquired). 
The leading case on so-called "structural abuses" is still Continental Can27 in 
which the Court held that the Commission has the power to control certain mergers 
under Article 86 EC. What was challenged by the Commission in Continental Can was 
not the dominant position of Continental Can as such but the strengthening of that 
position through the acquisition (under normal circumstances not involving any abusive 
or abnormal pressure on behalf of the buyer) of a competing undertaking. Although 
the Court annulled the Commission's decision on the facts of the case, it did confirm 
the Commission's interpretation of Article 86 EC according to which that provision is 
not only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also 
at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition 
structure, as mentioned in Article 3 of the Treaty. The Court therefore concluded that 
an abuse may occur if an undertaking in a dominant position strengthens the position 
in such a way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition 
(i.e., that only undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends on the 
dominant one). 28 
The judgment in Continental Can is a clear example of the teleological 
interpretation of the competition rules (in particular, Article 86 EC). Indeed, the Court 
based its reasoning on the spirit, general scheme and wording of Article 86, as well 
as on the system and objectives of the Treaty. On the basis of this reasoning, the Court 
was able to "extend" the powers of the Commission under Article 86 EC. 29 As has 
already been indicated above, certain wording contained in the judgment could leave 
scope for further and new developments in the future. In particular, the Court observed 
that "the endeavour of .fhe authors of the Treaty to maintain in the market real or 
27 
28 
29 
Case 6171, Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, [1973] ECR 215. 
Continental Can, cited above, at para. 26. See also the Commission's observations in the Tenth Report 
on Competition Policy, 1981, at para. 150, where it is indicated that "[s]trengthening by means of 
merger is likely to constitute an abuse if any distonion of the resulting market structure interferes with 
the maintenance of remaining competition (which has already been weakened by the very existence of 
this dominant position) or its development. Such an effect depends, in panicular, on the change in the 
relative market strength of the panicipants after the merger, i.e., the position of the new unit in relation 
to remaining competitors.". 
In this respect, it is interesting to observe that the Court did not follow on this point the Opinion of 
Advocate-General Roemer who had objected against the Commission's reasoning that Article 86 EC 
could be used in a Continental Can type of scenario. The Advocate-General followed in fact a more 
restrictive interpretation of Article 86 EC. 
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potential competition even in cases in which restraints on competition are permitted 
was explicitly laid down in Article 85(3)(b) of the Treaty. Article 86 does not contain 
the same ·explicit provisions, but this can be explained by the fact that the system fixed 
there for dominant positions, unlike Article 85 (3), does not recognize any exemption 
from the prohibition. With such a system the obligation to observe the basic objectives 
of the Treaty, in particular that of Article 3 (j), results from the obligatory force of these 
objectives. "30 This broad wording, referring to the necessity to protect and achieve 
the objectives of the Treaty, could possibly be used in future cases to "extend" the 
concept of "abuse" further. 31 , 
The decision and judgment in Tetra Pak 132 and the decision in BIC/Gillette33 
are based on reasoning similar to- that in the Court's judgment in Continental Can. 34 
In both these cases it was not the existing dominant position of the undertakings 
concerned which was directly challenged under Article 86 EC but certain conduct (i.e., 
the acquisition of an exclusive license and the establishment of structural links with a 
competitor, respectively), and the effects of such conduct of the dominant undertakings 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Continental Can, cited above, at para. 25. 
See also the interpretation which has been given to the judgment in Continental Can by Advocate-
General Lenz in his Qpinion in Ahmed Saeed (Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others v. 
Zentrale zur Bekiimpfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs, [1989] ECR 803). In general terms, the Advocate-
General considered that the Court held that the mere fact that competition was substantially fettered on 
the relevant market by a dominant undertaking or dominant undertakings acting together constituted an 
abuse, regardless of the means and procedure by which it was achieved (Opinion of the Advocate-
General, at para. 35). 
Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak v. Commission, [1990] ECR 11-309. Commission Decision of 26 July 1988, 
Tetra Pak, O.J. 1988, L 272/27. The Commission (which referred explicitly to Continental Can. see 
para. 46 of the decision) considered that the acquisition of the exclusive license constituted an abuse 
of a dominant position since it prevented or at least substantially delayed a new competitor from 
entering into a market where very little if any competition was found as well as since it strengthened 
the dominant position of Tetra Pak (in particular, by reinforcing its technical advantages vis-a-vis the 
minimal competition that remained). It is also worth noting the Commission's observations that the 
impact of that acquisition was not hypothetical but very real. The effect in the circumstances of that 
case was to preclude the possibility of any new competition (in particular from Elopak, which was on 
the verge of trying to enter the market). The Commission also observed that Tetra raised considerably 
or even insurmountably the barriers to entry and that "the effect of blocking or delaying the entry of a 
new competitor is all the more serious in a market such as the present one already dominated by Tetra 
because a new entrant is vinually the only way at the present time in which Tetra's power over the 
market could be challenged". 
Commission Decision of 10 November 1992, BIC/Gillette and Others, OJ. 1993, L 116/21. 
See also the Commission's decision in Tetra Pak II in which the Commission considered that the 
acquisition by Tetra Pak of certain of its competitors could be viewed as part of its predatory strategy 
to eliminate competitors in violation of Article 86 EC (Commission Decision of 18 March 1992, O.J. 
1992, L 72/1). For a summary of the cases which were dealt with, prior to the entry into force of the 
Merger Control Regulation, by the Commission, without leading to a formal decision, under the 
Continental Can doctrine, see Hawk & Huser, European Community Merger Control: A Practitioner's 
Guide, Kluwer Law International, 1996, in particular at chapter XII "Application of Articles 85 and 
86 to structural transactions". 
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in the particular circumstances of the cases concerned which strengthened their 
dominant market position. 35 
In the three above cases, the remedy required to ensure compliance with the 
competition rules was the re-establishment of the market structure in its situation as it 
existed prior to the "abusive structural conduct" of the dominant undertaking 
concerned. In Continental Can, 36 the Commission gave the dominant undertaking a 
period of about six months to make proposals to the Commission to put an end to the 
infringement. The Commission· explained that this time period was proper given the 
nature of the measures which needed to be taken. These measures, although this is not 
explicitly stated in the decision, should have been the divestiture of the undertaking 
which Continental Can had acquired. In Tetra Pak I, the Commission considered that 
the abuse was eliminated at the time that Tetra Pak renounced the exclusivity of the 
license. 37 Thus, the remedy was not the divestiture of the company which had been 
acquired by Tetra Pak, and which was the beneficiary of the license, nor was it the full 
cancellation of the license but rather the elimination of the element of exclusivity which 
was contained in the license agreement. In Gillette, the Commission obliged Gillette 
to withdraw, within a given period of time, 38 the structural links which it had 
established, in contradiction with Article 86 EC, with one of its competitors. 
(iv) Conclusions 
The overview of the various types of abuses which have already been referred 
to in the case law and an analysis of the existing cases and decisions leads to the 
conclusion that in all the cases so far dealt with by the European Commission and the 
European Courts, involving the application of Article 86 to individual undertakings, 
the assessment under the competition rules related each time to a specific conduct of 
the dominant undertaking. The notion of "conduct" has however been interpreted in 
a broad manner and consisted either of a positive action (for example, the granting of 
fidelity rebates or the implementation of predatory pricing), a negative action (for 
35 
36 
37 
38 
It may be noted that the issue of strengthening of a dominant position was not directly at issue in the 
appeal lodged against the Commission decision in Tetra Pak I since the Court considered that the appeal 
was only based on the point of law as to whether or not the applicability of an exemption to an . 
agreement excludes the applicability of Article 86 EC (see para. 13). The Court of First Instance did 
however refer to the judgment in Continental Can (see para. 22) and it confirmed that the Commission 
had been right in considering that in the specific circumstances of the case the acquisition of the 
exclusive license was incompatible with Article 86 EC: "The specific context to which the Commission 
had refe"ed was expressly characterized as being the fact that acquisition of the exclusivity of the 
license not only strengthened Tetra's very considerable dominance but also had the effect of preventing, 
or at the very least considerably delaying, the entry of a new competitor into a market where very little 
if any competition is found" (see para. 23). 
Commission Decision of 9 December 1971, Continental Can Company, O.J. 1972, L 7/25. 
Commission Decision, cited above, at paras. 27 and 45. 
The specific time period concerned is not specified in the public version of the Commission decision. 
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example, a refusal to supply, a refusal to license or a refusal to provide access) or a 
failure to act (for example, not reacting on a given market demand or the failure to 
develop new technologies and to implement technological innovations39). In each of 
the cases, there was at least a reference or references to actual evidence of the fact that 
there had been an actual abusive conduct. 40 
It is arguable that the Court of Justice has never been asked directly the question 
whether there are any circumstances in which there would be no need to bring 
evidence of an actual abusive conduct in order to impose a remedy to ensure 
compliance with Article 86 EC. This question is examined, from a theoretical 
perspective, in the following Section in the light of the case law of the Court of Justice 
on the combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC in which it developed and used 
a concept of "automatic abuse" of a dominant position. This latter concept has been 
applied by the Commission in its Article 90 directives in the telecommunications 
sector. 41 
I.A.2 Application of Article 86 EC to "structural" market situations involving 
Member State legislation 
When conSidering, under the EC competition rules, a situation in which an 
undertaking holds a do~ble monopoly or a double dominant position, it is necessary 
to examine the doctrine of the "automatic abuse of a dominant position" established hy 
the Court of Justice in a series of cases involving the combination of Articles 90 and 
86 EC (as well as the combination of Article 90 with the Treaty provisions on free 
movement, as will be discussed further below). 42 It is this doctrine which is also one 
of the principal legal ba_ses underlying the liberalization directives adopted by the 
Commi~sion pursuant to Article 90(3) EC in the telecommunications sector. 43 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
With regard to the latter types of abuses, it may be noted that they have so far mainly be used in the 
context of cases on the combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC. 
In cases under the procedure for preliminary rulings pursuant to Article 177 EC, the national court was 
entrusted with the task of verifying whether there had been such actual abusive conduct. 
The Commission's assessment of concentrations under the Merger Control Regulation is also forward 
looking and preventive in nature and also includes assessments of markets which do not yet exist. E.g. 
Commission Decision of 17 July 1996, Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, Case No. IV/M.737 (not yet published). 
See, in particular, the cases cited below. 
See the discussion below in Section I. B below. We just recall here the findings set out in recital 18 to 
the Cable TV Directive in which it is stated that "[w]here Member States grant to the same undertaking 
the right to establish both cable TV and telecommunications networks, they put the undertaking in a 
situation whereby it has no incentive to attract users to the network best suited to the provision of the 
relevant service, as long as it has spare capacity on the other network. In that case, the undertaking 
has, on the contrary, an interest for overcharging for use of the cable infrastructure for the provision 
of non-reserved services, in order to increase the traffic on their telecommunications networks. [. .. }". 
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The purpose of this background study is clearly not to give a detailed and 
exhaustive examination of the case law on "automatic abuse" which has already given 
rise to extensive legal writing. 44 Rather, the discussion below will focus, on the one 
hand, on the specific results achieved by that case law (in particular, whether or not 
that case law has resulted in the obligation for undertakings to divest part of their 
activities and/or assets) as well as, on the other hand, on the question as to whether 
or not this case law on automatic abuse which was established by the Court through 
a combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC can be transposed automatically into 
Article 86 EC and applied to undertakings as such, independent of any State 
intervention. Before proceeding in this manner, it is however necessary to give a brief 
overview of the doctrine itself. 
In addition, it is worth noting, in anticipation of the discussion in Section I.A.3, 
that the case law of the Court of Justice on the combined application of Articles 90 and 
86 EC is a typical example of the evolutionary nature of the application of the Treaty 
rules and, in particular, of those on competition. This case law in fact illustrates well 
how the Court, through a gradual evolution, 45 has been willing to stretch, albeit not 
without any limits,46 the interpretation of the Treaty rules in order to achieve the 
goals of the Treaty and to allow the full implementation of the instruments set out in 
the Treaty to achieve those goals. Furthermore, it can. be noted that the primary 
content and effect of this gradually developing case law was precisely in the area of 
the liberalization of the markets through the challenging of structural barriers to market 
entry consisting of State regulation. 
I.A.2.1 Doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse" and "unlawful extensions of 
dominant positions" 
As indicated above, the doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse" has been 
constructed by. the Court of Justice on the ~ombined interpretation and application of 
Articles 90 and 86 EC. Article 90( 1) EC provides that "[i]n the case of public 
undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive 
rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary 
44 
45 
46 
See, in particular, the reference below in the Section on the Commission's powers under Article 90(3). 
See, in particular, the evolution from Sacchi (Case 155173, [1974] ECR 409, in particular at para. 14), 
in which the extension of a dominant position through State regulation was considered as not contrary 
to the Treaty, to GB-INNO-BM (cited and discussed below) where an extension of a dominant position 
was considered as incompatible with the EC Treaty (in particular, the combined application of Articles 
90 and 86 EC). See also the evolution towards the judgment in Corbeau (referred to below) where the 
Court focused almost immediately on the justifications of the monopoly without going into the detailed 
analysis of the question as to why the monopoly could be considered as contrary to the Treaty rules in 
the absence of such a justification (in particular, under Article 90(2) EC). 
See, in particular, the judgments in Meng (Case C-2/91, [1993] ECR 1-5751), Reiff (Case C-185/91, 
[1993] ECR 1-5801) and Ohra Schadeverzekeringen (Case C-245/91, [1993] ECR 1-5851) which relate 
also to the extended application of Articles 85 and 86 EC to Member State regulations through a 
combination of these provisions with Articles 3(g) and 5 of the Treaty. 
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to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 
6 and Articles 85 to 94. ". 47 In addition, it needs to be observed that several of the· 
cases (and, consequently, the results which they achieve) which are referred to below 
are not only based on the competition rules but also on the Treaty rules on free 
movement (in particular, Article 30 on the free movement of goods48 and Article 59 
on the free movement of services49). In fact, in several of those judgments it is not 
entirely clear whether the Court's judgment was based more on the arguments under 
the competition law provisions of the Treaty or on the rules on free movement of 
goods and/ or serv""ices. 
The basic rules which have been developed through the case law on the 
combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC are the following. Firstly, the Court 
confirmed that the mere creation of a dominant position by the granting of an e~clusive 
right within the meaning of Article 90( 1) EC is not as such incompatible with Article 
86 of the Treaty. 50 However, secondly, a Member State will infringe Article 90 in 
combination with Article 86 EC if it places, through the granting of exclusive rights, 
an undertaking (namely,- the undertakings which fall within the categories of 
undertakings covered by Article 90( 1) EC) in a position so that the undertaking, 
merely by exercising the exclusive rights granted to it, cannot avoid abusing its 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Article 90(2) EC provides that "Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules 
contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such 
rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks .assigned to them. The 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the 
Community". Article 90(3) EC provides that "The Commission shall ensure the application of the 
provisions of this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to 
Member States." For a further discussion of Article 90(3) EC, see Section I.B below. 
See, in particular, the judgment in Terminal Equipment Directive (Case C-202/88, France v. 
Commission, [1991] ECR 1-1223). Furthermore, elements of Article 37 EC, the provision on the 
adjustment of monopolies of a commercial character, have also been used in the said case law. 
See, in particular, the judgment in Telecommunications Services Directive, (Joined Cases C-271/90, 
C-281/90 and C-289/90, Spain and Others v. Commission, [1992] ECR 1-5883) and inERT (Case C-
260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE), [1991] ECR 1-2925). 
In fact, this principle had already been confirmed by the Court of Justice in its early case law on the 
interpretation and application of Article 86 EC, including the judgment in Sacchi in which the Court 
already considered that "[t]he interpretation of Articles 86 and 90 taken together leads to the conclusion 
that the fact that an undertaking to which a Member State grants exclusive rights has a monopoly is not 
as such incompatible with Article 86" (Case 155173, Giuseppe Sacchi, [1974] ECR 409, at para. 14). 
The principle has then been confirmed by the Court in a consistent manner. 
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dominant position51 , or when such rights are liable to create a situation in which that 
undertaking is induced to commit such abuses 52• 
The precise content of the tests spelled out by the Court for determining whether 
or not there is an "automatic abuse" is not entirely clear and there remains therefore 
doubt as to what factors make it possible to distinguish a situation necessarily leading 
an undertaking or inducing an undertaking to abuse its dominant position from a 
situation, on the other hand, which does not have such an effect. Nor do the judgments 
referred to above specify whether it is sufficient to find that a given situation is 
potentially one leading to abuse or on the contrary whether it must be ascertained in 
every case that a given abuse has actually been committed. 53 The Court of Justice did 
however specify, on at least one occasion, that the joint application of Articles 90 and 
86 EC can only be triggered if the "automatic abuse" is the "direct consequence" of 
the national law concerned. 54 The latter point is further discussed below. 
The European Commission has also used the doctrine of "automatic/necessary 
abuse" as an important basis for the liberalization directives in the telecommunications 
sector. Several references to the doctrine can be found in the recitals to the said 
liberalization directives. 55 In particular, recital 11 to the Cable Television Directive 
summarizes the dO'ctrin~ by indicating that "[t]he mere creation of a dominant position 
within a given market is not, as such, incompatible with Article 86. A Member State 
is, however, not allowed to maintain a legal monopoly where the relevant undertaking 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
This test was developed by the Court of Justice in Hafner and Elser (Case C-41190, Klaus Hbfner and 
Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, [1991] ECR 1-1979, at para. 27) and repeated thereafter by the Coun 
in various other judgments including, in particular, Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova (Ca!.e C-
179/90, [1991] ECR 1-5889, at para. 17), Societe Civile Agricole du Centre d'Insemination de Ia 
Crespelle (Case C-323/93, [1994] ECR 1-5077, at para. 18) and Banchero (Case C-387/93, [1995] ECR 
1-4663, at para. 51). 
Test developed by the Court of Justice in ERT (cited above, at para. 37) and repeated thereafter in 
several judgments including Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova (cited above, at para. 17). 
See in this respect the Opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro in Paul Corbeau (Case C-320/91, [ 1993] 
ECR 1-2533, at para. 11). See also footnote 12 in the said Opinion in which the Advocate-General 
refers to the different interpretations which have been given to the judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Porto di Genova, cited above, by the Italian Courts which had to apply the Court's ruling to the specific 
facts of the cases pending with them. On this question, see also the discussion below on GB-INNO-BM. 
See, in particular, Societe Civile Agricole du Centre d'Insemination de la Crespelle (cited above, at 
para. 20). In that case, the Court considered that the alleged abuse (which consisted of the charging of 
excessively high fees by insemination centres which had been entrusted by State regulation with local 
legal monopolies) was not a direct consequence of the national law (which merely allowed the 
insemination centres to require breeders who request the centres to provide them with semen from other 
production centres to the additional costs entailed by that choice, without compelling them to do so) and 
that, therefore, the combined application of Articles 86 and 90 EC was not triggered. 
See also the discussion in Section I.B below. 
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is compelled or induced to abuse its dominant position in a way that is liable to affect . 
trade between Member States" .56 
In addition to the doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse", mention must also 
be made of the doctrine on the "extension of a dominant position" by way of a State 
measure. The case law on the illegal "extension of a dominant position" under the 
combination of Articles 90 and 86 EC has in fact been developed in parallel with and 
in addition to the.._case law on "automatic/necessary abuse". The judgment in GB-
INNO-BM, which is directly concerned with the telecommunications sector,57 has a 
central place in this context and merits a more detailed attention since it contains a 
number of passages which may shed light on the Court's approach to the application 
of the competition rules to sectors which are in the process of being liberalized. In 
addition, GB-INNO-BM is also one of the cases in which a requirement was 
established to remove certain activities from a dominant undertaking. 
GB-INNO-BM related to questions which had been referred to the Court by a 
national court in order to allow the latter to assess the compatibility with EC law of 
certain national rules. These rules gave the public undertaking which was responsible, 
subject to the authority of the Minister, for the establishment and operation of the 
public telephone network, and which sold telephone equipment, the power to grant 
type-approval to telephone equipment which it did not supply itself with a view to the 
connection of that equipment to the telephone network (over which the undertaking 
held a monopoly). 58 After referring to the judgment in Telemarketing59, the Court 
considered _that under Article 90, Member States must not put public undertakings and 
undertakings· to· which they grant special or exclusive rights in a position which the 
said undertakings could not themselves attain by their own conduct without infringing 
Article 8p. Accordingly, it concluded that where the extension of the dominant position 
56 
57 
58 
59 
In recitals 12 and 13 to the Cable Television Directive it is then stated that the (abusively) high prices 
in the Community for the provision of high-capacity infrastructure (in particular, for leased lines) are 
a "direct consequence" of the restrictions imposed by Member States on the use of infrastructures other 
than those of the telecommunications organizations, and in particular of· those of the cable TV 
operators, for the provision of telecommunications services. This is then used as one of the arguments 
for justifying the obligation specified in the Directive that the restrictions on the use of cable TV 
infrastructure should be abolished for the provision of non-reserved services. 
Case C-18/88, Regie des Telegraphes et des Telephones (RTT) and GB-Inno-BM SA, [1991] ECR 1-
5941. Certain of the issues dealt with in GB-INNO-BM are also identical to questions which were 
raised in the judgment in Terminal Equipment Directive (cited above). 
In fact, the questions referred to the Court of Justice related to the Belgian regulatory framework which 
put the RTT, the Belgian TO, in a situation of being both "judge and party" in the economic activities 
concerned. 
In Telemarketing, cited above, the Court had held that an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 is 
committed where, without any objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position in a 
particular market reserves to itself an ancillary activity which might be carried out by another 
undertaking as part of its activities on a neighbouring but separate market, with the possibility of 
eliminating all competition from such undertaking. 
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of a public undertaking, or an undertaking to which the State has granted special or 
exclusive rights, results from a State measure, such· a measure constitutes an 
infringement of Article 90 in conjunction with Article 86 of the Treaty. 
In the judgment, the Court also rejected the argument that the provisions of 
Articles 90 and 86 could not apply since there was no indication of the fact that an 
abuse had actually taken place. It also rejected the argument that the mere possibility 
of discriminatory application of those provisions (by reason of the fact that the R TT 
was designated as the authority for granting approval and was competing with the 
undertakings that apply for approval) could not in itself amount to an abuse within the 
meaning of Article 86. 60 In fact, the Court considered that "it is the extension of the 
monopoly in the establishment and operation of the telephone network to the market 
in telephone equipment, without any objective justification, which is prohibited as such 
by Article 86, or by Article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 86, where that extension 
results from a measure adopted by a State. As competition may not be eliminated in 
that manner, it may not be distorted either. A system ofundistorted competition. as laid 
down in the Treaty. can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as 
between the various economic operators. To entrust an undertaking which markets 
terminal equipment with the task of drawing up the specifications for such equipment, 
monitoring their- application and granting type-approval in respect thereof is 
tantamount to conferring upon it the power to determine at will which terminal 
equipment may be connected to the public network, and thereby placing that 
undertaking at an obvious advantage over its competitors" 61 (emphasis added). 
I.A.2.2 Has the doctrine on "automatic/necessary abuse" and "extension of 
dominant position" resulted in obligations for dominant undertakings to 
divest or separate certain of their powers. activities and/or assets? 
The answer to the question raised in the above title is clearly positive. 
However, a close analysis of the case law makes clear that the obligation (on the basis 
of the application of the competition rules and/or the rules on free movement) to 
remove certain activities from a dominant undertaking (because otherwise it would 
automatically abuse of its position or because its dominant position would be 
unlawfully extended) has so far been applied only in limited circumstances. 
The clearest case on this point is GB-INNO-BM in which the Court considered 
in very clear terms that "the maintenance of effective competition and the guaranteeing 
of transparency require that the drawing up of technical specifications, the monitoring 
of their application, and the granting of type-approval must be carried out by a body 
which is independent of public or private undertakings offering competing goods or 
60 GB-INNO-BM, at para. 23. 
61 GB-INNO-BM, at para. 18. 
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services in the telecommunications sector" .62 Thus, the Court made it clear that any 
"regulatory" powers which had been entrusted to the public undertaking and which 
could be used to "regulate market entry" had to be taken away from that undertaking, 
since otherwise a situation would exist infringing Article 90(1) in conjunction with 
Article 86 EC. In other words, the Court considered that an undertaking cannot 
possess the power to regulate the competitive process in which it itself participates and 
that power, at least if it is a power granted by the State, needs to be taken away. It is 
this principle which has also been applied by the Commission in the Terminal 
Equipment Directive (creation of an independent regulator)63 , the Telecommunications 
Services Directive (creation of an independent regulator)64 and the Full Competition 
Directive (allocation of numbers )65 • 66 
In the other cases involving the combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC 
to "automatic/necessary abuses" and "extensions of dominant positions", the end-result 
of the application of the Treaty rules (in particular, those on competition) was not the 
divestiture or removal of any activities and/or assets by the dominant undertaking. 
Rather, these cases resulted in the condemnation of the State regulations which 
provided for a legal monopoly and, therefore, created, strengthened or extended a 
dominant position contrary to the competition rules. Those legal monopolies needed 
to be abolished since they created a fundamental (artificial) obstacle to the freedom of 
competition and market development and growth. In addition, in each case it was each 
time verified whether or not there was an objective justification for the situation 
concerned which could have put the competition rules out of play on the basis of 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Judgment at para. 26 in which the Court also referred to its judgment in Telecommunications 
Equipment Directive (cited above, reference in particular to para. 52). See also Case C-91194, 
Tranchant, [1995] ECR 1-3911, in which the Court of Justice stated, at para. 19, that this requirement 
of independence "seeks to eliminate any risk of a conflict of interests between, on the one hand, the 
regulatory authority responsible for drawing up the technical specifications, monitoring their application 
and granting type-approval and, on the other hand, undertakings offering goods or services in the 
telecommunications sector." 
See Article 6 and recital 17 of the Terminal Equipment Directive. 
See Article 7 and recital 29 of the Telecommunications Services Directive. 
See recital 11 to the Full Competition Directive where it is indicated that "[n]ewly authorized voice 
telephony providers will be able to compete effectively with the current telecommunications organizations 
only if they are granted adequate numbers to allocate to their customers. Moreover, where numbers are 
allocated by the current telecommunications organizations, the latter will be induced to reserve the best 
numbers for themselves and to give their competitors insufficient numbers or numbers which are 
commercially less attractive, for example, because of their length. By maintaining such power in the 
hands of their telecommunications organizations Member States would therefore induce the former to 
abuse their power on the market for voice telephony and infringe Article 90 of the Treaty, in conjunction 
with Article 86." See also point 3.4 of the Full Competition Directive. 
For a further discussion of these directives and the way in which they have made use of the combined 
application of Articles 90 and 86 EC, see Section I.B below. 
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Article 90(2) EC. 67 Also, in certain other cases, the State measures which were in 
violation of Article 90 in conjunction with Article 86 needed to be withdrawn, 
amended or eliminated so that the illegal situation would be eliminated. 68 
The above principles may be illustrated by a number of Court judgments as well 
as by the Commission's telecommunications liberalization directives: 
67 
68 
69 
70 
In Hafner, 69 it was concluded that the undertaking entrusted with a legal 
monopoly for the carrying out of recruitment activities could not exercise 
its exclusive rights and could not prevent other undertakings from 
engaging in executive recruitment activities since the undertaking in the 
dominant position was manifestly not (owing to the lack of resources 
which the State had provided to it) in a position to satisfy the demand 
prevailing on the market for activities of that kind. Thus, the recruitment 
office was not compelled to leave the market for executive recruitment 
activities, it was merely precluded from using its exclusive rights against 
other undertakings which became active on that market and, 
consequently, the application of the Treaty rules resulted in the 
condemnation of the State measures which had created an illegal situation 
of monopoly. 70 
See, in particular, the judgment in Paul Corbeau (cited above) in which the Court provided guidance 
as to the circumstances in which the extension of the dominant position of the postal services 
~dertaking could be extended from the basic postal services into other activities of value-added postal 
services. 
See, in this respect, the Court judgment in Corsica Ferries (Case C-18/93, Corsica Ferries Italia sri v. 
Como dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, [1994] ECR 1-1783) in' which the Court held that the approval 
by State authorities of discriminatory tariffs for piloting services carried out by a legal monopoly 
infringed Article 90 in conjunction with Article 86. In particular, the Court had considered in this case 
that a Member State infringes the prohibitions in Articles 90 and 86 EC "if, by approving the tariffs 
adopted by the undertaking, it induces it to abuse its dominant position inter alia by applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with its trading partners, within the meaning of Article 86(c) of the 
Treaty". 
For another illustration, see also the Commission decisions regarding the license fees applied to the 
second GSM operators in Italy and Spain: Commission Decision of 4 October 1995 concerning the 
conditions imposed on the second operator of GSM radiotelephony services in Italy, 0 .J. 1995, L 
280/49; and Commission Decision of 18 December 1996 concerning the conditions imposed on the 
second operator of GSM radiotelephony services in Spain, O.J. 1997, L 76/19. 
Cited above. 
It may be questioned whether the Court's judgment in HOfner did not in fact leave room to the Member 
State concerned for ensuring that the dominant undertaking was given sufficient means to meet the 
market demand. On the basis of the reasoning and test followed by the Court in the case concerned, 
there should have indeed not been an infringement of Articles 90 and 86 if the dominant undertaking 
held the necessary means to meet all market demand in a satisfactory manner. 
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The judgment in ERT71 is most illustrative of the principles outlined 
above. The case concerned a Greek radio and television undertaking 
which was granted an exclusive franchise comprising both the right to 
broadcast its own programmes ("broadcast") and the right to receive and 
retransmit programmes from other Member States ("retransmission"). 
Although the Court referred the practical application of the Treaty rules 
as interpreted by the Court to the national court which had referred the 
questions to the Community Court, it did observe that the concentration 
of the monopolies to broadcast and retransmit in the hands of a single 
undertaking may lead that undertaking to -favour its own programmes to 
the detriment of foreign programmes and would lead to a situation in 
which the equality of opportunities for the undertakings would not be 
guaranteed.72 Under, the test of "automatic abuse", this was then 
expressed as meaning that Article 90( 1) of the Treaty prohibits the 
granting of an exclusive right to retransmit television broadcasts to an 
undertaking which has an exclusive right to transmit broadcasts, where 
those rights are liable to create a situation in which that undertaking is 
led to infringe Article 86 of the Treaty by virtue of a discriminatory 
broadcasting policy which favours its own rights. 73 
The Court did not indicate that if there would indeed be such a situation 
of fact, the undertaking concerned should be compelled to stop its 
activity of retransmission. Rather, it was implied that the exclusive right 
for retransmission could no longer be entrusted to the dominant 
undertaking holding the broadcasting rights. Thus, the exclusive right 
could no longer be invoked and enforced against another undertaking 
which had already started activities of retransmission in violation of the 
State regulation providing for the exclusive transmission right. 74 
It is also this reasoning which has been followed by the Commission in 
the liberalization directives in the telecommunications services sector. 75 
On the one hand, as indicated above, these directives obliged the 
Cited above. 
The Court's reasoning was based both on the Treaty rules on the free movement of services and on the 
EC competition rules. 
ERT, at para. 37. 
In his Opinion in ERT, Advocate-General Lenz touched very briefly upon the question of the "structural 
separation" of the two activities of broadcasting and retransmission. In fact in a puzzling statement, he 
indicated that it may be "accepted that the best means to ensure that there is no such danger [of 
discrimination against foreign broadcasts] is to separate the areas covered by the monopoly, that is to 
say, to abolish the retransmission monopoly." (Opinion of the Advocate-General, at para. 17). 
For a more detailed discussion of the Article 90(3) directives adopted by the Commission in the 
telecommunications sector, see Section I. B below. 
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Member States to take away from the monopolistic and dominant 
operators certain regulatory powers which they exercised. On the other 
hand, the directives considered that the extension of the exclusive rights 
for and the dominant positions over basic (voice) telephony services to 
other activities including non-reserved services was contrary to Article 
90 in conjunction with Article 86 EC. The remedy imposed to ensure 
that this illegal situation would be eliminated was not to make the 
dominant undertakings leave the market for non-reserved services but 
rather to abolish the existing special and exclusive rights for the 
provision of such non-reserved services. 
The results achieved by the case law on the combined application of Articles 90 
and 86 EC show clearly some similarities with the case law on exclusionary abtlses and 
extensions of dominant positions under Article 86 EC. In particular, in cases such as 
Telemarketing and Commercial Solvents/6 the undertakings which were considered 
to be dominant in one market (namely, in a market for upstream services such as the 
television advertisement in Telemarketing or the upstream supply for raw materials 
such as in Commercial Solvents) were not prevented, on the basis of the competition 
rules, from entering into or being active in a downstream or in a neighbouring market. 
Rather, the abuses which needed to be eliminated in those cases consisted of the fact 
that the undertakings abused their dominant position in the first market by not 
confining themselves to participating in the second market but simultaneously 
attempting (by means of their conduct which consisted of refusals to supply in the first 
market) to eliminate the competition of those active in the second market. Therefore, 
the conduct.which excluded competition in the second markets had to be eliminated. 
This is comparable to the situation in the cases on the combined application of Articles 
90 and 86 in which the legal barrier to entry into secondary or neigbouring markets, 
which excluded competition in such secondary markets and for which there was no 
objective justification, had to be abolished in order to ensure equality of opportunities. 
It may also be observed that in all the cases which have so far been dealt with 
in the case law on the combined applica~on of Articles 90 and 86 EC there was little 
or no doubt about the fact that the abolition of the monopoly rights was sufficient to 
introduce a certain degree of competition into the market. The facts of the cases 
concerned in fact demonstrate that most of the judgments of the court concerned 
situations in which certain undertakings had already started to carry out certain 
activities in competition with the dominant undertaking notwithstanding the fact that 
there was still a State measure which precluded them, as a matter of national law, to 
do so. Thus, the Court only had to deal with the question as to whether or not the 
national law could be enforced against the competitor concerned taking into account 
its possible violation of EC law. The answer given by the Court, namely that the 
national monopoly/exclusive rights were prohibited by EC law in the circumstances 
76 Both cited and discussed above. 
\0603-00S.DVL [030] 
27 Strictly Confidential 
concerned, provided in this context a sufficient answer to the questions which had been 
raised with the Court. · 
I.A.2.3 Transposing the doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse" into Article 86 
EC and its application to "dominant undertakings" 
As has been indicated above, the doctrine on "extension of dominant 
position" has been applied at several instances in pure Article 86 cases. Therefore, 
there is no doubt as to the fact that there is indeed a possibility of applying Article 86 
to undertakings in a situation in which, through their conduct, they extend (or 
strengthen) their dominant position in an unlawful manner. As also indicated above, 
there remains some doubt as to what needs to be understood by the terms "unlawful 
manner" used in the previous sentence and as to the precise circumstances in which 
this test will be met. 
Furthermore, the parallel between the doctrine on "extension of dominant 
position" under Article 86 EC, as applied to individual undertakings, and under the 
combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC is also illustrated by the Court's 
reasoning in GB-INNO-BM in which the Court considered that "Member States must 
not [. . .] put public undertakings and undertakings to which they grant special or 
exclusive rights in a position which the said undertakings could not themselves attain 
by their own conduct without infringing Article 86" (emphasis added)77 • 
The question as to whether or not the doctrine on "automatic/necessary abuse 
of a dominant position" can be automatically transposed into Article 86 EC is much 
more complex and it is submitted that the case law does not provide direct and full 
guidance on this point and could leave room for further action by the Commission. 
First, it should be considered that, as a general principle, Article 90(1) of the 
Treaty is only a reference rule ("norme de renvoi") which, in itself, does not contain 
additional obligations of substance other than those which are set. out in the other 
Treaty provisions. On the other hand, there is at least one important difference 
between the application.of Article 86 as a stand-alone provision and the application of 
Article 86 in conjunction with Article 90 EC. Namely, Article 86 is applicable to 
individual undertakings whereas the combined application of Articles 90 and 86 is 
applicable to the Member States. This is borne out by the wording of Article 90(1) EC 
which prohibits Member States to enact or to maintain in force measures which are 
contrary to the Treaty rules in respect of public undertakings and undertakings which 
are entrusted with special or exclusive rights. 
Second, there remains some doubt as to the precise conditions in which the 
doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse" applies under Article 90 in conjunction with 
Article 86. In particular, it remains unclear whether the doctrine can be applied on the 
77 GB-INNO-BM, cited above, at para. 20. 
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basis of assumptions that there will be an abuse or whether it applies only where an 
abuse has actually been committed. 78 In this respect, the judgment in Centre 
d'Insemination de la Crespelle79 appears to indicate that the doctrine only applies in 
cases where the abuse is a "direct consequence" of the State measure concerned. The -.. 
introduction of this rule in the case law may be a consequence of the observations of 
Advocate-General Gulman in that case since in his Opinion he had indicated that the 
risk of an abuse is not sufficient to trigger the application of Articles 90 and 86 EC. 80 
If this interpretation is correct, this could mean that the doctrine only applies if the 
State measure concerned does not leave the (dominant) undertaking concerned any 
discretionary margin for ensuring that its conduct will be in compliance with the 
competition rules but that whatever it may do it will necessarily abuse its dominant 
position. The above considerations may also be one of the reasons why the Court did 
not use in GB-INNO-BM the doctrine of the "automatic abuse" (based on the premise 
that the State measures would put the undertaking in a situation in which the latter 
would be induced to abuse its dominant position) but the doctrine of the "extension of 
a dominant position" since entrusting an undertaking with certain regulatory powers 
does not directly and necessarily mean that the undertaking will abuse such powers. 81 
Notwithstanding the above, it can be argued that the doctrine on 
"automatic/necessary abuse" should not be interpreted too narrowly (in particular, by 
giving too much weight to the criterion of "direct consequence" used in part of the 
case law). In particular, if the above reasoning is followed, this would mean that the 
application of the doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse" is now limited to one of the 
two tests which had been developed by the Court of Justice. The doctrine would then 
in fact be limited to the test developed in Hafner in which the undertaking cannot 
avoid abusing its dominant position (by merely exercising its exclusive rights),82 and 
the less severe test of Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova when the exclusive rights 
are liable to create a situation in which the undertaking is (only) induced (but not 
"compelled") to commit such abuses would have been implicitly overruled and 
78 
79 
80 
81 
See the discussion above. 
Cited above. 
Centre d'Insemination de la Crespelle, cited above, Opinion of Advocate-General Gulman, at para. 43. 
In GB-INNO-BM, this point was also partly addressed by the RTT which had emphasized that the order 
for reference which had been made by the national court did not state that any abuse had actually been 
committed and that the mere possibility of discriminatory conduct by reason of the fact that the RTT 
was designated as the authority for granting type approval and was competing with the undertakings that 
applied for such approval could not in itself amount to an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 of 
the EEC Treaty; GB-INNO-BM, cited above, at para. 23. 
Such a test would be difficult to apply to an individual undertaking since it is virtually impossible to 
think of any circumstances in which such undertaking would not be in a position to adjust its conduct 
so that it does not act in a manner which is contrary to Article 86 EC. 
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repealed by the Court. 83 There is no direct and explicit support in the case law for 
the latter conclusion and the Court did refer to the two alternative tests on several 
occasions. 84 
If the test of Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova was deliberately overruled 
in Centre d'lnsemination de la Crespelle, then it could be thought (see also the 
discussion above) that this had already been prepared in GB-INNO-BM in which the 
Court did not follow the doctrine of "inducement to abuse" but the doctrine of 
"extension of a dominant position". This seems however difficult to accept since there 
were only three days between the judgment in Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova 
and that in GB-INNO-BM. 85 In addition, it can also be argued that, in fact, in GB-
INNO-BM the Court applied itself the test of the automatic abuse in a situation in 
which the undertaking was clearly not "compelled to abuse its dominant position" and 
in a situation where there was arguably freedom for the undertaking to behave in a 
manner compatible with Article 86 (for example, by exercising its regulatory powers 
in an entirely objective, fair and non-discriminatory manner). The Court in fact did not 
invite the national court concerned to verify whether or not there had actually been an 
abuse or whether or not there had been, on the facts of the case, an extension of a 
dominant position. Rather, it declared the situation of fact as reported by the national 
court to be contrary to Articles 3(f), 90 and 86 of the Treaty. 86 Thus, the Court must 
have assumed that there would have been an extension of the dominant position as a 
likely, and possibly direct, consequence of the fact that the undertaking concerned had 
been entrusted with a regulatory power regarding its own activities and those of its 
competitors on the equipment market. 87 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
Both cases cited above. 
Admittedly, in the more recent judgments the Court referred to only one test which is the test based 
on Hofner in which the undertaking cannot avoid abusing its dominant position (see, in particular, Case 
C-387/93, Banchero, [1995] ECR I-4663, at para. 51). However, see also Corsica Ferries in which the 
Court referred to the test on "inducement to abuse a dominant position" in a situation in which a 
Member State had "cooperated" with an abuse of a dominant position by approving a discriminatory 
tariff scheme (cited above, at para. 43). 
' 
The judgment in Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova was given on 10 December 1991 (Court 
composed of 11 judges) and that in GB-INNO-BM on 13 December 1991 (Court composed of 5 
judges). 
In the holding of the judgment, the Court indeed ruled that "Articles 3if), 90 and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
preclude a Member State from granting to the undertaking which operates the public telecommunications 
network the power to lay down standards for telephone equipment and to check that economic operators 
meet those standards when it is itself competing with those operators on the market for that equipment". 
Admittedly, importance may need to be given to the fact that the Court's judgment in GB-INNO-BM 
is not exclusively based on the doctrine of "extension of a dominant position". In fact, after having 
referred to the doctrine on extension of a dominant position both under Article 86 and under the 
combined application of Articles 90 and 86, the Court went on to state that as competition may not be 
eliminated through such an extension of a dominant position, it may also not be distorted either. 
Thereafter, it repeated the language which it had used in its judgment in Terminal Equipment Directive: 
"A system ofundistorted competition, as laid down in the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of 
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A parallel may also be made with another line of case law which is based on 
the combination of Articles 3(g), 5 and 85 and/or 86 EC and which is based on the 
same principles as the case law on the combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC. 
The Court has consistently held that the Member States could not deprive the .. 
competition rules of their practical effect and effectiveness since otherwise they would 
be infringing the aforementioned Treaty rules. 88 In this line of cases, the Court has 
consistently held that such a situation would not only occur where a Member State has 
required an undertaking or undertakings to act in a manner contrary to the competition 
rules but also where a Member State has favoured or encouraged behaviour in restraint 
of competition and incompatible with the competition. rules. This reasoning arguably 
confirms that the rules developed by the Court can apply not only where the conduct 
of the undertaking is the direct consequence of the State action but also in certain 
circumstances in which the undertaking concerned still has some possibility to "adjust" 
its market behaviour in order to ensure that it is in compliance with the constraints 
imposed by the competition rules. 
The above leads us to conclude that it is not excluded by the existing case law 
for the Commission to apply to individual undertakings the doctrine on 
"automatic/necessary abuse" under Article 86 EC. However, doing so would clearly 
constitute a novel-deve~opment in EC competition law. In addition, it is submitted that 
such a case should be co~tructed in a careful manner in order to attempt avoiding that 
it would be qualified as incompatible with the basic principle underlying Article 86 that 
what is prohibited is not the dominant position but the abuse of such a position. ""'c 
revert to this question in the Sections below. 
88 
opponunity is secured as between the various economic operators. To entrust an undenaking "-Juch 
markets terminal equipment with the task of drawing up the specifications for such equipment. 
monitoring their application and granting type-approval in respect thereof is tantamount to conferring 
upon it the power to determine at will which terminal equipment may be connected to the public 
network, and thereby placing that undenaking at an obvious advantage over its competitors. [. .. ]In 
those circumstances, the maintenance of effective competition and the guaranteeing of transparency 
require that the drawing up of technical specifications, the monitoring of their application, and the 
granting of type-approval must be carried out by a body which is independent of public or private 
undenakings offering competing goods or services in the telecommunications sector." (GB-INNO-BM, 
cited above, at paras. 25-26). It cannot be excluded that the latter was the principal reason why the 
Court considered that the situation of fact which had been created by the Member State was 
incompatible with the Treaty rules on competition and that the reference to the "extension of a dominant 
position" was only a first step in the reasoning followed by the Court but that the Court did not 
conclude that this condition was met in the specific circumstances of the case. The latter observation 
could find support in the reasoning of the Court in Lagauche (Joined Cases C-46/90 and C-93/91, 
[1993] ECR 1-5267) which was based on the "equality of opportunities" argument and not on the 
"extension of the dominant position" argument. 
See, in particular, Case 13177, INNO v. A tab, [1977] ECR 2115; and Case 82177, Openbaar Ministerie 
v. van Tiggele, [1977] ECR 25. See also Meng, Reiff and Ohra Schadeverzekeringen, cited above. 
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I.A.3 Evolutionary nature of the application of the competition rules 
Both competition law itself and its application have almost by definition an 
evolutionary nature and are very often developed on a case-by-case basis. Within the 
European Community, this is illustrated by the very notable evolutions and 
developments which have taken place throughout the years after the entry into force 
of the EC Treaty both in the content and the scope of the law as well as in its 
interpretation and application. 
Below, the focus is on a number of elements of EC law which are particularly 
relevant to the present study. In addition, in the Sections above, a number of other 
relevant evolutions in the case law have already been highlighted in an implicit 
manner. In particular, the evolution which has taken place in the interpretation and the 
application of the concept of II abuse 11 and in the combined application of Articles 90 
and 86 EC are already good practical examples of the ways in which competition law 
is apt to be adjusted in a flexible manner to new market circumstances and new legal 
and policy questions in which the Commission plays a major role. As a general rule, 
it may be stated that, under the ultimate control and authority of the Court of Justice, 
the interpretation and application of the EC competition rules has gradually been 
extended in order to cover new types of agreements, practices and market 
circumstances. References have already been made· above to the teleological 
interpretation of the Treaty rules which has been used by the Court of Justice in the 
application and the interpretation of the competition rules in order to ensure that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted. 89 
I.A.3.1 Impact of technological changes and other market developments on the 
assessment under EC competition law 
In each case applying the competition rules to specific facts, it is essential 
to take due account of the legal and economic context in which the agreement or 
practice concerned takes place. This automatically implies that changes in market 
circumstances, such as technological or other developments, have a direct impact on 
the analysis under competition law. 
This basic principle may be illustrated by the mechanism of exemptions and 
negative clearances under EC competition law. In particular, exemptions granted under 
Article 85(3) EC are always limited in time and a renewal of an exemption should only 
be granted if the requirements of Article 85(3) continue to be satisfied. 90 In addition, 
an exemption may be revoked where there has been a change in any of the facts which 
were fundamental in the making of the exemption decision. 91 A similar rule applies 
89 See Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty. 
90 See Article 8(1) and (2) of Regulation No 17/62, O.J. 1959-1962, Spec. Ed. 
91 See Article 8(3) of Regulation No 17/62. 
\0603-005. DVL [030] 
32 Strictly Confidential 
to negative clearances under Article 85(1) and Article 86 EC. Such negative clearance 
decisions are limited to the facts in the possession of the Commission and do not 
prejudice the impact which any future market or technological developments may have 
on the assessment made in the negative clearance decision concerned. This confirms 
that in certain market situations certain agreements or practices may be allowed and 
in other market circumstances (for example, after a technological development leading 
to a change in the market structure) are prohibited. 92 Thus, for example, if the 
conditions for exemption are no longer met, undertakings may be required to change 
their market behaviour and to modify their commercial conduct or existing agreements 
on the market. This may also result in certain types of divestitures, for example, where 
the exemption concerned relates to a structural cooperation agreement such as a joint 
venture. 93 
Looking more specifically at the impact of technological developments on the 
assessment under EC competition law and, in particular, under Article 86 EC, it can 
be considered that such developments can affect the undertaking's position in at least 
two different manners: 
92 
93 
First, a technological development (for example, obtaining a patent which 
protects a production process which is far more efficient than existing 
production processes) may directly influence the position of economic strength 
of an undertaking and may, if the conditions therefore are met, put it directly 
or after a short period of time in a dominant position. If this happens, the 
undertaking may have to change its commercial conduct and practices since the 
special responsibility which it will have as· a dominant undertaking may imply 
that practices which would be tolerated when the firm is not dominant could 
become prohibited for the newly dominant undertaking. 
Second, technological developments may have an indirect impact on the market 
position of undertakings through their influence on market definition. In 
particular, technological developments may result in the emergence of new 
markets or in re-defining the scope of existing markets which are converging 
For a practical application, see for example the Commission's assessment of strategic alliances in the 
telecommunications sector where it has been clearly indicated by the Commission that the situation 
needs to be re-examined at regular occasions. For a recent decision in which the Commission made also 
a specific reservation for a possible review of one aspect of the decision see Iridium (Commission 
Decision of 18 December 1996, O.J. 1997, L 16/87) in which the Commission indicated that the 
exclusive rights granted to gateway operator investors could be revisited should the particular 
circumstances of the case change in a substantial manner. The Commission indicated that such a change 
would happen, in particular, should Iridium acquire a dominant position in respect of the actual 
provision of S-PCS services. 
A recent illustrative example for the non-renewal of an exemption and the order of divestiture resulting 
thereof is UIP Pay TV, the joint sales venture between Paramount, MCA and MGM. UIP was granted 
an exemption in 1989 (O.J. 1989, L 226/25); in March 1997, the Commission decided not to renew 
the exemption and requested the parents to dissolve UIP after a period of 18 months following the 
decision (European Commission Press Release of 17 March 1997). 
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or expanding. In each of these cases, it will be necessary for the undertakings 
concerned to re-assess their market position on the newly defined markets and, 
where necessary, to modify their business practices in order to ensure their 
compliance with the constraints imposed by EC competition law. 
The assessment of business practices and regulations under the EC rules and, 
in particular, those on competition may also be influenced by more general 
developments in the economy and society. This may, for example, be illustrated by the 
gradual process 1lf implementation of the liberalization in the telecommunications 
&ector which meant that, in a gradual manner, the possibility of having recourse to the 
exception of the application of the Treaty rules set out in Article 90(2) (in particular, 
to justify exclusive rights) was eliminated. In GB-INNO-BM, the Court referred to 
these developments in a general manner by stating that "fait the present• stage of 
development of the Community. [the monopoly for the establishment and operation of 
the public telecommunications network ... ] constitutes a service of general economic 
interest within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Treaty" (emphasis added)94 . This 
wording clearly illustrates the evolutionary nature of the application of the Treaty 
competition rules as is further confirmed by the directives adopted by the Commission 
in the telecommunications sector which have implemented, based on the interpretation, 
specification and application of the Treaty rules (including those on competition) the 
liberalization process in a gradual manner moving to the full liberalization of the 
markets. The liberalization directives have each time specified the scope, content and 
meaning of the Treaty rules taking into account technological, market, societal and 
political developments. 95 
Technological and market developments may also result in sector specific 
applications of the competition rules and may require the adoption of specific 
instruments and the implementation of measures which are necessary to ensure the 
creation and maintenance of an environment where competition is undistorted and 
where there are equal opportunities for the undertakings concerned. The adoption of 
the Competition Guidelines in the Telecommunications Sector96 and of the recent 
Draft Notice on access agreements in the telecommunications sector97 are good 
illustrations of this principle. The adoption of these non-binding measures was 
necessary to clarify the scope of the competition rules as a necessary instrument for 
ensuring a level playing field in the liberalized telecommunications sector in Europe. 
94 
95 
96 
GB-INNO-BM, cited above, at para. 16. 
For a further discussion of the liberalisation directives in the telecommunications sector, see Section 
I.B below. 
Commission Notice of 6 September 1991, Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in 
the telecommunications sector, O.J. 1991, C 233/2. 
Communication from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector - framework, relevant markets and principles, 
O.J. 1997, C 76/9. 
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Furthermore, Article 87 EC implicitly acknowledges that there may be sector specific 
differences in the application of the EC competition rules. 98 · 
In Part II of this study, we will examine to what extent the above general 
principles can be applied in practice, in the context of Articles 86 and 90, to the 
specific situation which is the subject of this study. 
I.A.3.2 Impact of the changes in the regulatory environment on the assessment 
unde; EC competition law 
As has been indicated above, the analysis under EC competition law must 
always be made in the legal and economic context in which the agreement, practice or 
other situation which is the subject of the analysis takes place. This basic principle of 
EC competition law already confirms that changes in the regulatory framework have 
an impact on the assessment of agreements, practices and situations under EC 
competition law. The above mentioned Competition Guidelines in the 
Telecommunications Sector and the Draft Notice on access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector are typical examples of instruments which have been 
adopted to adjust the interpretation and application of the competition rules to the new 
market situations and structures resulting from changes in the regulatory framework 
which have been brought about by the liberalization programme in the 
telecommunications sector. 
Apa_rt from the general impact which regulatory changes may have on the 
assessment under the competition rules, changes in the regulatory framework may also 
have a more direct impact on the analysis of business practices and conduct under 
Articles 85 and 86 EC. In particular, the Court has recognised that obligations and 
rules set out in EC secondary legislation can be used as interpretative criteria for the 
assessment as to whether or not a certain practice is prohibited under the competition 
rules. 99 Furthermore, the said case law confirms that this rule applies even if the rules 
contained in the secondary legislation are not directly addressed. to the individual 
undertakings but to other entities (in p_articular, the Member States). The above 
principle should also imply that when there are changes in the regulatory framework 
98 
99 
Article 87 EC provides that the Council may adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give 
effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86 and that such measures shall be designed, in 
particular, "to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the scope of the provisions 
of Anicles 85 and 86" (emphasis added). 
See, in particular the judgment in Ahmed Saeed, in which the Court considered that "cenain 
interpretative criteria for assessing [under Anicle 86 EC] whether the rate employed is excessive may 
be inferred from Directive 871601 IEEC, which lays down the criteria to be followed by the aeronautical 
authorities for approving tariffs. lt appears in panicular from Anicle 3 of the directive that tariffs must 
be reasonably related to the long-term fully allocated costs of the air carrier, while taking into account 
the needs of consumers. the need for a satisfactory return on capital. the competitive market situation, 
including the fares of the other air carriers operating on the route, and the need to prevent dumping" 
(cited above, at para. 43). See also the reference to this rule and principle in the Draft Notice on access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector, cited above, at para. 56. and footnote 49. 
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or in the secondary legislation, this will also change the interpretative criteria which 
can be inferred from it for the application of the competition rules. This may then 
mean that a change in the regulatory framework and in secondary legislation can have 
as a direct consequence that a certain practice, agreement or situation which used to 
be permissible becomes prohibited after the entry force of the modification to the 
regulatory framework. 
It is the above case law which may be used as one of the arguments to consider 
that the entry into force of the liberalization directives in the telecommunications 
sector, as well as the entry into force of the harmonisation legislation (in particular, 
the ONP legislation), may have resulted or may result in the appearance of new types 
of abuses. In particular, the liberalization directives contain a number of obligations 
which need to be imposed on certain categories of undertakings active in the 
telecommunications sector through the implementation of the directives in the national 
legal orders of the Member States. Those obligations not only cover practices which 
in a traditional application of the competition rules would be qualified as abusive 
practices (including, for example, a refusal to grant interconnection or the application 
of excessively high or discriminatory interconnection rates) but also contain a number 
of accompanying measures necessary to implement the liberalization in an effective 
manner (including, f~r example, the necessary implementation of systems of 
accounting separation a1_1d cost allocation systems or the compliance with certain 
transparency principles). It could be argued, on the basis of the above mentioned case 
law, that non-compliance by undertakings with the latter category of obligations could 
in itself be considered as an abuse of a dominant position. In addition, such practices 
could be qualified as abusive in an indirect manner by considering that an undertaking 
which does not implement the said obligations (for example, the requirement to 
implement an appropriate cost-allocation system) will not be able to demonstrate that 
its business practices are in compliance with the regulatory framework and, therefore. 
with the competition rules and will result in a situation where it is impossible to verify 
whether the undertaking concerned is complying with the regulatory constraints which 
are applicable to it. 
The impact of regulatory changes on the assessment under the competition rules 
may also be illustrated by the initial versions of the Telecommunications Services 
Directive and the Terminal Equipment Directive. Both these directives contained 
certain provisions which related to changes which were required to be made to 
agreements entered into by telecommunications organizations. 100 In particular, the 
said provisions required the introduction of short notice periods in (long-term) 
customer agreements in order to avoid that the existence of such agreements, entered 
into prior to the liberalization of the markets, would have prevented the introduction 
100 See Article 7 of the Terminal Equipment Directive and Article 8 of the Telecommunications Services 
Directive. 
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of free competitiOn from having a practical effect within a reasonable period. 101 
Notwithstanding the fact that those provisions of the two directives have been annulled 
by the Court of Justice on specific grounds related to the scope of the Commission's 
powers under Article 90(3), 102 it is clearly arguable that the principle for which they 
stood was correct: namely that prior to the entry into force of the liberalization 
directives, long-term supply agreements did not raise specific issues under the 
competition rules since there was simply. no significant competition which could be 
restricted in the markets concerned which were reserved to one undertaking; but that 
after the entry into force of the liberalization those agreements needed to be examined 
in a new context and could raise specific concerns under the competition rules through 
their foreclosure effects on new market entrants. 
The fact that competition law and policy develops gradually, and may over time 
result in different and new results, is also acknowledged in the case law of the Court. 
For example, in Leclerc/ Au Ble Vert, the Court considered that it was apparent "that 
the purely national systems and practices in the book trade have not yet been made 
subject to a Community competition policy with which the Member States would be 
required to comply by virtue of their duty to abstain from any measure which might 
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty. It follows that, as Community 
law stands, Member States' obligations under Article. 5 of the EEC Treaty, in 
conjunction with Articles 3 (f) and 85, are not specific enough to preclude them from 
enacting legislation of ihe type at issue on competition in the retail prices of books, 
provided that such legislation is consonant with the other specific Treaty provisions, 
in particular those concerning the free movement of goods" (emphasis added). 103 The 
observations made by the Court in that case confirm that developments in individual 
competition cases may influence the general scope of the competition rules and the 
obligations imposed on individual· undertakings and Member States. 
I.A.3.3 Evolution in the administrative practice from behavioural solutions to 
structural solutions 
In this Section of the background study, a short summary is made of an 
evolution which may be noted in the administrative practice of the Commission in the 
assessment of cases under the competition rules and, in particular, in the types of 
101 See recital 18 to the Terminal Equipment Directive and recital 31 to the Telecommunications Services 
Directive. 
102 See the judgments in Terminal Equipment Directive and Telecommunications Services Directive, both 
cited above. In both cases, the Court considered that the Commission had not provided sufficient 
reasons indicating that the holders of the special or exclusive rights had been compelled or encouraged 
by State regulations to conclude long-term contracts. Therefore, the Court considered that the questions 
could not be dealt with in a directive adopted on the basis of Article 90(3) but that the obstacles which 
were purportedly created by the long-term contracts could only be examined through individual 
decisions adopted under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. 
103 Case 229/83, [1985] ECR 1, at para. 18. 
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remedies which have been developed in order to eliminate anti-competitive situations. 
The basic finding and starting point in this respect is tha:t there is a tendency in the 
application of the competition rules towards increased emphasis on structural market 
situations and the need to ensure a sufficient degree of openness of markets. 104 The 
purpose of this Section is to provide a background as well as a frame of reference for 
the practical application of these principles in the Part II of the study. 
The increased attention and emphasis on the structural market situations is 
accompanied by an increased use of structural solutions and remedies instead of 
behavioural solutions which have more traditionally been used to eliminate concerns 
under and infringements of the competition rules. The reasons for this shift in 
emphasis may be multiple. From an economic perspective, the orientation taken is 
certainly influenced by market developments and integration which provide for 
increased opportunities for undertakings to enter into important international and global 
alliances and other types of structural cooperation agreements as well as an incentive 
for extending market power through mergers and acquisitions (with a horizontal, 
vertical and/or conglomerate nature). One of the main concerns in examining these 
structural developments, in addition to the inherent restrictions on competition to which 
they may give rise, is their foreclosure effects on market access by third parties. From 
a legal perspective, the shift in emphasis may also be explained by the entry into force 
of the EC Merger Control Regulation which is specifically aimed at scrutinizing and 
controlling structural market operations and which may also have affected the approach 
followed in examining transactions under Article 85 EC. 
As already indicated in the preceding Sections, structural measures have only 
rarely been used in cases on the application of Article 86 EC to individual 
undertakings. The emphasis has traditionally been on behavioural obligations and 
commitments devised to eliminate the specific abuse concerned. 105 So far, pure 
structural measures have been reserved to those cases under Article 86 EC in which 
the abuse which needed to be eliminated consisted specifically of a structural behaviour 
(including, for example, the acquisition of a competitor). 106 
104 For a more detailed discussion and illustrations of these principles, see also Art & Van Liedekerke, 
"Developments in EC competition law in 1995: An overview", CMLRev 719-775 (1996). 
105 See, for example, Hilti (Commission Decision of 22 December 1987, O.J. 1988, L 65119) in which 
an undertaking was obliged to abrogate commercial practices that tied the sale of nails to the supply of 
powered tools for inserting them rapidly, a market over which the Commission found that Hilti was 
dominant. As indicated in the Sections above, in cases on refusal to supply or refusal to provide access, 
undertakings were effectively compelled to continue supplies which had been withdrawn or to 
commence supplies. The cases on essential facilities could be used to illustrate that there may also be 
some structural aspects involved in remedying situations of abuse of a dominant position since in those 
cases the Commission referred to a test comparing the behavior of a dominant undertaking with that 
of an independent authority whose decisions are not influenced by a "conflict of interest". 
106 See the discussion in Section I.A. I. 
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Therefore, the emphasis below is on developments under Article 85 EC and the 
EC Merger Control Regulation which have led to the imposition of structural remedies 
and/or undertakings. In particular, attention will be given to the exemption decision 
in Atlas in which the Commission, after an in-depth assessment of the competitive · .. 
impact of the operation, imposed the divestiture of one of the subsidiaries of France 
Telecom. 107 This aspect of the decision in Atlas is a good illustration of the evolution 
towards more structural solutions for remedying, through the application of the 
conditions for exemption in Article 85(3) EC, 108 anti-competitive concerns. 
(i) Cases under Article 85 and the Merger Control Regulation involving 
structural solutions 
In the cases examined below, the Commission considered that the only possible 
remedy to restore effective competition was to impose a structural measure or 
measures on the parties involved. Since every case generally presented different market 
circumstances and different reasons for the divestiture, the Commission each time 
needed to develop a package of measures tailored to those specific circumstances. 
In imposing a divestiture the Commission generally required the parties 
concerned to sell off a company belonging to their economic or financial group or to 
sell a part of the company which did not form itself an autonomous legal entity (i.e. 
production facilities or units). 
The Commission usually attached additional obligations, of a more behavioural 
nature, to the order to divest. These obligations can have different functions, such as: 
to maintain the value of the company to be disposed of during the period of time 
necessarY for the sale; to guarantee that after the completion of the sale new anti-
competitive effects will not arise such as economic coordination between purchaser and 
former owner; or to ensure that the purchaser would be able to compete with the 
former owner from the start, which often involves an obligation of assistance to and 
cooperation, on the part of the seller, with the purchaser. These additional obligations 
are also discussed below. 
• Article 85(3) 
The legal basis for structural remedies under Article 85(3) lies in Article 8(1) 
of Regulation 17/62, which provides that a "decision in application of Article 85 (3) of 
the Treaty shall be issued for a specific period and conditions and obligations may be 
attached thereto. " That provision does not specify the nature which these conditions 
can have but the practice has made it clear that they can be behavioural and/or 
107 Commission Decision of 17 July 1996, Atlas, O.J. 1996, L 239/23. 
108 See, in particular, the last condition for exemption under Article 85(3) according to which exemption 
can only be granted if the agreement "does not afford the undenakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial pan of the products in question." 
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structural in nature, depending on what the Commission considers necessary in order 
to be able to exempt the agreement. The condition for exemption under which such · 
measures are introduced is mainly the last condition in Article 85(3)(d) which provides 
that the agreement must "not afford the undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question." 109 
The Atlas decision110 provides the precedent for a case in the 
telecommunicatio~s sector in which exemption under Article 85(3) was granted subject 
to structural (as well as behavioural) conditions. The decision involved the grant of an 
exemption under Article 85(3) for Atlas, a joint venture between France Telecom (FT) 
·and Deutsche Telekom (DT). The Commission made its grant of an exemption subject 
to two structural conditions. 
• 
The first such condition was that the French and German public packet-switched 
data networks could not be integrated into Atlas before full and effective liberalization 
of the French and German telecommunications infrastructure and services markets. The 
Commission considered that no adequate competitive alternative would exist in 
Germany and France for customers using the public packet-switched data networks 
before at least two competing nationwide carriers were licensed in each of Germany 
and France to provide public telecommunications services. Pending full liberalization, 
the integration of the networks of FT and DT would reinforce their existing dominant 
positions in the French and German markets respectively for national packet-switched 
data communications services (each had a market share of more than 70% in its 
respective_ national market). The parties therefore undertook that Atlas would not 
acquire legal ownership or control (within the meaning of the Merger Control 
Regulation) of the foregoing networks before the full liberalization scheduled for 1 
January 1998. 
The second structural condition wa_s that France Telecom (FT) had to sell, 
before a certain date, its shares of a. German subsidiary, Info AG, which provided 
packet -switched data communications services in Germany in competition with 
Deutsche Telekom (DT). The market ciJcumstance which led to this divestiture was 
that DT owned the only existing nationwide, packet-switched data communications 
network in Germany. The divestiture was considered necessary to ensure that actual 
competition in the above market would not be eliminated. Info AG was DT's second 
largest and most important competitor and all remaining competitors were relatively 
small. The decision (at paragraph 68) implies that in the absence of the divestiture all 
actual competition in the market would have been eliminated. 
109 As a matter of law, certain conditions and obligations (including an obligation to take structural 
measures) could also be imposed in an exemption decision, on the ground that otherwise the 
"indispensability test" under Article 85(3) would not be met. 
110 Cited above. 
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As to the scope of the divestiture requirement, FT undertook to the Commission 
irrevocably to make Info AG available for sale, as a going business, or to execute 
alternative remedies if such sale should not occur. FT agreed to divest all assets and 
contracts of Info AG, and to transfer to Atlas multinational clients outside Germany 
to whom Info AG at that time provided advanced network services, to the extent to 
which the Commission would be satisfied that such services were separable from the 
German activities of Info AG without significantly lessening the value of those 
activities. FT undertook that, if no purchaser could be found for Info AG as a whole, 
the two parts of ... the business into which it was divided internally would be sold 
s.eparately. 
• Merger Control Regulation 
• 
For decisions adopted pursuant to the EC Merger Control Regulation, the 
powers of the Commission to impose certain conditions and obligations are set out, in 
particular, in Article 8(2) of the Merger Control Regulation which provides that the 
Commission "may attach to its decision conditions and obligations intended to ensure 
that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into 
vis-a-vis the Commission with a view to modifying the original concentration plan". 
Where a concentration has already been implemented Article 8( 4) of the Merger 
Control Regulation provides that "the Commission may, [. .. ]by decision require the 
undertakings or assets brought together to be separated or the cessation of joint control 
or any other action that may be appropriate in order to restore conditions of effective 
competition. " 
The substantive test under which structural measures are imposed is the general 
test for the appraisal of concentrations set out in Article 2 of the Merger Control 
Regulation in which it is provided, in particular, that a "concentration which creates 
or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
declared incompatible with the common market". Where structural measures (in 
particular, the divestiture of certain bus!ness units or subsidiaries) are imposed, this 
means that without such changes the concentration concerned would not be able to 
meet the standard for permissibility under the said Article 2. 
The discussion of individual cases below will clearly not be exhaustive but is 
simply aimed at providing a number of references to cases in which the Commission 
considered that the foreclosure effects raised by transactions were so substantial that 
it could not clear the transaction without structural modifications to the original plans 
of the parties concerned (and where behavioural commitments or obligations were 
implicitly considered as unworkable or not sufficient to remedy the situation at issue). 
In transactions dealt with under the Merger Control Regulation, structural 
measures have become more and more frequent. The Commission has requested 
structural undertakings, because behavioural remedies could not, alone, eliminate the 
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anti-competitive effects of the concentration. 111 Recently, the Commission has made 
use of them mostly in the form of the acceptance of commitments by the parties to 
divest a company or part of a company (production facility). The conditions in which 
a divestiture has been considered the appropriate remedy have included a variety of 
different economic and market circumstances in the context of which the concentration 
created or strengthened a dominant position impeding effective competition. 
The main circumstances, the usual scope of a divestiture package and the 
reasons justifying divestiture are illustrated by the examples of cases briefly referred 
to below in which the Commission imposed structural measures. 
1. In Nestle/Perrier, 112 in which Nestle planned to acquire 100% of the shares 
of its competitor Source Perrier SA, the Commission concluded that the acquisition 
would result in the French bottled water market having two producers who together 
would occupy a position of duopolistic dominance significantly impeding competition 
in the market concerned. The particular market circumstances which gave rise to the 
duopolistic dominance were mainly the high market shares of the two remaining 
market operators, the insufficient competitive counterweight provided by local mineral 
and spring waters, the increased dependency of wholesalers and retailers of bottled 
waters on the portfolio of brands of Nestle and the other operator, and the absence of 
effective price-constraining potential competition from new entrants. 
To address the Commission's concerns and avoid the creation of a duopolistic 
dominant position, Nestle undertook, inter alia, to divest to a single third party a 
bundle of brands and to supply to the prospective purchaser of these brands not less 
than 3000 million liters of water capacity per annum. The Commission considered that 
these undertakings addressed its concerns, because the combined effect of divesting the 
bundle of brands in addition to the water capacity would create effective competition 
111 For examples of cases indicating the reasons behavioural commitments are generally considered 
insufficient to remedy the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, ·.see the following: In 
Commission Decision of 24 April 1996, Gencor/Lonrho, O.J. 1997, L 11/30, in an attempt to address 
the Commission's concerns, the parties proposed a draft commitment to develop additional capacity, 
maintain output at existing levels and create a new supplier. The Commission considered that the 
commitment offered was behavioral in nature and could not therefore be accepted under the Merger 
Control Regulation. Nor did the proposed undertaking address the principal concern, which was that 
the proposed concentration created a dominant duopoly position in the relevant market. In Commission 
Decision of 9 November 1994, MSG Media Service, O.J. 1994, L 36411, at para. 99, the Commission 
declared the proposed joint venture incompatible with the common market and rejected the undertakings 
offered by the parties, on the grounds that they were mere pledges of conduct which have no structural 
dimension and whose fulfillment cannot in any case be checked and, therefore, were, as a matter of 
principle, inappropriate to solve the structural problem resulting from the fact that the joint venture 
created or strengthened a dominant position in the affected market. In Commission Decision of 19 July 
1995, Nordic Satellite Distribution, O.J. 1996, L 53/20, at para. 159, the Commission found that 
undertakings proposed by the parties were not sufficient to solve the competition problems identified 
by the Commission, because they were too limited in scope, mostly behavioral and would be very 
difficult to control and enforce. 
111 Commission Decision of 22 July 1992, Nestle/Perrier, O.J. 1992, L 356/1. 
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to counteract the duopolistic dominance which would have otherwise resulted from the 
proposed concentration. Moreover, the buyer would be put in a position to acquire a 
foothold in major retail stores, access to which was necessary to enable any new 
entrant to promote other lesser-known brands and to introduce new brands. 
2. In Kimberly-Clark/Scott, 113 Kimberly-Clark Corporation ("KC") notified 
the Commission of its intention to merge its worldwide activities with the Scott Paper 
Company. In its detailed competitive assessment of the planned concentration, the 
Commission reached the conclusion that the merger would create or strengthen a 
dominant position impeding effective competition. The principal factors which led to 
this conclusion were the fact that the merged entity would be the largest operator in 
terms of production capacity in the UK and Ireland in consumer markets for toilet-
tissue and facial tissues/handkerchiefs; the merged entity would be significantly 
stronger than the n~xt largest competitor; and existing competitors lacked the power 
to constrain the dominance of the merged entity. 
The Commission found that potential entrants would also not be able to 
constrain this dominance, because of the high barriers to entry including a high degree 
of brand loyalty, the high level of advertising sunk costs for the establishment of a new 
brand, and the need to obtain access to shelf space in sales outlets. Moreover, it found 
that the high degree of brand loyalty, combined with the need for retailers to stock the 
essential brands of KC and Scott, would enable the merged entity to pursue a tied 
branded product policy. 
To address the Commission's concerns, the parties undertook to divest four 
toilet-tissue brands and businesses in the UK and the Republic of Ireland, together with 
the copyright in the packaging, advertising and promotional materials used in relation 
to the products sold under these brands. The parties also agreed to enter into a fifteen-
year agreement with the purchaser containing provisions for an initial three-year 
royalty-free exclusive license for the purchaser to use the Kleenex trade mark in tbe 
UK and Ireland, an option for the purchaser to renew the license for seven more years 
on a royalty basis, and finally, an agreement by the parties not to use the Kleenex 
trade mark in the relevant market for a certain period of time. 
The Commission considered that the foregoing remedy was adequate to facilitate 
the entry into the market of an effective competitor and the avoidance of the creation 
of a dominant position. Four major reasons were given for justifying that the above 
divestiture was the proper remedy. 114 First, the divestiture would permit the post-
merger combined market share of the new entity not to exceed the greater of either 
party's pre-merger market share. Second, the sale of business, plant and brands to be 
113 Commission Decision of 16 January 1996, Kimberly-Clark/Scott, O.J. 1996, L 183/1. 
114 At paras. 235 and following. 
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divested would allow the entry into the market of a new effective competitor, 115 who 
would be able to compete immediately due to the possibility to use the well known 
brands which were also the object of the divestiture measures. Third, the package of 
assets to be divested was "highly profitable", so that the degree of risk connected to 
the necessary operation of rebranding would not be too high to prevent a third party 
to consider investing. Finally, as part of the package the parties divested a significant 
amount of primary production capacity in the UK and Ireland with the consequence 
that their market share fell from 50-60% to 30-40% in the market concerned. 
3. In Accor/Wagon-Lits, 116 the concentration involved the proposed 
acquisition by Accor SA, through the intermediary of the holding company Cobefin, 
of all the shares still in circulatioll of the Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-lits et 
du Tourisme. This transaction was found to create or strengthen a dominant position 
impeding effective competition in the market for motorway catering activities, in view 
of the very high market share (89%) of the post-acquisition enterprise, the expectation 
that this market share would not be eroded in the foreseeable future, the fact that this 
market share was 18 times larger than that of the next largest competitor, and the 
circumstance that the financial strength of the post-acquisition enterprise would have 
been "out of all proportion to that of its competitors". Moreover, due to legal and 
regulatory constraints, motorways were limited in number and the future development 
of networks was uncertain. Finally, foreign firms would experience difficulty to 
penetrate the market since barriers to entry were very high. 
The parties contended that the acquisition would not limit competition because 
the Accor and Wagon-Lit networks would continue to be operated separately, given 
that the operations were conducted in partnerships with local caterers each holding a 
minority stake in the capital of. the companies. The Commission responded that 
"internal competition between establishments belonging to one and the same group is 
not a sufficient argument for accepting a dominant position on the part of the group 
concerned. " 
To address the Commission's concerns, the parties agreed to -sell off the 
motorway catering activities. 
4. Another example is Crown Cork & Seal117 , concerning the notification by 
Crown Cork & Seal Company Inc. of its intention to acquire sole control of 
CarnaudMetalbox SA. The proposed concentration was found to create or strengthen 
a dominant position impeding effective competition, based on the following principal 
115 In fact, the new competitor would have been able to acquire a modem plant and thus maintain the high 
quality of the Kleenex toilet-tissue. 
116 Commission Decision of 28 April 1992, Accor/Wagon-Lits, O.J. 1992, L 204/1. 
117 Crown Cork & Seal/CamaudMetalbox, Commission Decision of 14 November 1995, OJ. 1996, L 
75/38. 
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factors: First, after the acquisition the combined market share of .the parties would 
have been more than three times larger than its next closest competitor, while before 
the transaction the three largest players were of approximately the same size. Second, 
the operation would result in the concentration of the two market leaders with respect 
to know-how, R&D and technology in a market that was experiencing a fast-moving 
and costly evolution in technology and know-how, in which possession and updating 
of state-of-the-art know-how was a primary factor driving competition in the market. 
Third, the concentration would have eliminated one of the only two suppliers able to 
offer full geographic coverage. Fourth, neither customers, us nor existing 
competitorsu9 nor potential competitors120 would have been able to constrain the 
market power of the new entity. 
To address the Commission's concerns, the parties agreed to divest five 
businesses located within five different Member States in order to facilitate the entry 
of a credible competitor with adequate resources into the concerned market. The 
divestiture package included plant facilities, equipment, machinery, all rights to 
contracts entered into in the regular course of business, plus all other assets related to 
aerosol can production, rights to any aerosol can trade-marks, patents, inventions, 
trade secrets and know-how. The Commission emphasized the following fundamental 
pro-competitive changes resulting from the divestiture. First, it prevented the parties 
from acquiring a dominant position, given the fact that the plants were widely spread 
from a geographical point of view which (together with the fact that the divestiture 
package included state-of-the-art machinery) granted to the prospective purchaser the 
possibility to compete immediately and effectively with the merged group. Second, the 
market share of the new group after the divestiture would have remained the same as 
that of only one of the parties prior to the acquisition. Finally, the Commission 
considered as important the fact that the divestiture package comprised a stand-alone 
ongoing business representing an overall market share of 22% . 
5. In DuPont/ICI, 121 DuPont de Nemours notified its proposed acquisition of 
the worldwide nylon operations of ICI. In order to eliminate the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, the parties agreed to both behavioural and 
structural remedies to address the Commission's concerns. The behavioural remedies, 
118 The Commission established that smaller competitors did not constitute a viable alternative to meet 
customer requirements, since they usually purchased a number of different sizes of aerosol can in large 
quantities that were manufactured in long production runs. 
119 Mainly because technological innovation which was under the control of the parties to the concentration. 
120 The market was characterized by high barriers to entry resulting from the need to have particular know-
how and the fact that the new entity alone would have had enough capacity to supply the entire market 
(with the consequence that new entrants would not undertake the risk of an investment to attempt 
penetrating the market). 
121 Commission Decision of 30 September 1992, DuPont/ICI, OJ. 1992, L 7113. 
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however, were of a particularly heavy character and, in effect, were comparable to 
structural remedies. 
First, DuPont agreed to reserve capacity to produce up to 12000 tons per annum 
of nylon staple fibre (representing a cross-section of ICI's production range) for the 
benefit of an independent third party. Second, DuPont agreed to manufacture up to 
12000 tons of such nylon as specified by the third party for a period of five years, 
renewable. The third condition was purely structural and consisted of a requirement 
for DuPont to transfer to the designated third party a free-standing, high quality carpet 
research and development facility appropriate to the business transferred. 
Given the undertakings, the-Commission considered that the third party would 
be able immediately to replace ICI as a supplier of high quality fibers. This third party 
would be able to maintain and build on the acquired position in the segment of the 
market which was closest to that of DuPont in terms of quality, through its use of the 
research and development facility and the development and support expertise which 
were also to be transferred. This would significantly improve the competitiveness of 
the third party, in particular as regards its product range and future product 
development. The Commission concluded that the undertakings imposed would 
therefore substantially reduce the likelihood that DuPont could be able to determine the 
degree of product develqpment and innovation in the market. 122 
6. Finally, in Magneti Marelli/CEAC, 123 the market share of a subsidiary of 
the Fiat group in the French battery market for the automotive aftermarket would have 
increased from roughly 20% to around 60% as a result of the notified acquisition. Thi~ 
was found by the CommJssion to create a dominant position significantly impeding 
effectiv.e competition because of tlre gap with the next largest competitor (of the order 
of 40% ), the financial strength of the new entity and that of its parent companies. its 
greater access to the lead market, the fact that competitors in other markets would not 
try to enter the French market through price competition124 and customers lacked the 
purchasing strength to counterbalance the power of the new entity. 
To address these concerns, Fiat undertook, within an agreed period, to reduce 
its majority holding in the capital of the above mentioned subsidiary to 10% and to 
reduce to one member its representation on the administrative or supervisory bodies 
of the subsidiary. This remedy may illustrate a possible alternative to full divestiture. 
122 At para. 48. 
123 Commissk: Decision of 29 May 1991, OJ. 1991, L 222/38. 
124 Because price competition was considered unreasonable on a mature market on which little production 
capacity is available. 
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(ii) Administrative practice regarding structural separation as a temporary 
condition before divestiture 
A number of the precedents mentioned above, as well as certain other cases, 
also contain useful guidance as to the practical measures used by the Commission when 
it imposes a structural separation or a divestiture on a specific undertaking in a direct 
or indirect manner. 125 In fact, these precedents could be used as a starting point for 
developing a framework of accompanying rules to be used if such measures were to 
be adopted in order to ensure the effectiveness of the remedy imposed. 
In particular, in cases where divestiture was a condition for clearance of a 
transaction, the Commission required the undertakings concerned to take a number of 
measures in respect of the company or entity which needed to be divested during the 
time necessary to carry out the sale. One of these measures includes a type of structural 
separation, of a temporary nature, to be implemented prior to the effective divestiture 
of the business concerned. These measures are generally aimed at: (i) maintaining the 
viability, marketability and competitiveness of the company to be divested and (ii) 
providing sufficient management and other resources for this purpose. Because they 
may be relevant in the Commission's further dealing with the subject of this study, a 
number of practical examples taken from existing precedents are briefly summarized. 
First, the Commission has imposed a number of "preparatory" measures which 
were necessary to make the entity concerned "transferable". In particular, in Procter & 
Gamble the Commission required the parties to render "the[ . .] plant capable of being 
transftrred to an independent third party and most particularly, that the plant [had to 
be made] capable of being managed separately from P&G". 126 Similarly, in Crown 
Cork &·Seal the Commission required the parties, as a first obligation, to "remove from 
[the facilities to be divested] the elements of Crown's metal-crown business at such 
location so that such operations become a .stand alone and ongoing aerosol business. 
Such removal [had to] be conducted so as not to impair the aerosol business as [ . .] 
conducted." 127 Other types of preparatory measures related to the staffing of the entity 
to be divested. Thus, for example, in DuPont!ICI the parties agreed that the facility to 
be transferred had to be "staffed with competent technical personnel at least half of 
whom should have been from [the German facilities] of JCI. "128 Also, in several other 
decisions the parties undertook to use their best efforts to encourage its personnel to 
take up employment with the purchaser. 
125 As has been indicated above, the existing precedents under Article 86 in which structural remedies were 
imposed (in particular, Continental Can, examined above) provide very little or no guidance in this 
respect. 
126 Commission Decision of 21 June 1994, Procter & Gamble/Schickedanz, O.J. 1994, L 354/32, at para. 
182. 
117 Crown Cork & Seal, cited above, at para. 115. 
128 DuPont/ICI, cited above, at para. 48. 
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Second, certain other obligations related to the viability and the competitiveness 
of the entity which would be divested. Such obligations concerned, for example, the 
assignment of existing contracts with both the supply and the retail side, support of the 
divestiture· with the necessary financial means and finally all other reasonable steps 
necessary to make the entity sold fully competitive from the start. In Crown Cork & 
Seal, for example, the Commission required Crown to "ensure that the businesses in 
the divestiture package are legally held separate and are maintained as distinct and 
saleable businesses and to ensure that production capacity and selling activities are 
maintained, pursuant to good business practices, at their current level, and that all 
contracts necessary to preserve the businesses are entered into or continue in 
accordance with their terms, consistent with past practice." Regarding the management 
of the business to be divested, the Commission considered it necessary to require 
Crown to undertake "to maintain all administrative and management function~ relating 
to the divestiture package which have been carried out at all appropriate headquarters 
levels in Crown [ . .]". 129 In Procter & Gamble the Commission also requested P&G 
to provide sufficient financial resources to the end of administrating and managing the 
divestiture, in the ordinary course of business." 130 
Third, in the event of temporary structural separation prior to divestiture, the 
Commission required, on the one hand, that the entity concerned be put under clearly 
separate management and, on the other hand, gave specific attention to the possible 
exchange of confidential information between the entities to be separated: 
129 
For the separation of the management, the Commission made use of the 
appointment of a trustee with· authority to take care of the sale of the entity to 
be divested as well as to manage that entity on a temporary basis. 131 In Crown 
Cork & Seal the trustee had to "determine the best management structure to 
ensure the viability, marketability and competitiveness of the divestiture 
Crown Cork & Seal, cited above, at para. 115. 
130 Procter & Gamble, cited above, at para. -182. In this respect, see also Kimberly-Clark/Scott, cited 
above, at para. 233, wliere the Commission included in the divestiture package extra obligations relating 
to the business to be divested in order to enhance its commercial viability. In particular, the list of 
obligations included: "transfer of sales staff [at the time] engaged in the UK consumer tissue categories; 
transfer of production and administrative personnel currently dedicated to the facility [to be divested]; 
provision of manufacturing technical assistance at the facility, for a period of not more than 12 months 
from the date of sale; assignment of existing pulp and other input supply contracts and services; finally 
the parties best efforts to procure the assignment to the purchaser of existing contracts or business with 
retailers for the supply of an agreed amount of store brand tissue products to the extent related to the 
facility." 
131 See, for example, Atlas, cited above, at para. 26, where the trustee had indeed twofold obligations: 
manage the business during the separate holding period and manage the sale of the business. As to the 
managing of the sale, the trustee had to: conduct good faith negotiations with interested third parties 
with a view to selling the entity; provide a written report before a binding contract was signed or in 
any event every month. Regarding the management of the entity, the trustee had to provide the 
Commission with a written report every two months concerning the monitoring of the operations and 
management of the entity. 
\0603-00S.DVL [030] 
48 Strictly Confidential 
package" 132 • In Procter & Gamble "P&G under[took} that the Business ha[d] 
its own management composed of ex- VP or other currently non-P&G personnel 
that shall, under the guidance and control of the Trustee be under instructions 
. . d d b . [ ]" 133 to manage zt on an zn epen ent aszs . . . . 
As far as the exchange and the utilization of information between the parties and 
the entity to be divested is concerned, in Nestle/Perrier the Commission required 
Nestle to undertake "not to permit the Perrier management to transfer any 
business secrets, know-how, commercial information or any other industrial 
information or property rights of a confidential or proprietary nature that it 
obtains from [the businesses to be divested} to any other commercial entity 
within the Nestle group and not to use any such information within the Nestle 
group other than for the purposes of selling the assets which [were] the subjects 
ofthis commitment" 134• In Procter & Gamble P&G undertook "not [to} obtain 
from the Business management [to be divested} any business secrets, know-how, 
[or similar confidential information] relating to the business." 135 
The two above points illustrate the kinds of minimum measures to be 
implemented by an undertaking to implement an internal structural separation as a 
remedy under the·· Merger Control Regulation. If such separation is to have a more 
permanent nature, it WOlJ.ld of course not be possible to work with a trustee but the 
undertaking would need to put in place an own adequate and separate management. In 
any case of structural separation, it is clear that one of the essential points would be the 
exchange and use of confidential and other commercially sensitive information. 
Therefore, impermeable Chinese walls would need to be built between the different 
entities so that the separation and the elimination of the anti-competitive concerns can 
be carried out in an effective manner. 
Fourth, in some recent cases, it is provided that the trustee will present the 
names of potential purchasers to the Commission which then has a certain period of 
time in which to take a position on whether any of the potential purchasers would be 
considered unsatisfactory. 136 
132 Crown Cork & Seal, cited above, at para. 115. In addition, in order to ensure that the divestiture would 
not have altered the marketability of the business, the trustee was also given access to the personnel and 
facilities as well as the documents, books and records of Crown's aerosol business, including those 
which did not form part of the divestiture package. 
133 Procter & Gamble, cited above, at para. 182. 
134 Nestlt!/Perrier, cited above, at para. 136. 
135 Procter & Gamble, cited above, at para. 186. 
136 Procter & Gamble, cited above, at para. 186. 
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Fifth, it may be noted that in the conditions set by the Commission ordering a 
divestiture, provision is often also made for the case that no purchaser can be found. 
The general remedy imposed in the event that the sale cannot be completed within the 
time limit defined in the definition is that the Commission reserves itself the right, 
pursuant to Article 8(5) of the Merger Control Regulation, to revoke its decision (which 
would then have the effect to re-separate the companies involved in the operation with 
the view to restore the degree of competition existing prior to the merger or 
acquisition). 137 In two other decisions, however, different solutions were envisaged. 
In Crown Cork & Seal, the Commission stated that in "the event that the trustee at any 
time prior to the target date determines in conjunction with the Commission that it is 
not possible to identify an acceptable purchaser for the divestiture package 'en bloc', 
the trustee, Crown and the Commission will discuss appropriate alternatives to the 
divestiture 'en bloc'" .138 In Atlas, the Commission required that if "the sale tJf [the] 
business does not seem likely to occur by the [target] date France Telecom shall, at 
least two months before that date, submit alternative remedies sufficiently satisfactory 
to safeguard actual competition in the German market." In case of a final absolute 
impossibility to find an acceptable purchaser for the business as a whole, the business 
needed to be divided in two entities and sold separately .139 
Finally, the Commission usually attaches, as an "after-sale" condition, a 
prohibition to re-acquire the divested business for a certain period of time as well as 
a prohibition to use confidential information regarding the divested business. 140 
l.A.4 Powers of the Commission to impose remedies for the infringement of the 
competition rules 
The cases discussed in Section l.A.l above provide already a good illustration 
of the powers which the Commission has to remedy situations in which an infringement 
of the EC competition rules is found. 141 However, in preparation of the discussion in 
Part II, it is useful to recall briefly the legal basis of the powers of the Commission as 
well as the interpretation which has been given to these powers by the European 
Courts. 
137 See, in particular, KNP/BT/VRG, Commission Decision of 4 May 1993, O.J. 1993, L 217/35, at para. 
71. 
138 Crown Cork & Seal, cited above, at para. 115. 
139 Atlas, cited above, at para. 26. 
140 See, for example, Kimberly-Clark/Scott, at para. 234, regarding the prohibition to use confidential 
information and Nestle/Perrier, at para. 136, for the prohibition not to re-acquire. 
141 The power of the Commission to impose fines, as set out in Article 15(2)(a) of Regulation 17, is not 
the subject of a specific discussion in the context of this study. 
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The legal basis of the Commission's powers can be found in Article 3(1) of 
Regulation 17/62142 which provides in broad terms that "[w}here the Commission[ . .} 
finds that there is infringement of article 85 and article 86 of the Treaty, it may by 
decision require the undertakings[ . .} concerned to bring such infringement to an end." 
In order to be able to enforce the competition rules in an effective manner, the 
Commission has had to interpret the wording of Article 3 and has, in fact, gradually 
"extended" its powers to impose remedies which were adequate in the circumstances 
at issue. The Courts have, in the great majority of the cases referred to them, upheld 
the Commission's interpretation of Article 3. 143 
It is clear that the Commission's powers pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation 17 
cover not only negative prohibitions (so-called cease or desist orders) but also positive 
orders to act. Furthermore, the Commission also has the power, where justified, to 
order the parties to refrain from future conducts. 144 Prohibitions are generally used 
in cases under Article 86 EC where no other more intrusive measure is warranted by 
the circumstances to stop the infringement. In other words, where the simple 
elimination of the anti-competitive practice is sufficient in and by itself to restore 
effective competition. 
As mentioned above, the Commission also has the power to require a positive 
action from the addressee of a decision finding an abuse of a dominant position. The 
type of action or conduct which can be imposed depends on the circumstances of the 
case at hand and, in particular, on the type of infringement. In Commercial Solvents 
v. Commission, 145 for example, the undertaking challenged the Commission's pov·;er 
to order certain quantities of raw material to be supplied to make good the refusal of 
142 Council Regulation 17/62, O.J. Spec. Ed. 1959-1962, 87. 
143 For a case in which the Court considered that the Commission's interpretation of Article 3 could not 
be followed, see Case T-7/93, Langnese-Iglo GmbH, [1995] ECR 11-1539. In that case, the Court of 
First Instance considered that the Commission did not have the power to prohibit the undertaking 
concerned to conclude exclusive purchasing contracts in the future, because the Commission was not 
empowered, by means of an individual decision, to restrict or limit the legal effects of a legislative 
measure such as block exemption Regulation No 1984/83, unless the latter expressly provides a legal 
basis for that purpose. See also Automec II where the Court of First Instance said that "the Commission 
cannot in principle be considered to have, among the powers to issue orders which are available to it 
for the purpose of bringing to an end infringements of Article 85 (1 ), the power to order a party to enter 
into contractual relations, since in general the Commission has suitable remedies at its disposal for the 
purpose of requiring an undertaking to terminate an infringement." Case T -24/90, Automec v. 
Commission (II), [1992] ECR II 2223, at para. 51. The content of the latter ruling may be difficult to 
reconcile with the position taken by the Court of Justice in cases as Commercial Solvents and Magill 
(both discussed above). 
144 For example, in Hilti (Case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Commission, [1991] ECR 11-1439) the undertaking 
was required to "refrain from repeating or continuing any of the acts or behavior specified in Article 
1 [of the decision] and [to] refrain from adopting any measures having an equivalent effect" to those 
found to have been abusive. On appeal, the Commission Decision was upheld. 
145 Joined Cases 6-7173, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. 
Commission, [1974] ECR 223. 
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supplies as well as the power to order that proposals to prevent a repetition of the 
conduct complained of be put forward on the basis of Article 3 of Regulation 17/62. 
The Court confirmed, however, that the said Article 3 "must be applied in relation to 
the infringement which has been established and may include an order to do certain .. 
acts or provide certain advantages which have been wrongfully withheld as well as 
prohibiting the continuation of certain actions, practices or situations which are 
contrary to the Treaty." 
Equally, in Magill 146, the Court of First Instance, following the Commercial 
Solvents interpretation, upheld the Commission's decision ordering the BBC and other 
broadcasting companies to make the information, covered by copyright, available to 
competitors, and to each other, by requiring it to grant licenses in one of two ways at 
the choice of the parties. 147 On appeal, the Court of First Instance rejected the 
applicants' arguments that the Commission had exceeded its powers under Article 3 of 
Regulation 17/62; it considered that "the Commission has the power under Article 3 of 
Reg. 17 to require the undertakings to take or refrain from taking certain action with 
a view to bringing the infringement to an end. In that light the obligations imposed 
upon the undertakings must be defined with regard to requirements related to re-
establishing compliance with the law, taking into account the details of each individual 
case." The Court then cited the language of Commercial Solvents, mentioned above, 
and referred, in addition, to the Camera Care148 judgment where "the Court of Justice 
ha[d} expressly acknowledged[ . .} that the Commission must be able to exercise the 
right to take decisions conferred upon it 'in the most efficacious manner best suited to 
the circumstances of each given situation.'" Lastly,· the Court held that the type of 
remedy mandated by the Commission was acceptable under the circumstances since it 
was the only means of bringing that infringement to an end. 
The Court's judgment in Camera Care also contributes to an understanding of 
the reasoning followed by the Court in assessing the powers held by the Commission. 
In that judgment, the Court confirmed the Commission's powers to impose interim 
measures on the basis of Article 3 of Regulation 17/62, a power which is not covered 
in an explicit manner in that provision. The Court held in that case that "[a}s regards 
the right to take decisions conferred upon the Commission by Article 3(1), it is essential 
that it should be exercised in the most efficacious manner best suited to the 
circumstances of each given situation. To this end the possibility cannot be excluded 
that the exercise of that right should comprise successive stages so that a decision 
finding that there is an infringement may be preceded by any preliminary measures 
which may appear necessary at any given moment.[ . .} The powers which the 
146 Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, [1991] ECR 11-535. 
147 The first way was through the supply to third parties on request and on a non-discriminatory basis of 
the listings concerned with a view to their publication. The alternative was the grant of licenses on 
conditions which took account of the parties' legitimate preoccupations. 
148 Case 792179 R, Camera Care Limited v. Commission, [1980] ECR 119. 
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Commission holds under Article 3(1) of Regulation No 17 therefore include the power 
to take interim measures which are indispensable for the effective exercise of its . 
functions and, in particular, for ensuring the effectiveness of any decisions requiring 
undertakings to bring to an end infringements which it has found to exist." 
On the basis of the above, it may be concluded that the exercise by the 
Commission of its powers under Article 3 of Regulation 17/62 is subject to a test 
similar to that of .proportionality. The Commission is entitled to exercise its remedy 
powers in the most efficacious manner best suited to the circumstances of each 
individual situation but if various options are open to achieve the same goal, it has to 
select that remedy which interferes the least with the commercial freedom of the 
undertaking(s) concemed. 149 
• 
I.B Article 90(3) - Commission powers to adopt directives and decisions 
This part of the study focuses on the Commission's power to adopt directives 
under Article 90(3) EC. It is intended to provide an overview of the existing case law 
and administrative practice in order to establish the circumstances under which this 
provision could be used as the basis to address structural market situations brought 
about by Member State measures. 
I.B.l The Commission's powers under Article 90(3) as confirmed by the Court of 
Justice 
I.B.l.l Power to supervise and prohibit Member State measures 
Article 90(3) empowers the Commission to ensure the application of the 
provisions of Articles 90(1) and (2) and, where necessary, to address appropriate 
directives or decisions to Member States. In particular, this provision imposes on the 
Commission both a power and a duty of supervision150 to ensure that measures 
adopted by the Member States in relatiop to public undertakings 151 and undertakings 
to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights 152 comply with Article 90(1) 
149 See C.S. Kerse, E.C. Antitrust Procedure, (3d ed., 1994), 314: "The principle of proportionality and 
of minimum intervention are not the same thing but are not mutually exclusive. Thus, where several 
means are available, each being justifiable to the end sought (proportionality), the least stringent which 
will be effective must be employed (minimum intervention)." Kerse cites Advocate-General Roemer in 
Case 31/59 Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia v. High Authority, [ 1960] ECR 71. 
150 Case C-202/88, France v. Commission, [1991] ECR 1-1223, at paras. 21 and 24. 
151 See the discussion of the concept of "public undertakings" further below. 
152 For the definition of "special" and "exclusive" rights as set out in the liberalization directives, see 
Article 1(1) of the Telecommunications Services Directive, as amended by the Satellite Services 
Directive; discussed further below. 
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of the Treaty. Article 90(3) also confers on the Commission a power of prohibition, in 
that it is entitled to prohibit individual Member States from adopting or maintaining 
measures· in breach of Article 90( 1 ). 
Pursuant to Article 90( 1 ), the Member States are prohibited from enacting or 
maintaining in force any measure153 contrary to the rules contained in the Treaty, in 
particular to those rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94. According to 
the Court of Justice, the supervisory power conferred on the Commission, pursuant to 
Article 90(3), depends on the' scope of the particular Treaty rules with which 
compliance is to be ensured, 154 i.e., for purposes of the present study the competition 
rules, and particularly Article 86. 
Article 90(2) permits a derogation where compliance with such rules would 
obstruct the performance of particular tasks of undertakings entrusted with the operation 
of services of general economic interest. 155 This "general economic interest" exception 
is strictly construed, 156 and is closely related in the telecommunications sector to the 
concept of "universal service" .157 This concept will not be discussed in greater detail 
153 See the discussion in Section II.B below. 
154 France v. Commission, cited above, at para. 21. 
155 Article 90(2) provides that: "Undenakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained 
in this Treaty, in panicular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does 
not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the panicular tasks assigned to them. The 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the 
Community." Article 90(2) "thus permits the Member States to confer on undenakings to which they 
entrust the operation of services of general economic interest, exclusive rights which may hinder the 
application of the rules of the Treaty on competition in so far as restrictions on competition, or even the 
exclusion of all competition, by other economic. operators are necessary to ensure the performance of 
the panicular tasks assigned to the undenakings possessed of the exclusive rights." Case C-320/91, 
Corbeau, [1993] ECR I-2533, at para. 2: third indent. According to the Court of Justice, in allowing 
derogations to be made from the general rules of the Treaty on certain conditions, Article 90(2) seeks 
to reconcile the Member States' interest in using certain undertakings, in particular in the public sector, 
as an instrument of economic or fiscal policy with the Community's interest in ensuring compliance 
with the rules of competition and the preservation of the unity of the Common Market (France v. 
Commission, cited above, at para. 12). 
156 
.£.&. Case 127173, BRT v. SABAM, [1974] ECR 313, at para. 19; Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed 
Flugreisen and Others v. Zentrale zur Bekiimpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs, [1989] ECR 803, at para. 
58. 
157 According to the Commission, the provision of telecommunication systems in a given country is a 
service of general economic interest. Commission Decision of 10 December 1982, British 
Telecommunications, O.J. 1982, L 360/36, at para. 41, on appeal in Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, 
[1985] ECR 873; RTT v. GB-Inno-BM, cited above, at para. 16. The concept of services of general 
economic interest and the general interest "universal service" requirements are discussed in the 
Commission's communication Services of General Interest in Europe, O.J. 1996, C 28113. See also the 
Commission's 1996 communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Universal Service for Telecommunications in the 
Perspective of a Fully Liberalised Environment, COM(96) 73 final. 
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here because it is not central to the analysis of one undertaking .holding dominant 
positions over telecoms and cable TV infrastructures (and/or both services) or to the 
elimination of restrictions on the use of telecoms infrastructure for the provision of 
cable TV services. 
I.B.1.2 Article 90(3) directives 
In making it possible for the Commission to adopt directives to ensure the 
application of Al'ticles 90(1) and (2), Article 90(3) of the Treaty empowers the 
Commission to lay down general rules specifying the obligations arising from the 
Treaty which are binding on the Member States as regards the undertakings referred 
to in those provisions. 158 The Commission's power is not, therefore, limited to mere 
surveillance to ensure application of the existing Commission rules. 159 • 
The Commission has described the scope of its powers to adopt Article 90(3) 
directives in its XXIVth and XXVth Reports on Competition Policy. The Commission 
indicates that its powers. under Article 90(3) are neither legislative nor "quasi-
legislative" and that it does not have the power under this provision to create new 
substantive obligations for either the Member States or State undertakings. Instead, the 
Commission is entitled to specify the implications of existing Treaty rules, and set up 
procedures for making sure that existing obligations on Member States are complied 
with. 160 
In addition to empowering the Commission to establish general rules defining 
the obligations already imposed on Member States by the Treaty, the Commission 
considers that Article 90(3) also empowers it to take the necessary preventive measures 
to allow it to carry out its monitoring function. 161 
158 France v. Commission, cited above, at p~a. 14; Spain and Others v. Commission, cited above, at para. 
12. According to the Court, the subject-matter of the power conferred on the Commission by Article 
90(3) is different from, and more specific than, that of the powers conferred on the Council by Article 
1 OOa or Article 87. Moreover, the possibili\y that rules containing provisions which impinge upon the 
specific sphere of Article 90 might be laid down by the Council by virtue of its general power under 
other articles of the Treaty does not preclude the exercise of the power which Article 90 confers on the 
Commission. France v. Commission, cited above, at paras. 25-26; Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 
and C-289/90, Spain and Others v. Commission, [1992] ECR 1-5833, at para. 14. 
159 Spain and Others v. Commission, cited above, at para. 12. 
160 Commission, XXIVth Report on Competition Policy 1994, at para. 215. 
161 Commission, XXVth Report on Competition Policy- COM(96)126 final, at para. 100. According to 
the Commission, it has always used its power to adopt directives under Article 90(3) with caution and 
has used it "only in situations where the existence of many infringements of the fundamental rules of the 
EC Treaty made them necessary to avoid a multiplicity of infringement proceedings and to give 
operators a minimum amount of legal cenainty. These initiatives have generally been taken in response 
to concerns expressed by the Council or Parliament. The Commission has always attached the greatest 
imponance to the need for this instrument to be used as pan of a transparent procedure involving the 
broadest possible dialogue with the other Union institutions, Member States and interested panies." I d. 
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Directives adopted by the Commission under Article 90(3) fall within the general 
category of directives referred to in Article 189. 162 According to Article 189, a 
directive is binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which 
it is addressed, but leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. 
In other words, the directive lays down an objective but the Member States are entitled 
to achieve that objective through the means of their choice. According to the Court of 
Justice, each Member State has a duty to implement a directive in a way which fully 
meets the requirements of clarity and certainty. 163 The failure of a Member State to 
implement an Article 90(3) directive in accordance with this duty could give rise to an 
application by the Commission to the Court of Justice under Article 169 for failure to 
fulfil an obligation. 
I.B.1.3 Article 90(3) decisions 
In addition to directives, the Commission is entitled to address decisions 
to individual Member States establishing that a given State measure is incompatible 
with the rules of the Treaty and indicating what measures the Member State must adopt 
in order to comply with its obligations under Community law. According to the Court 
of Justice, this power emanates, inter alia, from the principle of effet utile, as it is 
essential for the Commission so as to allow it to discharge the duty imposed upon it 
by Articles 85 to 93 of the Treaty to ensure the application of the competition 
rules. 164 Unlike a directive, a decision is adopted in respect of a specific situation in 
one or more Member States and necessarily involves an appreciation of that situation 
in the light of Community law. 165 
Decisions adopted by the Commission under Article 90(3) fall within the general 
category of decisions referred to in Article 189.166 According to Article 189, a 
decision is binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. 167 The failure 
of a Member State to which an Article 90(3) decision has been addressed to comply 
with the decision could give rise to an application by the Commission to the Court of 
Justice under Article 169 for failure to fulfil an obligation. 
162 Case 226/87, Commission v. Greece, [ 1988] ECR 3611, at para. 11. 
163 Case 102179, Commission v. Belgium, [1980] ECR 1473, at para. 11. 
164 Joined Cases C-48/90 and C-66/90, Netherlands and Others v. Commission, [1992] ECR 1-565, at 
paras. 28-29. 
165 Netherlands and Others v. Commission, cited above, at para. 27. 
166 Commission v. Greece, cited above, at para. 11. 
167 According to the Court of Justice, a "decision" is characterized by the limited number of persons to 
whom it is addressed. Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, P963] 9 Rec. 197. 
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I.B.2 The use made by the Commission of its powers in the telecommunications sector 
to adopt directives and decisions under Article 90(3) 
The Commission has used Article 90(3) directives as the legal basis for its 
regulatory initiatives aimed at liberalizing competition in the telecommunication 
sector. 168 . 
Through these directives, the Commission has already abolished special and 
exclusive rights granted by Memoer States for the importation, marketing, connection, 
bringing into service and maintenance of terminal equipment (Terminal Equipment 
Directive) and for the provision of telecommunications services other than voice 
telephony (Services Directive, as amended). It has also used these directives to remove 
restrictions on the use of cable TV and other alternative infrastructures for the provision 
of liberalized telecommunications services (Cable TV Directive and Full Competition 
Directive) and to liberalize satellite services and satellite terminals (Satellite Services 
Directive) and mobile and personal communications services (Mobile Services 
Directive). Under the Full Competition Directive, the market for voice telephony and 
the market for voice telephony infrastructure must also be liberalized by 1 January 
1998 (subject to longer periods for countries with small or less developed networks). 
A number of Member States challenged the power of the Commission to use 
Article 90(3) as the basis for the Terminal Equipment Directive169 and the 
Telecommunications Services Directive. 170 171 The Court of Justice, however, 
confirmed in broad terms the Commission's power under Article 90(3) to lay down in 
a directive general rules specifying the obligations arising from the Treaty which are 
168 Commission Directive 88/723/EEC of 16 May 1988, competition in the markets in telecommunications 
terminal equipment, O.J. 1988, L 131/73 ("Terminal Equipment Directive"); Commission Directive 
90/388/EEC of28 June 1990, competition in the markets for telecommunications services, O.J. 1990, 
L 192/10 ("Telecommunications Services Directive"), as amended by Commission Directives 94/46/EC 
of 13 October 1994, satellite communications, O.J. 1994, L 268/15 ("Satellite Services Directive"), 
95115/EC of 18 October 1995, abolition of the restrictions on the use of cable television networks for 
the provision of already liberalized telecommunications services, O.J. 1995, L 256/49 ("Cable TV 
Directive"), 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996, mobile and personal communications, O.J. 1996, L 20/59 
("Mobile Services Directive") and 96/19/EC, full competition in telecommunications markets, O.J. 
1996, L 74113 ("Full Competition Directive"). 
169 France v. Commission, cited above. 
170 Spain and Others v. Commission, cited above. 
171 Applications for annulment of provisions in the Cable TV Directive have also been filed by Spain and 
Portugal and are still pending. They contend, inter alia, that the Commission exceeded its competence 
under Article 90(3) on the ground that it did not specify obligations already in existence under Article 
90(1 ), but instead laid down a new obligation to liberalize the market going beyond the relevant 
legislation in existence at that time. Case C-11/96, Spain v. Commission, O.J. 1996, C 9515; Case C-
12/96, Portugal v. Commission, O.J. 1996 C 9515. At the time of writing only the Spanish approval 
was still pending as the appeal by Portugal had been withdrawn. 
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binding on the Member States in regard to public undertakings and undertakings to 
which the Member States have granted special or exclusive rights. 172 
In addition to the foregoing directives, the Commission has, for example, also 
adopted Article 90(3) decisions addressed to Italy and Spain, respectively, requiring 
them to take the steps necessary to remove the distortion of competition resulting from 
initial payments which they imposed on second operators of GSM radiotelephony and 
to secure equal conditions of competition for such second operators within fixed time 
limits. 173 
l.B.3 Lines of reasoning in current Article 90(3) directives and decisions 
The Commission's Article 90 directives in the telecommunications sector have 
been based in large measure on the doctrines already discussed in Section I.A above. 
The doctrine of"automatic/necessary abuse" is the key ground for the combined Article 
90/86 reasoning underlying the Cable TV Directive, the Satellite Services Directive, the 
Full Competition Directive174 and the Commission's Article 90 decisions relating to 
the second GSM operators in Spain and Italy. The doctrine of the "illegal 
172 On relatively limited grounds, the Court annulled all references in the Terminal Equipment Directive 
and the Telecommunications Services Directive to "special rights" on the ground that the Commission 
had failed to specify the types of special rights which are actually involved and in what respect the 
existence of such rights was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. The Commission rectified this 
omission in the Satellite Services Directive. The Court also held that Article 90 was, in the 
circumstances at issue (since the Commission had not demonstrated that the restrictions concerned 
resulted from a State measure), not an appropriate basis for the removal of obstacles to competition 
resulting from long-term contracts, with the consequence that it annulled provisions in the two 
Directives requiring Member State action to make it possible for certain types of long-term contracts 
to be terminated. It held that Article 90 confers powers on the Commission only in relation to State 
measures and that anti-competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings acting on their own initiative 
can be called into question only by means of individual decisions adopted under Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty. · 
173 Commission Decision of 4 October 1995 concerning the conditions imposed on the second operator of 
GSM radiotelephony services in Italy, O.J. 1995, L 280/49; Commission Decision of 18 December 
1996 concerning the conditions imposed on the second operator of GSM radiotelephony services in 
Spain, O.J. 1997, L 76/19. Italy and Spain had required the second GSM operators in their respective 
countries to make sizeable initial payments to the State as a condition of obtaining the license, whereas 
they had not required similar payments from the first GSM operators which were in each case public 
undertakings (Telecom ltalia SpA, controlled by STET, in Italy, and Telefonica de Espana in Spain). 
Appeals have been lodged against the decision concerning Italy. For summaries of the appeals, see Case 
C-406/95, Italy v. Commission, O.J. 1995, C 46/10; Case T-215/95, Telecom ltalia SpA v. 
Commission, 0 .J. 1995, C 46115; Case T -229/95, Telecom ltalia Mobile SpA, 0 .J. 1995, C 46117. 
174 Although it could be argued that both the Terminal Equipment Directive and the Telecommunications 
Services Directives are based at least in part on the doctrine of the "automatic/necessary abuse" of a 
dominant position, in the authors' opinion these directives are based primarily on the doctrine of the 
"illegal extension/strengthening" of a dominant position. 
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extension/strengthening" of a dominant position175 was used by the Commission as 
one of the bases for the combined applications of Articles 90 and 86 in the 
Telecommunications Services Directive, the Satellite Services Directive and the Full 
Competition Directive and was confirmed by the Court of Justice in its judgment on .. 
the Telecommunications Services Directive. The "equality of opportunity" doctrine 176 
was first developed by the Court of Justice in the context of its ruling on the Terminal 
Equipment Directive's provision requiring the separation of regulator and operator177 
before being further developed in GB-INNO-BM 178 and applied expressly by the 
Commission in its Article 90 decisions relating to conditions imposed by Italy and 
Spain, respectively, on the second GSM operators in those countries. The Commission's 
use of these doctrines in the foregoing directives and decisions is briefly discussed 
below. -
I.B.3.1 Doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse" of a dominant position" 
The doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse" is developed at length in the 
preamble to the Cable TV Directive. 179 The Commission's reasoning starts with a 
description of the special nature of the dominant positions held by incumbent 
telecommunications operators in telecommunications infrastructure, which is especially 
relevant to the subject of the present study. In recital 10, the Commission described the 
175 As discussed in Section I. A above, the doctrine of the "illegal extension/strengthening" of a dommant 
position was developed in parallel with the doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse". In the context of 
Article 90(3), the Commission has considered an illegal extension or strengthening of the dommant 
position to be one of the automatic abuses which may give rise to the combined application of Antelc'> 
90(1) and 86, as shown in particular by the Commission's decisions on the second GSM operator~ m 
Spain and Italy as discussed in Section I.B.3.1 below. 
176 As indicated in the discussion of the Full Competition Directive in Section I.B.3.1 below. the 
Commission has considered a violation of the "equal opportunity" doctrine to constitute an automatic 
abuse of dominant position giving rise to the combined application of Articles 90(1) and 86 where the 
vioiation of this doctrine results from a State measure. 
177 France v. Commission, cited above. 
178 Cited above and discussed in Section I.A. 
179 The doctrine is also used in the Satellite Services Directive (cited above), in particular in recital 14, 
where the Commission notes that exclusive rights in the satellite communications field have the effect 
of restricting or preventing, to the detriment of users, the use of satellite communications that could be 
offered, thereby holding back technical progress. The Commission reasoned that the exclusive rights 
implied a restriction on the development of satellite communication, because investment decisions were 
likely to be based on the exclusive rights with the consequence that the undertakings concerned would 
often be in a position to decide to give priority to terrestrial technologies. According to the 
Commission, incumbent telecommunications operators did not use satellites as a fully complementary 
transmission technology in its own right, but had instead generally given preference to the development 
of optical-fibre terrestrial links and used satellite communications mainly as a technical solution of last 
resort in cases where the cost of the terrestrial alternatives had been prohibitive, or for the purpose of 
data broadcasting and/or television broadcasting. In contrast, it was considered that new entrants might 
instead exploit satellite technology. 
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nature of the dominant position held by the telecommunications or-ganizations in the 
relevant national markets: "In each relevant national market the telecommunications 
organizations hold a dominant position for the provision of transmission capacity for 
telecommunications services because they are the only ones with a public 
telecommunications network covering the whole territory of those States. Another factor 
in this dominant position concerns the peculiar characteristics of the market and in 
particular its highly capital-intensive nature. Taking account of the amount of 
investment needed to duplicate a network, there is a high reliance on use of existing 
networks. This enhances the structural dominance of the relevant telecommunications 
organizations and constitutes a potential barrier to entry. Thirdly, as a result of their 
market share, the telecommunications organizations further benefit from detailed 
information on telecommunications flows which is not available to new entrants. It 
includes information on subscribers ' usage patterns, necessary to target specific groups 
of users, and on price elasticities of demand in each market segment and region of the 
country. Finally, the fact that the relevant telecommunications organizations enjoy 
exclusive rights for the provision of voice telephony also contributes to their dominance 
in the neighbouring, but distinct, market for telecommunications capacity." (emphasis 
added) 
In this context, the Commission concluded that the State's maintenance of a 
legal monopoly over telecommunications capacity would compel or induce the 
telecommunications operator to abuse its dominant position in a way that is liable to 
affect trade between Member States resulting in a violation of Article 90( 1) in 
conjunction with Article 86 under the doctrine of "automatic/necessary abuse of a 
dominant position". 180 According to the preamble, the prevention of new entrants' use 
of cable TV infrastructure "compels or induces" the telecommunications operators to 
commit ,six different types of abuses, as follows: 181 
encouraging them to charge higher prices for capacity which are abusive because 
they are not justified on the basis of higher costs and which are a direct 
consequence of the restrictions on alternative infrastructure; 
restricting the overall supply of capacity in the market and eliminating incentives 
for telecommunications operators to increase quickly the capacity of their 
networks, to reduce average costs and to lower tariffs; 
delaying the widespread development of high-speed corporate networks, remote 
accessing of databases and deployment of innovative services, as a result of the 
above high tariffs and shortage of capacity; 
180 Cable TV Directive, cited above, at recitals 11-13. 
181 Cable TV Directive, cited above, recitals 12-14. 
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limiting the emergence of new audio-visual-telecommunications applications and 
multimedia services; 
causing cable TV operators to postpone investments in their networks and the 
introduction of optical fibre, because it is not profitable unless spread over a 
larger number of services, thereby delaying the development of new 
telecommunications and multimedia services and holding back technical progress 
in this way as well; and 
putting telecommunications operators at an obvious advantage over competitors 
in violation of the "equal opportunity" doctrine. 182 
In light of these factors, the Cable TV Directive required the Member States to 
abolish restrictions on the use of cable TV networks and required them to allow the use 
of such networks for the provision of telecommunications services other than voice 
telephony. 183 
The Cable TV Directive also indicates possible "automatic abuses" which may 
result from the situation where a Member State grants to the same undertaking the right 
to establish both cable TV and telecommunications networks, the subject of the present 
study. In recital 18, the Commission noted the possible anti-competitive consequences, 
in particular the fact that such undertaking has no incentive to attract users to the cable 
TV network as long as it has spare capacity on the telecommunications network. The 
Commission concluded that the national authorities were best able to assess which 
measures are appropriate to address these concerns. However, in Article 2 of the 
Directive, the Commission nevertheless required the Member States to take certain 
minimum measures, as follows: 
182 "Lastly, as was recalled by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its Judgment of 19 
March 1991 in Case C-202/88, France v. Commission, a system of undistorted competition, as laid 
down in the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured between the various 
economic operators. Reserving to one undertaking which markets telecommunications services the task 
of supplying the indispensable raw material - transmission capacity - to all companies offering 
telecommunications services provided, however, [is] tantamount to conferring upon it the power to 
determine at will which service could be offered by its competitors, at which costs and in which time 
periods, and to monitor their clients and the traffic generated by its competitors, thereby putting that 
undertaking at an obvious advantage over its competitors." Cable TV Directive, cited above, at recital 
14. 
183 Spain and Portugal filed actions with the Court of Justice seeking the annulment of the Cable TV 
Directive. Case C-11/96, Spain v. Commission, O.J. 1996, C 9515; Case C-12/96, Portugal v. 
Commission, O.J. 1996 C 95/5 (appeal withdrawn). Spain contends that the Commission lacks 
competence to abolish restrictions on the provision of network transmission capacity for cable TV by 
means of an Article 90(3) directive. Spain also contends that the Commission has misused its powers 
by in fact implementing a harmonization measure in breach of the principles of inter-institutional 
balance enshrined in the Treaty and the case law. 
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to ensure accounting transparency and prevent discriminatory behaviour, where 
a telecommunications operator with an exclusive right to provide public 
telecommunications network infrastructure also provides cable TV network 
infrastructure; 
to ensure the separation of financial accounts as concerns the provision of each 
network and the telecommunications operator's activity as provider of 
telecommunications services; and 
"" 
-: to ensure that an operator with an exclusive right to provide cable TV network 
infrastructure in a given area in a Member State keeps separate financial 
accounts regarding its activity as a telecommunications network capacity 
provider when its turnover exceeds a certain level. 184 • 
It is obvious from the foregoing and from the explanation of these measures in 
the preamble of the directive that the Commission's principal concern was to address 
the situation where a dominant operator in one of these businesses also engages in the 
other business: "Where Member States grant to the same undertaking the right to 
establish both cable TV and telecommunications networks, they put the undertaking in 
a situation whereby it has no incentive to attract users to the network best suited to the 
provision of the relevant service, as long as it has spare capacity on the other network. 
In that case, the undertaking has, on the contrary, an interest for overcharging for use 
of the cable infrastructure for the provision of non-reserved services, in order to 
increase the traffic on their telecommunications networks. The introduction of fair 
competition. will often require specific measures that take into account the specific 
circumstances of the relevant markets. Given the disparities between Member States, 
the national authorities are best able to assess which measures are most appropriate, 
and in particular to judge whether a separation of the activities is indispensable. In 
early stages of liberalisation, detailed control of cross-subsidies and accounting 
transparency are essential. To allow the monitoring of any improper behaviour, 
Member States should therefore at least impose a clear separation of financial records 
between the two activities, though full sf!uctural separation is preferable. "185 
The Commission foresaw in the Cable TV Directive that the above minimum 
measures would not necessarily suffice to eliminate "automatic abuses" resulting from 
a dominant telecommunications operator also being dominant in the cable TV business. 
184 In the appeal which it had lodged in Case C-12/96, Portugal v. Commission, cited above, (but which 
has been withdrawn) Portugal contended that the Commission lacks competence under Article 90(3) to 
order accounting separation, on the ground that Article 90 only confers powers on the Commission in 
respect of measures adopted by the Member States and not in respect of anti-competitive conduct which 
undertakings themselves might adopt. According to Portugal, no specific State measure imposes upon 
the telecommunications operators or cable TV network operators any obligation as regards the 
organization of their respective accounting procedures. Portugal claimed that the absence of accounting 
separation was due only to the operators and not to Member State measures. 
185 Cable TV Directive, cited above, at recital 18. 
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As already indicated, the Cable TV Directive provides that the Commission will, before . 
1 January 1998, carry out an overall assessment of the impact where· a single operator 
provides both telecommunications and cable TV networks or both services. According 
to the preamble (recital 20), in the event that no competing home-delivery system is 
authorized by the relevant Member State, the Commission will reconsider whether 
separation of accounts is sufficient to avoid improper practices and will assess whether 
such joint provision does not result in a limitation of the potential supply of 
transmission capacity at the expense of the services providers in the relevant area, or 
' whether further measures are warranted. 
The Commission also made an extensive use of the doctrine of 
"automatic/necessary abuse" in the Full Competition Directive, in which it required 
Member States to eliminate, effective 1 January 1998 (subject to longer periods for 
Member States with small or less developed networks), all measures granting special 
or exclusive rights for the provision of voice telephony services and the provision of 
telecommunications networks required for the provision of voice telephony services. 
The Commission's reasoning in the preamble to the directive is directly relevant to the 
present study, 186 as it emphasizes the importance of granting new entrants to the voice 
telephony market free choice as regards the underlying infrastructure on which to 
provide their services in competition with the dominant TO. This reasoning, as shown 
below, represents a novel application of the doctrine of "the automatic abuse of a 
dominant position" in that it is based on the conflict of interest which results from the 
telecommunications operator's dominance in both the network infrastructure and the 
services ~arkets. Under the reasoning applied by the Commission, the 
"automatic/necessary abuse" is the direct consequence of the existence of this conflict 
of interest resulting from the dominance in two markets. 
According to the preamble, the absence of free choice regarding underlying 
infrastructure will have the de facto effect of preventing new entrants from entering the 
market for voice telephony and will deprive the abolition of special and exclusive rights 
for the provision of voice telephony of its effet utile. 181 It would qo so because the 
dominant TO would have a "conflict of interest" as both an infrastructure and a service 
provider with the consequence that it would be induced to abuse its dominant position, 
through its power to determine at will where, when and at what cost services can be 
186 In addition to the uses made of the "automatic/necessary abuse" doctrine discussed here, the 
Commission also made use of this doctrine in the Full Competition Directive as the legal basis for 
various other provisions, including the provisions on the control of numbering (recital 11 ), information 
on new numbers and number portability (recital 11) and infrastructure for high bandwidth services other 
than voice telephony (recital 25). 
187 Full Competition Directive, cited above, at recital 7: "[T]he abolition of exclusive and special rights 
on the provision of voice telephony would have little or no effect, if new entrants would be obliged to 
use the public telecommunications network of the incumbent telecommunications organizations, with 
whom they compete in the voice telephony marker.· 
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offered by its competitors and through its power to monitor the clients and traffic 
generated by its competitors. 188 
According to the preamble, this conclusion was supported by complaints 
illustrating that telecommunications operators use their control of the access conditions 
to the network at the expense of their competitors in the service market and use 
information acquired as infrastructure providers regarding the services planned by their 
competitors to target clients in the services market. The Commission therefore 
concluded that the most appropriate remedy to this conflict of interest is to allow 
service providers to use own or third party telecommunications infrastructure to provide 
their services to the final consumer instead of the infrastructure of their main 
competitor. 189 
As already indicated, the Commission applied the doctrine of 
"automatic/necessary abuse" in the Article 90 decisions on second GSM operators in 
Spain and ltaly. 190 In these decisions, the Commission described the case law of the 
Court of Justice on "automatic/necessary abuse" as precluding "Member States from 
enacting measures likely to cause an undertaking to infringe the provisions to ·which 
it refers, in particular, in the case in point, those contained in Article 86" .191 The 
Commission reas6ned t~at, as a direct consequence of the additional financial burdens 
imposed by Spain and !taly on the second GSM operators in their countries. the 
188 As stated by the Commission: "Reserving to one undenaking which markets telecommunications senKes 
the task of supplying the indispensable raw material, i.e. the transmission capacity, to all its compe111on 
would be tantamount to conferring upon it the power to detennine at will where and when services can 
be offered by its competi~ors, at what cost, and to monitor their clients and the traffic generated '" as 
competitors, placing that undenaking in a position where it would be induced to abuse its dommanr 
position." Full Competition Directive, cited above, at recital 7. 
189 ld. As already indicated above, the Commission also applied the doctrine of "the automatic abuse of 
a dominant position" in its reasoning regarding the TO's power to allocate numbers to the customer~ 
of new entrants. According to the Commission (at recital11), if telecommunications operators maintam 
the power to allocate numbers to the customers of new entrants, they "will be induced to resen·e rhe 
best numbers for themselves and to give their competitors insufficient numbers or numbers which are 
commercially less attractive, for example, because of their length. By maintaining such power in rhe 
hands of their telecommunications organizations Member States would therefore induce the fanner 10 
abuse their power on the market for voice telephony and infringe Anicle 90 of the Treaty, in conjunction 
with Anicle 86." As a consequence, the Commission required that the national numbering plan should 
be entrusted to an independent body. 
190 Cited above. Both decisions, adopted approximately one year apart, involved similar facts and almost 
identical reasoning. Italy and Spain charged very large "up-front" and annual fees to the second GSM 
operators in their countries. The Commission held that these conditions violated Article 90 in 
conjunction with Article 86, by leading, inter alia, to "automatic/necessary abuses" by the Italian and 
Spanish incumbent telecommunications operators which were holders of the first GSM licenses in their 
respective countries, in three different markets in which these operators were dominant -- the markets 
for public telecommunications networks, voice telephony and analogue radiotelephony. The appeals 
lodged against the decision concerning Italy have been referred to above. 
191 Second GSM operator in Italy, cited above, at para. 17, penultimate sub-para; Second GSM operator 
in Spain, cited above, at para. 21, penultimate sub-para. 
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incumbent telecommunications operators which were also the holders of the first GSM 
licences in each of those countries would have a choice between two different 
commercial strategies, each of which would amount to an abuse of dominant position 
in -violation of Article 90( 1) in conjunction with Article 86. 
The first commercial strategy which would be abusive was found to consist of 
the extension to GSM of the incumbent operator's existing dominance in the markets 
for public telecommunications networks, voice telephony and analogue radiotelephony. 
The Commission found that the extension of the dominant position would result from 
the fact that the incumbent telecommunications operator "could be encouraged" to 
reduce its tariffs to take advantage of the distortion of cost structure due to the initial 
payment the State required from the second operator. In the decision on the conditions 
imposed on the second Spanish GSM operator, the Commission also found that the 
incumbent telecommunications operator's dominant positions would be strengthened as 
a result of the fact that this operator "could use" the savings resulting from the fact that 
it did not have to make an equivalent payment as a means for pricing its services 
aggressively in areas where it faced competition from the second operator. It could also 
use these savings as a means for making special offers and conducting intensive 
advertising campaigns which "could threaten" the economic viability of the second 
operator. 
The alternative abusive commercial strategy was found to reside in the limitation 
of production, markets or technical development (Article 86(b) EC). The Commission 
reasoned that the reduction in capital resulting from the payment of the fee by the 
second operator meant that this money would not be available for investments. This 
factor "might encourage" the holder of the first license to delay the development of its 
GSM network, to concentrate on the analog system and to retain higher tariffs for its 
GSM services than it would in the absence of the State measure. 
· These directives and decisions indicate that the Commission gives the doctrine 
of "automatic/necessary abuse" a wide interpretation as applying in situations where 
State measures are likely to result in abuses of dominant positions; the Commission ·s 
interpretation of this doctrine could be described as the doctrine of "automatic/likely 
abuse". While for certain types of automatic abuses the Commission indicates in the 
preambles to the Article 90 directives and in its Article 90 decisions that it already has 
evidence of past abuses in support of its findings of "automatic/likely abuses", it is 
clear especially from the two GSM decisions that the Commission does not consider 
the existence of such evidence to be necessary for the application of the doctrine. 
I.B.3.2 Doctrine of the "illegal extension/strengthening" of a dominant position 
The doctrine of the "illegal extension/strengthening" of a dominant 
position underlies both the Terminal Equipment Directive and the Telecommunications 
Services Directive. Moreover, the Commission has used this doctrine as one of the legal 
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grounds for the combined applications of Articles 90 and 86 in the Satellite Services 
Directive and the Full Competition Directive. 
Although no mention of this doctrine is made in the preamble of the Terminal .. 
Equipment Directive or in the judgment of the Court of Justice on this directive, 192 
it follows from the reasoning of the Court of Justice in GB-INNO-BM that the latter 
would consider the Terminal Equipment Directive to be based on this doctrine. It was 
argued before the Court that there could be a finding of an infringement of Article 
90(1) only if the Member State had favoured an abuse that the dominant operator had 
in fact committed and that the fact that the latter operator was designated as both the 
authority for granting approval to telecommunications equipment and was competing 
with suppliers of such equipment could not in itself amount to an abuse of dominant 
position. The Court of Justice responded, however, that it was "the extension of the 
monopoly in the establishment and operation of the telephone network to the market 
in telephone equipment, without any objective justification, which is prohibited as such 
by Article 86, or by Article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 86, where that extension 
results from a measure adopted by a State. "193 
The Commission applied reasoning based on the illegal extension/strengthening 
of a dominant position in the preamble of the Telecommunications Services Directive, 
in which it stated that the special or exclusive rights granted to the incumbent 
telecommunications operator for the provision of telecommunications services 
strengthened that operator's dominant position in creating and operating the network, 
by extending it to services. 194 
The Commission applied the same reasoning in the preamble of the Satellite 
Services Directive, where it noted that exclusive rights held by incumbent 
telecommunications operators in the satellite communications field had the effect of 
extending the dominant position enjoyed by such operators in creating the terrestrial 
networks, thereby strengthening that position. 195 
This doctrine was used by the Commission as the legal basis for the provisions 
in the Full Competition Directive concerning telephone directories 196 and universal 
192 France v. Commission, cited above. 
193 RTT v. GB-INNO-BM, cited above, at para. 24. See also the discussion above on the full reasoning 
followed by the Court of Justice. 
194 Telecommunications Services Directive, cited above, at recital 15. 
195 Satellite Services Directive, cited above, at para. 13. 
196 Full Competition Directive, cited above, at recital 17. The Commission reasoned that exclusive rights 
held by incumbent telecommunications operators over telephone directories have the effect of extending 
the dominant position enjoyed by the telecommunications operators in providing voice telephony and 
therefore strengthen that position. Such rights were therefore incompatible with Article 90(1) in 
conjunction with Article 86, as were any restrictions on the provision of directory information by new 
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service financing schemes. 197 
Finally, as already indicated in the preceding section, in its Article 90 decisions 
on the second GSM operators in Spain and Italy, the Commission used the doctrine of · .. 
the "illegal extension/strengthening" of a dominant position as one of the two 
"automatic/likely abuses" found to exist in those decisions. 
I.B.3.3 Doctrine of "equality of opportunity" 
As already indicated, the Court of Justice developed the doctrine of "equality of 
opportunity" in the context of its judgment on the Terminal Equipment Directive. 198 
The issue arose in connection with the provisions of that directive requiring the 
separation of the roles of regulator and operator. The Court of Justice stated that: "a 
system of undistorted competition, as laid down in the Treaty, can be guaranteed onlv 
if equality of opportunity is secured as between the various economic operators. To 
entrust an undertaking which markets terminal equipment with the task of drawing up 
the specifications for such equipment, monitoring their application and granting type-
approval in respect thereof is tantamount to conferring upon it the power to determine 
at will which terminal equipment may be connected to the public network, and thereby 
placing that undertaking at an obvious advantage over its competitors" (emphasis 
added). The legal basis for this doctrine is not indicated by the Court of Justice. 199 
However, the reference to the requirement in Article 3(g) of a system of undistorted 
competition strongly implies that the doctrine finds its legal basis in the latter Treaty 
provision. 
The Commission emphasized this doctrine in the two second GSM operator 
decisioqs as being particularly important where the incumbent telecommunications 
operator holding the first GSM licence in the country concerned already enjoys a 
number of major advantages as a result of the fact that the first licensee is dominant 
on other markets. 200 
We shall revert to these various doctrines again in Section II.B below concerning 
the grounds of a new Article 90(3) directive aimed at completing and ensuring the 
effectiveness of the existing directives. 
technological means and on the provision of specialized and/or regional and local directories. 
197 Full Competition Directive, cited above, at recital 19. 
198 France v. Commission, cited above, at para. 51. 
199 Nor is it indicated in the Court's later GB-INNO-BM decision. RTT v. GB-INNO-BM, cited above, 
at para. 25. See the discussion of this case above. 
200 Second operator of GSM radiotelephony services in Italy, cited above, at para. 15; Second operator of 
GSM radiotelephony services in Spain, cited above, at para. 19. 
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I.B.4 Scope for further Commission action under Article 90(3) 
In view of the extensive liberalization under the above directives, and in 
particular the abolition of special and exclusive rights in respect of telecommunications 
infrastructure and services, the question arises whether there remains scope for further 
Commission directives applying Article 90(3) in the telecommunications sector. 
First, undet_ the principle of e.ffet utile,201 it is arguable that the Commission 
is empowered to adopt Article 90(3) directives aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of 
existing Article 90(3) directives. The Cable TV Directive is already an application of 
this principle. According to its preamble, the latter directive was adopted in part 
because the Commission found that regulatory restrictions preventing the use of 
alternative network infrastructures for the provision of liberalised services: and in 
particular the restrictions on the use of cable TV networks, were the main cause of a 
continuing bottleneck situation preventing the liberalisation under the 
Telecommunications Services Directive from being effective. 202 
Second, it is not necessarily the case that all special rights in the 
telecommunications sector have been abolished in the existing directives.203 For 
purposes of the latter, "special rights" have been defined in a specific manner which is 
not necessarily exhaustive. Broadly speaking, a "special right" is defined in Article 1 ( 1) 
of the Telecommunications Services Directive (as amended) as consisting of any legal 
or regulatory advantages, granted otherwise than on the basis of objective, proportional 
and non-d_iscriminatory criteria, which substantially affect the ability of any other 
undertaking -to provide the same telecommunications service or to undertake the same 
activity in the same geographical area under substantially equivalent conditions. In 
other contexts, other notions of "special rights" have already been used?04 It is 
201 See, e.g., Netherlands and Others v. Commission, cited above, at paras. 28-30. The Treaty requires 
the Member States not to take or maintain in force measures which could destroy the effectiveness of 
the Community's competition rules. Case 13177, lnno v. ATAB, [1977] ECR 2115, at paras. 31-32. 
202 The pending annulment applications filed by Spain and Portugal (cited above) appear to challenge the 
Commission's competence to use Article 90(3) in this manner in their contentions that the Commission 
in the Cable TV Directive is not specifying obligations already in existence under Article 90(1), but is 
rather laying down a new obligation to liberalize the market. 
203 See, for example, the reasoning followed by the Commission in paragraph 6 of the Commission's 
decision on the conditions imposed on the second GSM operator in Italy (cited above), in which the 
Commission considered that Italy's grant of the first licence to operate a GSM network qualified as a 
special right since the operator had been designated otherwise than according to objective and non-
discriminatory criteria. This could imply that an initial grant by the State of an exclusive right will 
automatically become and remain a special right after any future licences are granted to third parties 
on the basis of objective and non-discriminatory criteria. See, however, the grounds for appeal in Case 
T-215/95, Telecom ltalia SpA v. Commission, summarized in O.J. 1995, C 46115. 
204 See Article 2(3) of Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, 0.1. 
1993, L 199/84, adopted under Article 100A, for a different concept of "special or exclusive" rights 
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untested whether these types of "special rights" would also qualify as "special rights" 
within the meaning of Article 90 EC. In this respect, it can be noted that the fact that 
the Commission has defined a specific notion in an act of secondary legislation does 
not necessarily mean that such a definition is exhaustive.205 
Third, it follows from the Member States' duty to implement the objective laid 
down in an Article 90(3) directive that the Member States may not enact or maintain 
in force any measure which has the effect of resulting in the de facto continuation of 
special and exclusive rights which have been abolished in that directive and that the 
Commission is empowered to adopt a new Article 90(3) directive or decision (as 
appropriate) prohibiting such measures. The Full Competition Directive contains an 
application of this principle in recital 13 when it refers to the fact that dealys in 
interconnection of new operators due to disputes as to terms and conditions would 
jeopardize the market entry of new entrants and hence prevent the abolition of special 
and exclusive rights to become effective. According to the Commission, the ''failure by 
Member States to adopt the necessary safeguards to prevent such a situation would lead 
to a continuation de facto of the current special and exclusive rights, which as set out 
above are considered to be incompatible with Article 90(1) of the Treaty, in conjunction 
with Articles 59 and 86 of the Treaty." 
Finally, the abolition of special and exclusive rights under the existing directives 
does not affect the use of Article 90(3) directives by the Commission in respect of 
Member State measures relating to TOs which are "public undertakings" .206 
as consisting of the reservation for one or more entities of the exploitation of an activity covered by the 
directive; it provides that a special right exists for the purpose of constructing, inter alia, public 
telecommunications networks if the undertaking may take advantage of a procedure for the expropriation 
or use of property or may place network equipment on, under or over the public highway. Another kind 
of "special" right may also be found in the Foster case law, which refers to undertakings holding 
"special powers" (in French "pouvoirs exorbitants ") beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable to relations between individuals. Case C-188/89, Foster and Others v. British Gas, [1990] 
ECR I 3313, at para. 18. 
205 See the case law, discussed in the next footnote, on the concept of "public undertaking" as defined in 
the Transparency Directive. 
206 Indeed, it can be noted that the abolition of special and exclusive rights under the existing directives 
does not affect the use of Article 90(3) directives by the Commission in respect of Member State 
measures relating to TOs which are "public undertakings". The concept of "public undertaking" is not 
defined in the Treaty. The Commission defined the concept in the so-called "Transparency" Directive 
(Directive 801723 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings, O.J. 1980, L 195.35) as "any undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise 
directly or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation 
therein, or the rules which govern it" (emphasis added). Under the Transparency Directive, a dominant 
influence is presumed when the public authorities directly or indirectly hold the major part of the 
undertaking's subscribed capital, control the majority of the voting rights, or can appoint more than half 
the members of the undertaking's administrative, managerial or supervisory body." The Council has 
incorporated the same definition of "public undertakings" in the public procurement directives. See, e.g. 
Council Directive 93/38/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, O.J. 1993, L 199/84, Art. 
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We revert in Part 11.2 to the manners in which the Commission could still use 
Article 90(3) in the telecommunications sector and, more particularly, in the context 
of the currently ongoing process of revtew of certain situations m the 
telecommunications and cable TV sectors. 
1(2). The criteria in the Transparency Directive were accepted by the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 
188-90/80, France. Italy and UK v. Commission, [1982] ECR 2545. However, the Court of Justice 
made it clear that the definition of public undertaking for purposes of the Transparency Directive is not 
necessarily the same as for Article 90 itself. In GSM radiotelephony services in Italy, cited above, State 
ownership of 55% of the capital of Telecom Italia SpA was sufficient for it to be considered a "public 
undertaking" within the meaning of Article 90(1). In GSM radiotelephony services in Spain, cited 
above, the Commission concluded, by reference to the "decisive influence" test laid down in the 
Transparency Directive, cited above, that the Spanish Government had decisive influence over 
Telefonica de Espana by virtue of its ownership of 21.16% of the share capital of Telefonica de 
Espana, combined with the right to appoint a representative with the right of veto over the decisions 
of the board of directors and the right directly to appoint 25% of the members of the board of directors. 
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II. Application of the Treaty rules re~:ardin~: operators active in 
telecommunications and cable TV activities 
In the Sections which follow, an examination is made of two basic instruments 
(i.e., the application of Article 86 and the other EC competition rules as applied to 
individual undertakings, on the one hand, and the use of Article 90(3) in respect of 
Member State legislation and other rules in the national legal orders) which could be 
used by the European Commission in dealing with certain practices and market 
situations in which undertakings, after the liberalization of the markets, are active in 
a simultaneous manner in the converging sectors of telecommunications services and 
cable TV and (multi-)media services (or are prevented by way of State regulation to 
employ such a double activity). In particular, the focus will be on those undertakings 
which are in a dominant position both over telecommunications infrastructure and over 
cable TV infrastructure and networks and which are in such a position as a consequence 
of the legal monopoly rights from which they have benefitted throughout the years 
prior to the liberalization process implemented at the EC level. In the discussion on 
Article 90(3), we will also examine the restrictions placed by the State on the use of 
telecommunications infrastructure for the provision of cable TV services. 
In this respect, a graduated approach will be followed indicating the various 
degrees of specific interventions and control which could be considered and/or 
implemented by the European Commission on the basis of the existing Treaty 
provisions and those in secondary legislation on competition. Obviously, the discussion 
below will draw on the results and the findings· of the preceding background study 
which will be supplemented with a more practical application of the principles 
developed in those Sections to the situations of fact in the telecommunications and 
cable TV sectors. 
II.A Case-approach - Application to individual undertakin~:s 
This Section of the study focuses on the constraints imposed by the EC 
competition rules on the conduct of an undertaking holding a dual monopoly or, in the 
alternative, a dual dominant position over telecommunications network infrastructure 
and cable TV network infrastructure. It intends to demonstrate the ways in which the 
provisions of EC competition law impose rigorous constraints on such conduct. These 
constraints result, in particular, from the unique position in which the undertaking is 
placed in the market and which imposes on it a "special responsibility" not to weaken 
competition further and not to extend its market power to other markets. Both from a 
legal and a policy perspective, this should result in the strictest scrutiny and application 
of the competition rules not only because of the fact that very often the conduct of the 
undertaking concerned will almost automatically lead to a further strengthening of its 
dominant position but also because of the seriousness of any abuses committed which 
would occur in a market where rapid developments and growth are expected. 
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This part of the study will also address the issue whether, on the basis of 
existing law, the application of the EC competition rules in connection with applicable 
secondary legislation may result in the obligation on the undertaking which is in the 
specific situation of holding a dual dominant position over telecommunications network 
infrastructure and cable TV networks to take certain positive measures in order to avoid 
a finding that its conduct infringes the competition rules, in particular Article 86. 
Measures which could be envisaged in this respect are accounting separation and 
structural separation which do not require a modification to the ownership structure, as 
well as a more far-reaching obligation to divest one of the two network infrastructures. 
The emphasis in the Sections below will be on the application of Article 86 EC 
but references will be included to ~pecific issues which may arise under Article 85 and 
the Merger Control Regulation as well as to existing precedents under those instruments 
which may provide guidance on the interpretation of the competition rules in the 
present context. 
II.A.l Direct constraints resulting from the application of the EC competition rules 
(Articles 85 and 86 EC and the EC Merger Control Regulation) on the 
commercial conduct of an undertaking holding a dominant position over both 
cable TV and telecommunications networks 
The obvious starting point of the analysis below is that an undertaking holding 
a dominant position over both cable TV and telecommunications networks is subject 
to the application of the competition rules. This implies that its conduct is subject to 
the scrutiny under the various provisions ofEC competition law (Article 86 EC, Article 
85 EC or the Merger Control Regulation207), each of these provisions setting out 
specific criteria for assessing the conduct concerned and each providing the authorities 
concerned with different procedural means for controlling such conduct, ex post and/or 
a priori. For the sake of convenience, the undertaking holding a dominant position over 
telecommunications and cable TV infrastructure is referred to below as the "Dominant 
Undertaking". 
II.A.l.l The application of the EC competition rules to the market behaviour of 
the undertaking holding a dual dominant position will place a number of 
constraints on that undertaking's conduct 
The competition rules, and in particular Article 86, can be applied to the 
actual conduct of the Dominant Undertaking to address any abusive elements. Such 
elements can fall within the various categories of abusive practices which have already 
been discussed in Section I.A.l above, namely: "direct" abusive exploitation of 
suppliers, customers and end-users, exclusionary abuses, abuses based on monopoly 
leverage and structural abuses. 
207 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, O.J. 1989, L 395/1. 
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For the above reasons, the existing and draft instruments on. the application of 
the competition rules to the telecommunications sector, including the Commission 
Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition Rules in the telecommunications 
sector (the "Competition Guidelines)208 and the Draft Notice on the application of the 
competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector09, provide 
already substantial guidance as to what kinds of behaviour can be considered as abusive 
within the meaning of Article 86 EC. In addition, further guidance can also be drawn 
from the liberalization directives adopted by the Commission. So, for example, recital 
18 of the Cable Television Directive, which is one of the starting points of this study, 
provides that "[w}here Member States grant to the same undertaking the right to 
establish both cable TV and telecommunications networks, they put the undertaking in 
a situation whereby it has no incentive to attract users to the network best suited to the 
provision of the relevant service, as long as it has spare capacity on the other network. 
In that case, the undertaking has, on the contrary, an interest for overcharging for use 
of the cable infrastructure for the provision of non-reserved services, in order to 
increase the traffic on their telecommunications networks." The rationale underlying 
that statement should in fact also apply where the de facto dual dominant position is 
"inherited" from a previously existing legal monopoly and where the undertaking 
actually engages in the conduct concerned. 
The illustrations of abusive behaviour which are briefly discussed below are 
clearly not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, the intention is to recall a number of the 
practices which have already been condemned in the case law and the administrative 
practice as basic abuses within the meaning of Article 86 EC and show how they could 
occur in the present context. The headings followed below correspond with the 
categories of abuses used in Section I.A.l above.210 
208 O.J. 1991, C 233/2. As a general matter and by way of introduction, it is worth noting that the 
Competition Guidelines contain on certain points an already extensive interpretation of Article 86 EC. 
So, for example, it is stated that "it is not necessary for the purpose of the application of Article 86 that 
competition be restricted as to a service which is supported by the monopoly provision in question. It 
would suffice that the behavior results in an appreciable restriction of competition in whatever way. This 
means that an abuse may occur when the company affected by the behavior is not a service provider 
but an end user who could himself be disadvantaged in competition in the course of his own business." 
(at para. 85). 
209 Cited above. 
210 As indicated above, this classification may be considered as being a bit artificial in specific cases since 
one and the same conduct may fall within several types of abuse. Thus, the granting of financial or 
other advantages to a favored (large) customer may at the same time result in exclusionary effects for 
a competitor of the Dominant Undertaking and may also involve elements of discrimination in favor 
of the customer concerned putting it at a competitive advantage as compared with its competitors which 
do not receive the privileged treatment. 
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(i) Direct abusive exploitation of suppliers, customers and end-users 
Direct abusive exploitation of suppliers, customers or end-users can take a broad 
variety of forms. A general distinction can be drawn between conduct which is related 
to prices and conduct relating to other unilateral or contractual terms and conditions of 
purchase and/or supply. Furthermore, the Competition Guidelines state in this respect 
that "Article 86 can apply to behavior of dominant undertakings [in the 
telecommunications sector J resulting in a refusal to supply, discrimination, restrictive 
tying clauses, unfair prices or other inequitable conditions"211 • 
Price-related conduct: As is confirmed by the extensive case law, not only prices 
which are excessively high can be considered as abusive but also those which are 
discriminatory or those which have predatory effects. 
As far as selling prices are concerned, the above quoted language from the Cable 
TV Directive already gives a good example of the manner in which the Dominant 
Undertaking may breach Article 86 EC by charging excessively high prices (through 
an unfavorable allocation of resources). As concerns purchase prices, the Competition 
Guidelines make it clear that Article 86 would apply to conduct of the Dominant 
Undertaking through which it attempts to "negotiate" with its suppliers excessively low 
purchase prices. 212 
Although it is not the purpose of this study to discuss the question of when 
prices can be considered to be abusively high,213 one question which merits further 
attention in the context of this study is the question of the burden of proof (which \\ill 
also be discussed further in Section II.A.3 ). Indeed, the position and the combined 
activities of the Dominant Undertal\ing may give rise to specific difficulties in verifying 
whether· a certain price level is justifiable. 
211 Competition Guidelines, at para. 85. 
212 Given the fact that the Dominant Undertaking could, subject to verification in each individual case ( m 
which the definition of the relevant market could play a significant role), also have a dominant position 
in respect of the purchasing of a broad variety of goods and/or services, there could indeed be room 
for this type of an abuse in the present context. 
213 In this respect, we simply note that a number of different tests have already been used in the past case 
law under Article 86 in this respect, in particular: the use of geographic price discrimination not based 
on differences in costs for establishing that the higher price was abusive (see, for example, United 
Brands, cited above), the relationship between the price and the "economic value" of the product or the 
service concerned (see, for example, Case 26175, General Motors v. Commission, [ 1975] ECR 207, 
at para. 11), the relationship with the cost of production (United Brands, cited above), the relationship 
with the price charged for equivalent products or services by competitors (Case 226/84, British Leyland 
v. Commission, [1986] ECR 3263), the reference to interpretative criteria set out in secondary 
Community legislation (see Ahmed Saeed, cited and discussed above), the benchmarking with prices 
applied in other regions and countries where a reasonable common base for comparison can be 
established (see, for example, Case 30/87, Bodson v. Commission, [ 1988] ECR 24 79, at para. 31; and 
also Case 395/87, Ministere Public v .· Tournier, [ 1989] ECR 2521, para. 38 and Joined Cases 110/88 
a.o., Lucazeau v. SACEM, [1989] ECR 2811, at para. 25). 
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It is an established rule that in competition cases 1t 1s incumbent upon the 
Commission to demonstrate in a sufficient manner any finding of an infringement of 
the competition rules and, in particular, of an abuse of a dominant position.214 
However, the Court has recognised and, in fact, compelled the Commission to verify 
the costs of an undertaking which was alleged and found to practice abusively high 
prices.215 This makes it arguable that the undertaking which is alleged to charge 
excessively high prices is under an obligation (to be able) to provide the Commission, 
at the latter's request, with the costing information which may be required to allow the 
Commission to carry out its verification. This can further be interpreted as meaning that 
in such cases there is a certain reversal of the burden of proof since it is arguable that 
the undertaking concerned should provide such information which allows an effective 
verification. An essential point in respect of the Dominant Undertaking would be that 
it should be made possible to make a verification of the appropriate nature of the 
allocation of costs between the various activities and services provided by the said 
undertaking. We revert to these questions in more detail below. 
Product-related conduct: With regard to non-price related forms of conduct, a 
variety of practices engaged in by the Dominant Undertaking may be considered as 
abusive. One of these forms of exploitative conduct is tying (which may also have at 
the same time certain exclusionary effects on competitors). Tying practices216 engaged 
in by a dominant undertaking are generally abusive unless they can be objectively 
214 It is incumbent on the Commission to bring evidence of infringements; see, in particular, Joined Cases 
1Q0/80 a.o., Musigue Diffusion Francaise v. Commission, [1983] ECR 1825, where it is stated that 
the Commission must produce "sufficiently precise and coherent prooF. It has also already been held 
that instances where the evidence is equivocal will be resolved in favor of the undertaking (Joined Cases 
29 & 30/83, CRAM & Rheinzink v. Commissign, [1984] ECR 1679). In Wood Pulp (Joined Cases C-
89/85 a.o., Ahlstrom and Others v. Commission, [1993] ECR I-1307, at para. 71), the Court annulled, 
among others, the Commission's finding of concertation ruling that parallel conduct cannot be regarded 
as furnishing proof of concertation unless it is the only plausible explanation for such conduct (the Court 
considered that Article 85 did not prevent the undertaking from intelligently adapting or anticipating the 
conduct of competitors). By contrast, where the undertaking engages in equivocal if not "suspicious" 
conduct such as attending a meeting at which prices are discussed, this alone can suffice to find an 
infringement (see Case T-6/89, Enichem v. Commission, [1991] ECR 1623, at para. 112). 
215 In United Brands, cited above, the Court annulled the Commission's finding that United Brands had 
set unfair prices. The Court ruled that the Commission should have assessed the unfairness of United 
Brand's prices by comparing the selling price and its cost of production, which the Commission had 
not done (at para. 251). The Court recognized that calculating the production cost could be a difficult 
and complex task, but was not so in the case of bananas (at para 254-255). Consequently, the Court 
stated that the Commission was "at least under a duty to require UBC to produce paniculars of all the 
constituent elements of its production costs" and that the "accuracy of the contents of the documents 
produced by UBC could have been challenged but that would have been a question of proof." (at paras. 
256-257). 
116 According to Article 86(d), tying consists of "making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other panies of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts." 
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justified.217 The Competition Guidelines already provide a substantial list of examples 
of how tying of telecommunications services may occur.218 While these examples are 
mainly oriented towards the old notions of "reserved services" and the extension of 
dominance and/or the leverage into markets for "non-reserved services", the principles 
for which they stand clearly apply in respect of "markets in which there is dominance" 
and "markets in which there is no dominance" .219 
The fact that the Dominant Undertaking is dominant over both 
telecommunications infrastructure and cable TV infrastructure and provides a wide 
range of both wholesale and retail products and services, shows that there is a large 
potential for abusive tying practices by the Dominant Undertaking. These practices will 
need to be monitored very closely and any "objective justification" which is put 
forward will need to be examined carefully.220 • 
Other abuses: Reference is made to the obligation of dominant undertakings not 
to apply discriminatory conditions with respect to prices as well as with regard to other 
trading conditions.221 Given the fact that the Dominant Undertaking is faced with 
217 See Hilti (Commission Decision of 22 December 1987, O.J. 1988, L 65/19; and Case T-30/89, Hilti 
v. Commission, [1991] ECR 11-1439) and Tetra Pak (Commission Decision of 24 July 1991, Tetra Pak 
IL O.J. 1992, L 72/1; Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak v. Commission, [1994] ECR 755, and Case C-333/94 
P, Tetra Pak International v. Commission, Judgment of 14 November 1996, not yet reported). 
218 For example, tying the provision of the reserved services to the supply by a TO or others of terminal 
equipment to be interconnected or interoperated, in panicular through imposition, pressure, offer of 
special·prices or other trading conditions for the reserved service linked to the equipment; tying the 
provision of the reserved services to the agreement of the user to enter into cooperation with the 
reserved service provider himself as to the non-reserved service to be carried on the network; the 
imposition of unneeded services by supplying reserved and/or non-reserved services when the reserved 
services are reasonably separable from the others, Competition Guidelines, cited above, at para. 98. 
219 See also the Draft Notice on access agreements in the telecommunications sector where it is set out that 
where the vertically integrated dominant service operator obliges the party requestipg access to purchase 
one or more services which are superfluous to the latter without adequate justification, this would 
constitute an abuse under Article 86 sub-paragraph (d) which expressly prohibits "making the conclusion 
of contracts subject to the acceptance by the other party of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts." 
Moreover, such tying can result in excluding competitors of the access provider from offering these 
elements of the package independently. 
22° For cases in which such objective justifications were rejected since there were other lesser restrictive 
means to achieve the goal pursued, see in particular Hilti (Commission Decision of 22 December 1987, 
OJ. 1988, L 65/19; and Case T-30/89, Hilti v. Commission, [1991] ECR 11-1439) and Tetra Pak 
(Commission Decision of 24 July 1991, Tetra Pak II, O.J. 1992, L 7211; Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak v. 
Commission, [1994] ECR 755, and Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International v. Commission, Judgment 
of 14 November 1996, not yet reported). 
221 Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties thereby placing them 
at a competitive disadvantage is also expressly prohibited in Article 86(c). See also the Competition 
Guidelines in which a number of discriminatory practices which could occur in the telecommunications 
sector are listed, in particular: discrimination (other than tariff discrimination) may take the form of 
restrictions or delays in connection to the public switched network or leased circuit provision, in 
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almost no, if any, competition and that it can be considered as an unavoidable source 
of supply (both for consumers as well as for competitors), it may be apparent that its 
market position creates substantial room for discrimination.222 
Other types of abuses which may be particularly relevant to the conduct of the 
Dominant Undertaking can be found in the case law on the combined application of 
Articles 90 and 86 EC.223 In particular, in Porto di Genova/24 the Court held that 
the conduct of an undertaking which was granted an exclusive right to organize dock 
work at Genoa's port was abusive in that it refused to use modem technology, resulting 
in an increase in costs and prolonged delays in performance. In fact, this element can 
also be found in the text of Article 86(b) which expressly prohibits the limiting of 
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers. Therefore, 
the rationale underlying that case and the abuse found there should also be applicable 
in pure Article 86 cases. Accordingly, "inefficiency, idleness, mismanagement or wilful 
neglect" or other forms of "quiet life"225 should also be considered as possible 
abuses. 226 Subject to verification through economic theory and analysis, it can be 
argued that the absence of competitive pressure on the Dominant Undertaking may lead 
to a number of inefficiencies, delays in investments and innovation and the withholding 
from the consumer of new and enhanced services. 
installation, maintenance.and repair, in effecting interconnection of systems or in providing infonna11on 
concerning networks planning, signalling protocols, technical standards and all other infonna11on 
necessary for an appropriate interconnection and interoperation with the (reserved) service which rna~ 
affect the interworking of competitive services or terminal equipment offerings. Discrimination 
obviously may also have certain exclusionary effects where it puts competitors at a compe11m r: 
disadvantage as compared with the dominant undertaking's own activities. The Competition Guide! me~ 
also list various fonns of usage restrictions which the dominant operator may attempt to impose. such 
as the prohibition to connect private leased circuits by means of concentrator, multiplexer or other 
equipment to the public switched network, the prohibition to use private leased circuits for providing 
services, or the imposition of extra charges or other special conditions for certain usages of services 
supported by the legal or de facto monopoly (at paras. 88-97). 
222 In this respect, it should also be borne in mind that the Dominant Undertaking can control the supplies 
of certain of its services (including for example the physical connection to the network(s)) in an almost 
absolute manner and is not faced with certain resellers which would function as arbitrageurs on the 
market. 
223 See the discussion above. 
224 Cited above. 
225 Bellamy & Child, Common Market Law of Competition, Fourth Edition 1993 (1996 Supplement), p. 
640. 
226 See also Commission Decision of 4 November 1988, London European/Sabena, O.J. 1988, L 317/47 
and Joined Cases 110, 241 and 242/88, Lucazeau v. SACEM, [1989] .ECR 2811. 
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(ii) Indirect exclusionary abuses 
Indirect abuses may also take a number of different forms. Two of them are 
discussed in some more detail below. 
Price-related exclusionary abuses: Predatory pncmg, cross-subsidisation and 
fidelity rebate-schemes are three examples of price-related exclusionary abuses which 
could be of particular relevance in examining the market conduct of the Dominant 
Undertaking.227 .... 
As far as predatory pricini28 and cross-subsidisation are concerned, it will be 
necessary to monitor closely the behaviour of the Dominant Undertaking. However, 
since the examination of both of these practices is directly related to and based' on the 
costs and the cost allocation of the Dominant Undertaking, issues of proof similar to 
those described above regarding excessive prices are likely to arise come up. This point 
is further discussed below in Section II.A.3.229 
As far as rebate schemes are concerned, a number of scenarios can be considered 
in which a rebate scheme implemented by the Dominant Undertaking could be qualified 
as abusive. First, the rebate scheme could fall within the prohibited category of what 
has generally been referred to as fidelity rebates tying the customers to the Dominant 
Undertaking.230 Second, it should always be examined whether any rebate scheme is 
used as an instrument for a different type of tying practice through the bundling in one 
scheme of _services for which there is no or little competition and services for which 
there is a higher degree of competition. Third, any allegations by the Dominant 
Undertaking that a rebate scheme is objectively justified by cost-savings would need 
227 Equally, the implementation of excessively high or discriminatory access prices may also have 
exclusionary effects on competitors requiring such access. 
228 See, in particular, the general test for predat<Jry pricing set out by the Court of Justice in AKZO (cited 
above) and Tetra Pak II (cited above). See also the test specific to the telecommunications sector 
developed by the Commission in the Draft Notice on access agreements in the telecommunications 
sector (at para. 91 and footnote 66). 
229 It can already be noted here that the Competition Guidelines refer to the possible use of presumptions 
of abuse in the context of predatory pricing and cross-subsidies. In particular, there it is stated that "if 
in a specific case there are substantial elements converging in indicating the existence of an abusive 
cross-subsidization and/or predatory pricing, the Commission could establish a presumption of such 
cross-subsidization and predatory pricing. An appropriate separate accounting system could be important 
in order to counter this presumption." (at para. 108). 
230 See, in particular, Joined Cases 40/73 a.o., Suiker Unie v. Commission, [1975] ECR 1663; Hoffmann-
La Roche, cited and discussed above; Case T-65/89, BPB Industries/British Gypsum v. Commission, 
[ 1993] ECR II-389; and Case C-3l0/93P, BPB Industries /British Gypsum v. Commission, [ 1995] ECR 
1-865. See also Almelo (Case C-293/92, Almelo, [1994] ECR 1477) in which the Court of Justice 
confirmed that it is an abuse for a dominant undertaking to include a loyalty obligation in its contracts, 
even at the buyer's request. 
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to be examined carefully and would require that the means for effective verification of 
the lawfulness of the arguments invoked are available. 
Other exclusionary abuses (in particular, refusals to provide access): Given the 
fact that the Dominant Undertaking would hold the control over the two essential 
sources of supply of transmission capacity in the telecommunications sector as well as 
over the access through (local loop) customer lines, any refusal by that undertaking to 
provide access to its networks and facilities would require very close attention since it 
would clearly raise competitive concerns. Subject to verification through economic 
theory and analysis, the Dominant Undertaking with its bundled control over the 
telecommunications and the cable TV network could reasonably be expected to control 
in fact a clear essential facility and would therefore be subject to the obligations which 
are attached to this concept. 231 
II.A.l.2 The Undertaking's commercial conduct will require an increased scrutiny 
since a large potential for abusive conduct and foreclosure effects exists 
The position which is occupied in the market by the Dominant 
Undertaking may-.require a particularly strict and vigilant application of the competition 
rules. · 
First, the position of the Dominant Undertaking, due to its unique nature, creates 
a very large potential for abuses. As is already stated in the recitals to the liberalization 
directives, the position of the Dominant Undertaking is such that it can be considered 
that it will be induced to abuse of its dominant position. In particular, recital 18 to the 
Cable TV Directive indicates that where Member States grant to the same undertaking 
the right to establish both cable TV and telecommunications networks, they put the 
undertaking in a situation whereby it has no incentive to attract users to the network 
best suited to the provision of the relevant service, as long as it has spare capacity on 
the other network. In that case, the undertaking has, on the contrary, an interest for 
overcharging for use of the cable infrastructure for the provision of non-reserved 
services, in order to increase the traffic on their telecommunications networks. Subject 
to verification through economic theory and analysis, it is prudent to consider that this 
situation of fact, which raises in itself competitive concerns, will not substantially 
change immediately after the abolition of subsisting special and exclusive rights. In 
particular, where, following liberalization, a legal monopoly is replaced by a de facto 
monopoly or dominant position over telecommunications networks and cable TV 
networks, the Dominant Undertaking's potential for abusive conduct could remain 
virtually unchanged. 
231 See, in particular, the rules applicable to essential facilities as summarized in the Draft Notice on access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector and the individual cases on essential facilities referred to 
therein. 
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Second, the need for strict scrutiny is confirmed by certain practices which have 
already occurred in the past and which could allegedly have been viewed as abusive. 
As is reflected in the recitals to the Cable TV Directive the "bottleneck" situation which 
was created through regulatory constraints and which forced potential service providers 
to rely on transmission capacities provided by the telecommunications organizations has 
encouraged them to charge high prices in comparison with prices in other countries. For 
example, it is stated that tariffs for high-capacity infrastructure were (in 1995) on 
average 10 times higher in the Community than equivalent capacity over equivalent 
distances in the United States.2l2 It is clear that one of the policy objectives should 
be that these practices do not re-occur and that potential market entrants are not 
discouraged to make a market entry. 
Third, (tele)communications activities are currently considered to be one of the 
essential sectors and driving forces of the economy in which rapid development, 
technological innovation and growth are expected. Therefore, any conduct by the 
Dominant Undertaking which would impair the achievement of these essential 
objectives of the liberalization program should raise serious concern and when falling 
within the definition of abuse under Article 86 should be considered as a serious abuse 
requiring rapid elimination and possibly severe penalties. 
II.A.2 The special responsibility and special position of the Dominant Undertaking 
resulting from the fact that virtually each conduct of that undertaking is likely 
to strengthen its dominant position 
The Dominant Undertaking holding control over both the telecommunications 
and the (;able TV infrastructure has a special responsibility resulting in a rather general 
obligation not to weaken competition further. 233 Therefore, the maintenance of such 
a position will in principle result, through the application of the competition rules, in 
severe constraints on the business conduct of such undertaking. Indeed, virtually any 
232 For other types of abuses which may have occurred in the past, see also the recitals to the Full 
Competition Directive. 
233 In addition to the references already made above regarding the "special responsibility" of dominant 
undertakings and the discussion of those cases on the "strengthening of a dominant position", reference 
may also be made to the XXIVth Report on Competition Policy (1994), at para. 207, in which the 
Commission restated its approach to the concept of abuse as follows: "The existence of a dominant 
position is not in itself against the rules of competition. Consumers can suffer from a dominant company 
exploiting this position, the most likely way being through prices higher than would be found if the 
market were subject to effective competition. However, the Commission in its decision-making practice 
does not normally control or condemn the high level of prices as such. Rather it examines the behavior 
of the dominant company designed to preserve its dominance, usually directly against competitors or 
new entrants who would normally bring about effective competition and the price level associated with 
it. A dominant company therefore has a special obligation not to do anything that would cause further 
deterioration to the already fragile structure of competition or to unfairly prevent the emergence and 
growth of new or existing competitors who might challenge this dominance and bring about the 
establishment of effective competition." (emphasis added). 
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of such business conduct (including, in particular, the realization of mergers or joint 
ventures and the entry into cooperation or supply agreements) could be likely to · 
strengthen and reinforce the existing position of economic strength of the Dominant 
Undertaking and could therefore be open to challenge and criticism under the EC 
competition rules (Articles 85 and 86 EC and/or the Merger Control Regulation 
depending on the nature of the business conduct concerned). 
Both the recent prohibition decisions in the telecommunications and media 
... 
sectors adopted under the Merger Control Regulation and the analysis of strategic 
aHiances under Article 85 in the telecommunications sector already illustrate that 
transactions involving already dominant undertakings may incur substantial difficulties 
in obtaining clearance and, where they are cleared, may result in the imposition of strict 
conditions and undertakings bringing anti-competitive effects within acceptabre limits 
and eliminating the grounds for future abusive behaviour in as far as possible. One 
basic element in these precedents is that the control over essential and other bottleneck 
facilities is considered as a basic concern for anti-competitive effects which in itself 
may discourage market entry by potential entrants and which, when it is combined with 
the control over other facilities either horizontally or vertically (for example, through 
an alliance or concentration with undertakings in upstream or downstream markets) will 
often give rise to unacceptable levels of elimination of competition and foreclosure 
effects. By way of illustration, some of the relevant recent decisions are briefly 
summarized below.234 
II.A.2.1 Merger control decisions 
Not surprisingly, nearly all of the transactions where vertical foreclosure 
concern.s triggered Commission enforcement action involved undertakings from the 
telecommunications sector. Moreover, of the six prohibition decisions issued to date 
under the Merger Control Regulation, three involved the media and telecommunications 
sectors. 
MSG Media Service235 provide~ the only example (to the best of our 
knowledge) of the special obligations incumbent upon a Dominant Undertaking holding 
234 In this respect, see also the observations made in the Competition Guidelines (at paras. 129 and 
following). For example, it is stated in respect of vertical integration by a service provider into the 
equipment market that if "dominant service providers are allowed to integrate into the equipment market 
by way of mergers, access to this market by other equipment suppliers may be seriously hindered. A 
dominant service provider is likely to give preferential treatment to its own equipment subsidiary." 
235 Commission Decision of 9 November 1994 (Case IV/M.469), O.J. 1994 L 364, p. I. Media Service 
GmbH ("MSG") was a proposed joint venture between Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (now Deutsche 
Telekom or "DT"), Benelsmann AG and Taurus Beteiligungs GmbH, which belongs to the Kirch 
group. At the time of the Commission decision, DT had a monopoly over the German telephone 
network and was the owner and operator of nearly all the German cable networks (90%). In its decision 
under the Merger Control Regulation, the Commission prohibited the joint venture as being likely to 
create or reinforce a dominant position in three separate markets (i.e., the market for pay-television 
services, the market for technological services, and the market for cable network services). 
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control over both the telecommunications and the cable TV infrastructures. As pertinent 
to the present study, this decision stands for the general proposition that the holder of 
dominant positions in broadband cable network and fixed telephone network 
infrastructures may not extend these dominant positions into the market for pay-TV .. 
technical and administrative services.236 It also stands for the general proposition that 
the holder of a dominant position in the cable TV network may not strengthen its 
dominance by obtaining privileged links with the leading suppliers of pay-TV and pay-
TV programming in a way which makes it more difficult for other cable network 
operators to compete.237 • 
In Nordic Satellite Distribution238 ("NSD"), the Commission refused to allow 
236 The Commission noted (paragraph 61) that DT, as the owner of the broadband cable network and at 
the same time the holder of the monopoly for the fixed telephone network, controlled the two main 
means of transmission that can provide the return channel required for interactive digital television. As 
the mobile phone system was an uneconomical alternative and the broadband cable network could not 
immediately be used for this purpose for technical reasons, this made DT's telephone network or its 
glass fibre network all the more important as the only channel currently available for interactive 
television. Moreover, as a cable and telephone network operator, DT had experience in network 
management and the technological know-how for communications services. Because of MSG's 
shareholder structure involving DT, Bertelsmann and Kirch, the Commission found that any new pay-
TV suppliers would probably be largely dependent on the joint venture's supply of services, especially 
because the links with Bertelsmann and Kirch meant that the joint venture could provide the largest 
number of programmes and the most attractive programmes, thus occupying a favoured position against 
which the other service providers would have difficulty in asserting themselves (para. 71). The 
Commission found that the "suction effect" of a service undertaking controlled by Bertelsmann and 
Kirch could be countered most easily by a cable network operator that took over pay-TV subscriber 
management itself and possibly offered cable customers programme packages which it had itself put 
together (para. 72). Because of the structural conditions in Germany, such a function could be 
performed only by DT, which dominates the market for cable networks. As a result of DT's 
involvement in the joint venture, therefore, a market structure was created which suggested that the 
joint venture would have a dominant position in. the market for technical and administrative services for 
pay-TV and other payment-financed communications services in Germany. 
237 According to the Commission, there was a danger that, by jointly operating the pay-TV structure 
together with the leading pay-TV suppliers, DT would strengthen its position as a cable network 
operator in such a way that, following liberalization, competition in the cable network market will be 
substantially impeded and thus DT' s dominant position safeguarded. In the Commission's view, the 
concentration would remove DT as a potential competitor of Bertelsmann and Kirch in related service 
markets and, simultaneously, remove Bertelsmann and Kirch from being available as potential partners 
for other future cable network operators. Moreover, the Commission stated that the entry of private 
cable network operators following the liberalization in 1998 would be much more difficult if DT 
together with Bertelsmann and Kirch controlled MSG as the dominant service company. 
238 Commission Decision of 19 July 1995 (Case IV/M.490), O.J. 1996 L 53, p. 20. NSD was a planned 
joint venture between Norsk Telekom, the largest cable TV operator in Norway with about 30 percent 
of connections and satellite capacity on one of the Nordic satellite positions; TeleDanmark, the largest 
cable TV operator in Denmark with about 50 percent of the connections and holding a "privileged 
position" as regards cable TV operations until the liberalization of the Danish market on 1 January, 
1998; and the Swedish conglomerate, Kinnevik, the most important provider of Nordic satellite TV 
programs and the largest pay-TV distributor in the Nordic countries with important stakes in a Swedish 
cable TV company and in TV4, the largest advertising-financed Swedish channel. The joint venture was 
intended to transmit satellite TV programs to cable TV operators and households with a dish. The 
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the creation of a joint venture holding a "gatekeeper function" (or "bottleneck" position) 
which NSD would have gained on the Nordic market for satellite TV broadcasting due 
to its dominant position on the market for transponder capacity. As pertinent to the 
present study, it stands for the proposition that a dominant cable TV operator may not 
strengthen its dominant position by participating in the creation of a "gatekeeper" 
through which other cable TV operators must go to obtain TV channels and through 
which broadcasters would have to go to reach the cable TV operators.239 
Although it does not involve telecommunications or cable TV operators, Holland 
Media Group is a further example of the Commission's strict position against vertical 
link ups between dominant media content providers and dominant downstream 
providers of services using such content.240 
• 
Moreover, this case also illustrates the risk for holders of dominant positions in 
national markets in countries which do not have national merger control laws, where 
the dominant undertaking participates in a merger or an acquisition falling below the 
Commission prohibited the operation after finding that NSD would have led to a concentration of the 
activities of its parent companies creating a highly vertically integrated operation including the operation 
of satellite and cable TV networks, the production of TV programs to retail distribution services for 
pay-TV and other encrypted channels. 
239 The planned joint venture was intended to transmit satellite TV programmes to cable TV operators and 
households and would have held a monopoly position as regards provision of such programmes. The 
Commission found that the participati<;m in the proposed joint venture of Tele Danmark ("TD"), the 
holder of the legal monopoly in Denmark for the ownership of commercial cable TV infrastructure and 
the transmission of TV signals by cable across municipal borders, and also the operator of the largest 
cable TV network and the largest supplier of cable TV in Denmark (para. 114), would strengthen TD's 
dominant position in the market for cable TV networks in Denmark (para. 132). It would do so because 
the joint venture would be able to discriminate in favour of TD when offering channels to competing 
Danish cable operators. Moreover, the joint venture's monopoly position as regards provision of 
programming would mean that the terms <;>ffered to cable operators would be those most favourable to 
TD, rather than to others. Finally, cable operators in competition with TD would have to negotiate with 
TD as a partner in the joint venture. The Commission also noted in a different context that TD was in 
a position where it would obtain knowledge about the strategic considerations of its competitors, since 
all offers made by TD's competitors would necessarily involve a contractual relationship with TD 
regarding the use of TD's infrastructure, while TD could make an offer without being forced to 
negotiate the terms for using another company's infrastructure (para. 116). 
240 Commission Decision of 20 September 1995, RTL!Veronica/Endemol, O.J. 1996, L 134/32. As 
originally proposed, HMG was a joint venture between RTL (a supplier of Dutch language TV and 
radio programmes), Veronica (the leading TV broadcaster in the Netherlands) and Endemol Entertain-
ment Holding BY ("Endemol "). The Commission found that, through its three channels, HMG would 
achieve a very strong position on the Dutch market for TV broadcasting (40% plus audience share) and 
a dominant position in the Dutch market for TV advertising (60% market share). hi addition, the 
Commission found that the structural links of Endemol, the largest independent producer of TV 
programmes in the Netherlands and already in a dominant position due to the diminutive size of its 
competitors, with the leading Dutch broadcaster would have further strengthened Endemol's dominant 
position by providing it with preferential access to the largest customer in the TV production market. 
In early 1996 Endemol withdrew from HMG, thereby removing the foregoing structural link as well 
as HMG's preferential access to Endemol's productions and weakening HMG's position in the TV 
advertising market. The Commission subsequently approved the new shareholding structure. 
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Community dimension thresholds. The Holland Media Group merger was referred to 
the Commission under Article 22 of the Merger Control Regulation. In such cases, the 
Merger Control Regulation's rules on suspension do not apply, with the consequence 
that, if the dominant undertaking implements the merger or the acquisition before 
obtaining clearance from the Commission, it may have to divest the target company in 
the event of a negative decision by the Commission pursuant to the Article 22 referral. 
II.A.2.2 Assessment of strategic alliances 
In the context of merger control, the Commission is provided by the 
Merger Control Regulation with broad powers enabling it to prevent market foreclosure 
before it occurs, thus contributing to the preservation of competitive market conditions. 
Even outside the context of merger decisions, the Commission uses all its possibilities 
to strictly apply the EC competition rules to undertakings, whether dominant or not, 
and to prevent that foreclosure occurs. 
In several decisions and pending decisions relating to the telecommunications 
sector, most notably BT/MCI/41 Atlas, 242 Phoenix/Global One,243 
Unisource/Telefonica244 and Uniworld,245 the Commission had occasion to assess 
agreements which established strategic alliances for the provision of liberalized 
telecommunications services and which were ultimately aimed at positioning the parties 
to take advantage of full liberalization of the European telecommunications markets 
after 1 January 1998. 
In examining these alliances under the criteria for exemption under Article 85(3), 
the Commission was particularly diligent to ensure that the creation of the strategic 
allian~es would not allow telecommunications operators dominant in their home 
countries to insulate themselves from competition in their national markets at the same 
time as they participated in the alliances to take advantage of liberalization in 
European-wide markets. 
In these decisions and pending decisions, the Commission employed substantial 
leverage power to obtain numerous behavioural (and in certain cases also structural) 
undertakings from the parties as conditions for the grant of exemptions under Article 
241 Commission Decision of 27 July 1994, BT/MCI, OJ 1994, L 223/36. 
242 Cited above. 
243 Commission Decision of 17 July 1996, Phoenix/Global One, O.J. 1996, L 239/57. 
244 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 and Article 3 of Protocol 21 of the EEA 
Agreement, Unisource - Telefonica, O.J. 1997, C 44115. 
245 Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 and Article 3 of Protocol 21 of the EEA 
Agreement, Uniworld, O.J. 1997, C 44/4. 
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85(3).246 In addition, in the Atlas and pending Unisource/Telefonica decisions, the 
Commission required, as a condition of exemption, that the Governments of the home 
countries· of the European telecommunications organizations participating in the 
strategic alliances agree to liberalize telecommunications infrastructures.247 
Apart from control of specific transactions qualifying under the technical rules 
of Article 85 and the Merger Control Regulation in the light of the above precedents, 
the business conduct of the Dominant Undertaking would also remain subject to the 
"strengthening of dominance" and "extension or leverage of dominance" tests of Article 
86 as already indicated above. Although each time subject to economic analysis on the 
basis of the facts of each individual case at issue, it can be anticipated that a number 
of practices and agreements engaged in by the Dominant Undertaking could run against 
these tests and may therefore be challengeable. Tetra Pak 11248 is a good illustration 
of this principle which could, for example, find an application in the event that the 
Dominant Undertaking enters into certain exclusive or other (for example, long-term) 
agreements with undertakings active in upstream and downstream markets or even with 
(large) customers. 
II.A.3 The Dominant Undertaking needs to take a number of measures in order to 
ensure that its conduct does not infringe the competition rules 
II.A.3.1 Accounting separation and cost allocation 
As has already been discussed above, the pncmg practices of the 
Dominant Undertaking will need to be kept under strict and almost continuous control 
under the competition rules, at least at the early stages of liberalization. In this respect, 
fundamental questions are likely to arise regarding the costing and accounting structures 
and methods and the cost allocation systems used by the Dominant Undertaking to 
calculate and set its prices. The importance of appropriate accounting and costing 
methods is already underscored in part by the rules set out in the ONP sector specific 
legislation. In this Section, we examine whether the Dominant Undertaking can be 
246 The behavioural undertakings aim in particular at ensuring that the national telecommunications 
operators parties to the agreements will not: discriminate in favour of the joint venture as regards the 
provision of leased lines, interconnection and other matters; misuse any confidential information which 
they would acquire as a result of their provision of infrastructure and services to third party competitors 
of the joint venture; cross-subsidize within the meaning of the Commission's Competition Guidelines 
(cited above); bundle reserved and non-reserved services; or bundle TO and joint venture services. In 
Uniworld, the Commission also required certain undertakings from AT&T regarding access to and 
interconnection with AT &T's international facilities and services. See Section l.A.3 for a discussion 
of the structural undertakings in the Atlas decision. 
247 The exemption of the Atlas strategic alliance was set to apply from the prospective date on which two 
or more licences for the construction or ownership and control of alternative infrastructure for the 
provision of-liberalized telecommunications services take effect in Germany and France. 
248 Cited and discussed above. 
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obliged under the competition rules to take specific measures regarding its cost 
accounting. 
It may first be observed that the Dominant Undertaking will clearly have an 
individual interest to implement appropriate cost accounting and cost allocation methods 
at its internal level.. As has been indicated above, when the Commission opens an 
investigation into particular pricing practices, it should be considered as entitled or even 
obliged to request the undertaking targeted by the investigation to provide it with the 
necessary costing information allowing the Commission to conduct its investigation in 
an effective manner?49 If the undertaking would fail to provide such information (in 
particular, when it did not implement the necessary costing methods), it is strongly 
arguable that there would be a presumption that the prices concerned are not justified 
and therefore abusive within the meaning of Article 86, at least when there are some 
other prima facie elements hinting at potentially abusive pricing.250 If the Dominant 
Undertaking wants to be in a position to rebut such a presumption, it should take all 
steps necessary in its accounting and costing methods to be able to do so.251 In this 
respect, and given the market position of the Dominant Undertaking and the variety of 
its activities, one of the essential elements in its accounting should be that it keeps 
separate accounts at least for those activities for which it has a dominant position. 
Apart from the issue described in the preceding paragraph which should be duly 
taken into account by the Dominant Undertaking if it wants to avoid findings of an 
abuse of a dominant position, a number of other arguments or circumstances support 
the position that the Commission could compel a Dominant Undertaking to implement 
appropriate cost accounting and allocation methods.- These arguments and circumstances 
are described below following a graduated approach. 
Firstly, following a specific investigation under the competition rules leading to 
a finding of an infringement of Article 86 EC, the Commission should have the power 
to impose certain obligations on the dominant undertaking in order to avoid that the 
abusive practices would re-occur in the future. 252 In particular, in a case where there 
is a finding of illegal cross-subsidies or where the Dominant Undertaking is not in a 
position to rebut in an adequate manner the presumption mentioned in the preceding 
249 See the discussion in Section II.A.l above. 
250 For example, these prima facie elements could be deduced from certain types of bench-markings with 
other jurisdictions and/or other operators as well as from sudden changes in the level of the prices. 
251 For a parallel argument and reasoning, see the Competition Guidelines, cited above, where it is stated 
that "if in a specific case there are substantial elements converging in indicating the existence of an 
abusive cross-subsidization and/or predatory pricing, the Commission could establish a presumption of 
such cross-subsidization and predatory pricing. An appropriate separate accounting system could be 
imponant in order to counter this presumption." (at para. 108). 
25 ~ For a general discussion of the powers of the Commission to impose certain remedies pursuant to 
Article 3 of Regulation 17/62, see the discussion in Section I. A .4 above. 
\0603-005.DVL /030] 
86 Strictly Confidential 
paragraphs, the Commission should be entitled to impose on the undertaking concerned 
certain reporting and monitoring obligations as well as to require that undertaking to 
implement appropriate cost allocation and accounting separation systems in order to 
make the reporting and monitoring obligations effective.253 In order to justify the 
proportional and indispensable nature of imposing such measures in a particular case, 
arguments could also be invoked along the lines of those listed in Section II.A.l which 
demonstrate the particular need for close scrutiny on the business conduct (including 
pricing practices) of the Dominant Undertaking. 
A second manner for setting out an obligation under the competition rules to 
implement appropriate accounting rules (including accounting separation) would be to 
refer, where possible, to the obligations and requirements set out in secondary 
legislation (including, in particular, the ONP framework254 and the liberalization 
directives). As indicated above, the Court has already indicated that provisions and 
rules included in secondary Community legislation can be used as interpretative criteria 
for the interpretation and the application of the EC competition rules.255 It is arguable 
that a natural corollary of this principle should be that the failure to respect certain 
obligations set out in secondary legislation should in itself constitute an infringement 
of the competition rules. From a legal perspective, such a reasoning would mean that 
the existing case law would need to be extended since, to the best of the authors· 
knowledge, this argument. has so far not yet been used in an explicit manner in existing 
precedents. Although establishing such a principle would be helpful in ensuring a more 
effective scrutiny of dominant undertakings, it may however not be sufficient since the 
secondary legislation could fall short of covering all situations and services where 
accounting transparency and separation is needed. Therefore, it may be necessary to 
follow a more general reas~ning, as described in the following paragraph, which could. 
where necessary, be combined with the reasoning set out in the present paragraph. 
Thirdly, the specific duties and the "special responsibility" of the Dominant 
Undertaking could be used to construct a more general rule stemming from the 
competition provisions that a failure to implement appropriate accounting separation 
and cost allocation mechanisms would infringe in itself Article 86 EC and constitute 
an abuse of a dominant position. In fact, although this element does not appear as such 
in existing case law and precedents, it is at least arguable that any dominant 
undertaking is under a general duty of care and is, in addition to its obligation not to 
253 The Commission has already imposed in the past annual reporting requirements in Article 86 cases. For 
example, in Tetra Pak II (Commission Decision of24 July 1991, O.J. 1992, L 72/1), the Commission 
ordered Tetra Pak, among others, to abstain from certain pricing practices in the future and to submit, 
during a period of five years, a yearly report to the Commission enabling it to establish whether Tetra 
Pak has complied with its obligations. See also Commission Decision of 14 December 1985, 
ECS/AKZO, O.J. 1985, L 374/1. 
254 See, in particular, the principles of cost-orientation, transparency and cost-allocation set out in the ONP 
rules. 
255 See, in particular, the discussion of Ahmed Saeed above. 
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abuse its dominant position, also under an obligation to take all precautions necessary 
to exclude the occurrence of such abuses. Indeed, it seems reasonable to consider that 
each dominant undertaking should at least be able itself to verify whether its conduct 
is in compliance with the competition rules and that it would be negligent and abusive 
if it were not to implement sufficient measures which allow it to control and examine 
its own behaviour. In the present context, this argument could have a particular weight 
since the Dominant Undertaking should be fully aware of the fact that any of its abuses 
may have particularly serious consequences. Furthermore, the considerations described 
in Section II.A.l above can clearly be used to argue that an obligation on the Dominant 
Undertaking to keep separate accounts and to implement appropriate cost allocation 
methods, allowing an effective scrutiny under the competition rules, would be justified 
as reasonable and proportional in the particular circumstances concerned. Then, the 
failure by the Dominant Undertaking to comply with such an obligation could be 
qualified in itself as an abusive conduct under Article 86 EC. 
II.A.3.2 Structural separation without modification to the ownership structure 
Whereas accounting separation and the implementation of appropriate cost 
allocation methods can help in verifying and avoiding a number of possibly abusive 
practices by the Dominant Undertaking, the beneficial effects of such rules remain 
largely limited to pricing practices. However, as is anticipated in the Cable TV 
Directive,256 the position of the Dominant Undertaking may also give rise to more 
fundamental concerns which go back to the essential "conflict of interest" which is 
inherent in that position due to the control over both the telecommunications and cable 
TV infrastructure. 
F: or the above reason, it needs to be examined whether the competition rules can 
be used to compel the Dominant Undertaking to proceed with a structural internal 
separation through which the two basic activities of the Dominant Undertaking would 
be placed in separate entities. It is submitted that the analysis which could be followed 
to come to such a conclusion is in essence the same as that to be made in order to 
examine whether certain divestiture measures (including a change in the ownership over 
certain ofthe assets and activities of the Dominant Undertaking) can be imposed on the 
Dominant Undertaking. For that reason, the relevant analysis is made in the Section 
which follows. It can already be noted here that, if after a full analysis of the matter 
it is concluded that, pursuant to the competition rules, structural measures can indeed 
be imposed on the Dominant Undertaking, it then needs to be examined whether a 
structural separation would be sufficient to achieve the goals pursued and to eliminate 
the abusive situation or whether it would be indispensable to impose the more severe 
divestiture measures. 
It should already be noted here that in order to be effective any structural 
separation should be accompanied by sufficient guarantees which would exclude, in an 
256 See the citations above. 
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effective manner, the possible negative effects resulting from the bundling of the 
telecommunications and the cable TV infrastructure in one hand.257 As is the case for 
the possible obligation to divest in the circumstances at hand, an obligation to proceed 
with a structural separation in those circumstances would also be an innovation to the 
current application of the competition rules (in particular, Article 86 EC).258 
II.A.4 Divestiture 
At the present time, an obligation on undertakings holding a dominant position 
both over telecommunications networks and services and over cable TV networks and 
services to divest part of their assets and activities . appears to be one of the most 
ultimate means to ensure a minimum degree of competition on the markets, equality 
of opportunities and a level playing field. 
In addition, even if structural divestiture measures are adopted, this will not be 
sufficient to create automatically a level and fair playing field in which competition is 
not distorted. Indeed, even after the adoption of such measures there will clearly remain 
a need for strict enforcement of the competition rules. First, it will continue to be 
necessary to ensure that the practices of the undertakings on the market (of which there 
will be at least two after a successful divestiture) are in full compliance with the 
competition rules. Indeed, immediately after a divestiture, the traditional operator may 
be expected to maintain for at least a certain period of time a dominant position259 
on a number of markets which it could abuse in order to strengthen or maintain its 
position on those markets. Those practices (for example, refusals to provide access or 
the provision of access under unfair pricing or technical conditions and the application 
of excessively low and predatory prices intended to eliminate new competitors) will 
require specific attention under Articles 85 and 86 in order to ensure the full effects on 
the market of the said divestiture. Second, the divestiture could in principle, and at least 
for a certain period of time, also give rise !o a duopolistic market structure in which 
257 In this respect, reference can be made to the findings in Section l.A.3 above. The conditions imposed 
in the cases discussed there, where structural separation was ordered as a temporary measure prior to 
the divestiture of a certain business entity, should be considered as minimum conditions which would 
be required in the event of the implementation of a structural separation on a more permanent basis. 
258 In this respect, it may be noted that a number of the essential facilities cases (see, in particular, 
Commission Decision of 23 December 1993, Sea Containers, O.J. 1994, L 15/8, at para. 75) may be 
interpreted as containing a test of "virtual separation" since it was indicated that the conduct of the 
dominant undertaking, as the controller of the essential facility, needed to be compared with that of an 
independent authority which would have controlled the essential facility without having activities in the 
downstream market for the provision of services. 
259 In each individual case, the position of market strength of the operators concerned should be examined 
on the basis of the classical tests developed in this respect in the case law of the Court and the 
administrative practice of the European Commission. See also the criteria for assessing dominance set 
out in Section 1 of Part III of the Draft Notice on access agreements in the telecommunications sector. 
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there could be a likelihood for collective dominance.260 In such circumstances, the 
competitive behaviour of the undertakings concerned should be closely monitored under 
the competition rules in order to avoid that such undertakings would engage, through 
collusion or otherwise, in certain practices which would have as their purpose or effect 
the exploitation of customers and consumers (for example, through market sharing 
agreements or direct and indirect price fixing agreements) or the foreclosure of market 
entry of new operators and/or service providers (for example, through collective 
boycotts). 
If divestiture is imposed as a structural measure on the basis of the competition 
rules, the implementation of and the conditions for such divestiture could be inspired 
on the existing precedents in EC competition law in which such measures have already 
been used as an instrument to establish or re-establish competitive market structures. 
These principles have been described in Section I.A.3 above. In addition, use could also 
be made of the experience with these types of measures in other jurisdictions. 
In accordance with the graduated approach which is followed in this part of the 
study, two separate scenarios will be examined below. In the first scenario, it is 
examined whether divestiture can be ordered after the finding and establishment of 
actual abusive practices by an undertaking which holds a dominant position both over 
telecommunications infrastructure and over cable TV infrastructure. In the second 
scenario, there will be no findings of specific actual abuses. 
II.A.4.1 First scenario: findings of actual abusive behaviour by the Dominant 
. Undertaking have been established 
As has been indicated above, a situation in which an undertaking holds 
a dominant position both over the telecommunications infrastructure and over the cable 
TV infrastructure creates a very large potential for abusive behaviour which can take 
a wide variety of forms. Admittedly, this is the case for any dominant undertaking in 
whatever market since by virtue of the definition of the concept of "dominance" such 
undertaking enjoys a substantial freedom to determine its market behaviour since it "has 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers"261 , which should create at least a potential 
for abusive behaviour. However, it is submitted that the above described situation can 
be differentiated from situations which have already been examined in the past under 
the EC competition rules (in particular, Article 86 EC). 
In particular, the situation concerned arises in a sector which is characterised by 
the implementation of the process of full liberalization and by the convergence of 
260 In this respect, see also Section 1.3. "Joint dominance" of Part III of the Commission's Draft Notice 
on access in the telecommunications sector. In particular, at para. 70, where an assessment is made of 
the position in the local loop of the incumbent telecommunications operators and the cable operators. 
261 Case 27176, United Brands v. Commission, [ 1978] ECR 207, at para. 65. 
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technologies and activities which both create new opportunities anticipated to result in 
substantial market development and growth. This is to result in very rapid · 
developments in the markets with the implementation of new technologies leading to 
the provision of new and enhanced services. In this environment, two infrastructures 
are expected to play a crucial role, namely the telecommunications infrastructure and 
the cable TV infrastructure. The increasing degree of convergence and competition 
between these two infrastructures in different market segments should become one of 
the main driving forces of the new expected market developments. Where these two 
.... 
infrastructures are bundled in and controlled by one hand, this mechanism of auto-
regulation of the market through strong competitive pressure stimulating investments 
and innovation would be absent and may distort competition, namely by putting the 
dominant undertaking in a position of economic strength which is quite unique as 
compared to more traditional types of dominant positions in, for examp!e, the 
production and trade in goods where the risk of the withholding from customers and 
consumers of new services and developments is far less pronounced than in the sector 
which is the object of this study and where the barriers to entry are very often much 
lower than in the latter sector. 
It is almost inevitable that the Commission and/or other enforcement authorities 
will be called upon in the near future to examine, under the competition rules as well 
as under other regulatory frameworks, practices of dominant telecommunications/cable 
TV operators which could be considered as abusive under Article 86 EC. Through their 
enforcement actions, the competition authorities could be in a position to establish a 
number of_anti-competitive abusive practices. If a series of such findings is made, then 
it could be considered whether or not divestiture of certain activities and assets would 
not be an appropriate remedy.262 To the best of the authors' knowledge, such a 
remedy has so far not yet been used or considered in individual cases examined under 
Article 86 EC except in those cases in which the abuse consisted of the acquisition of 
certain assets or other undertakings which then needed to be separated again from the 
dominant undertaking.263 However, it is at least arguable that in specific 
circumstances in which there is a cumulation of various and conse~utive findings of 
abuses of one or more dominant position~ by a single undertaking which are a direct 
consequence of the pos~tion of economic strength which it holds, structural measures 
are required in order to ensure that the said undertaking will not continue to engage in 
any further foreseeable abuses. 
Such structural measures should be justifiable, in particular, either where the 
series of abuses concerned consist of exclusionary conduct or where the said abuses are 
accompanied by a situation where due to the presence and/or the behaviour of the 
dominant undertaking it is clear that market entry by other undertakings has become 
262 Individual abuses would of course remain subject to the normal liabilities for infringement of the EC 
competition rules (including the imposition of fines for intentional or negligent infringement of those 
rules). 
263 See, in panicular, the discussion in Section I. A .1 of Continental Can and Tetra Pak I. 
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unlikely or virtually impossible. In the latter respect, the occurrence of repeated or a 
series of different abuses directly detrimental to customers ·and consumers could in 
itself be an indication that an increased degree of competition in the market is unlikely. 
It is impossible to set out very specific theoretical criteria as to the level, number 
and degree of anti-competitive practices and findings of infringements of the 
competition rules which would be required for being able to justify the imposition of 
structural measures such as a divestiture of a part of the assets or the activities of the 
dominant undertaking. This analysis should mainly be made on the basis of general 
principles including, in particular, the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. 
However, it appears a priori that there could be certain exceptional circumstances in 
which these tests would not exclude the imposition of structural measures. 
It could be argued against the above course of action that the Commission holds 
powers other than the imposition of far reaching structural measures which should 
allow it, through a case-by-case approach, to remedy a situation in which an 
undertaking engages at several occasions and at different levels in abusive conduct. In 
particular, it could be argued that the Commission has the necessary powers to impose 
fines for abuse of a dominant position and that it has also the power to provide for the 
imposition of periodic penalty payments on undertakings which do not put to an end 
an infringement of the EC competition rules in accordance with a Commission 
Decision264• It is submitted that the validity of this type of argument should he 
examined on a case-by-case basis but that the fact that there have indeed been repeated 
abuses of a dominant position, which were the subject of a Commission or other 
competition law investigation, could be used in order to hold that the above mentioned 
powers of the Commission are not sufficiently effective in order to control the 
undertaking(s) concerned· in an efficient manner.265 Furthermore, the analysis of the 
existing administrative practice of the Commission already demonstrates that there arc 
clearly circumstances in which behavioural measures or obligations266 are not 
sufficient to exclude the existence or emergence of anti-competitive situations. In 
particular, it has already been concluded in cases in the past that such behavioural 
measures may be too difficult to monitor and to enforce and do not provide for 
sufficient guarantees of compliance with the competition rules.267 In addition, both 
264 See Article 16 of Regulation 17/62. 
265 See the parallel with the principle of "effectiveness" of remedies which has been used by the Court of 
Justice in the past to examine whether or not the Commission had the power under Regulation 17/62 
to impose a specific remedy in a specific case. This case law is summarized in Section I.A.4 above and 
has, as indicated in that Section, already given rise to the confirmation of "new" powers of the 
Commission including the right to impose interim measures. 
266 Measures imposed by the Commission on the basis of its existing powers under Regulation 17/62 would 
necessarily have this behavioral nature if the Commission were to be precluded from adopting structural 
measures on the basis of those existing powers. 
267 See the discussion in Section I.A.3 above in which the evolution from behavioural towards structural 
commitments under EC competition law has been described. 
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from a practical and from a legal point of view, it appears to be virtually impossible 
to develop, through a number of individual case approaches, specific behavioural rules 
which would be, on the one hand, precise enough to be fully effective and easily and 
rapidly enforceable and, on the other hand, sufficiently broad to cover the various types 
of conduct which could be engaged in by the dominant undertaking(s) concerned on 
subsequent occasions. This, again, could be used as an additional argument to 
demonstrate that in certain circumstances the following of a case-by-case approach 
would not be an effective approach under the competition rules to control the behaviour 
of a dominant undertaking which can allow itself in the market to abuse, in a repeated 
and almost continuous manner, its economic strength. 
One of the advantages of following the above approach which is based on the 
assessment of the situation after the establishment, at different subsequent occasions, 
of a series of abuses is that the enforcement of the competition rules would not be 
based on assumptions but on elements of actual abuses. Thus, an undertaking in the 
dominant position(s) described above would at least be given a chance to demonstrate 
that notwithstanding its very important position of economic strength it can still and 
does still behave in a manner which is compatible with the competition rules. 
Furthermore, such undertakings would be given different warnings and the opportunity 
to correct their -conduct and behaviour before the ultimate structural measure of 
divestiture would be imposed on the basis of the competition rules. 268 
An important disadvantage of following the scenario described in this Section 
could be that it would take a very substantial amount of time before the structural 
measures could be considered and eventually imposed since there would be a need to 
find and establish first a critical mass of various types of abuses prior to moving to the 
imposition of structural measures .. Given the complexity of the issues which are likely 
to arise in such individual cases and the normal length of competition law enforcement 
actions, this could mean that the competition law enforcement would be too slow to go 
hand in hand with and to stimulate the rapid market developments which are expected 
to occur and that such market developments could be considerably delayed by the 
presence and conduct of the dominant undertakings. 
268 Another advantage which could result from this is that the enforcement of competition law would leave 
room for diversity in different Member States and would not be used directly for "harmonizing" the 
structure of the sectors concerned in all Member States. This could possibly also be seen as an 
application of the principle of subsidiarity given the fact that the Member States at the national level 
could also take a number of measures (either regulatory measures or direct measures where the Member 
State concerned is an important or majority shareholder in the undertaking concerned) which could 
contribute to ensuring that the undertaking does not abuse its position of economic strength but meets 
its special responsibilities. 
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Second scenario: no findings of actual abusive behaviour by the 
Dominant Undertaking have been established 
The scenario described in the present Section is clearly the most far 
reaching and novel in the graduated approach followed so far. A number of arguments 
will be outlined which could be used for bringing a case under Article 86 EC leading 
to an obligation for a dominant undertaking holding a dominant position both over 
telecommunications and cable TV networks to divest at least one of those two. At the 
present stage, most of these arguments are largely untested both from a legal 
perspective, since there are no direct precedents on these points, and from an economic 
and market perspective, since the arguments will need to be supplemented and 
supported by further economic and market analysis. 
It should also be noted that certain of the arguments discussed below could also 
be combined with the approach followed in preceding Section since they could be used 
to support and strengthen that approach. In addition, it seems very reasonable to 
consider that the strength of the arguments presented in this Section will clearly be 
greater if they can be used in an investigation or case in which there is at least some 
proof of actual abusive conduct engaged in by the undertakings concerned. 
One of the main starting points of the reasoning followed is that the situation of 
fact in which are currently the undertakings holding the control over both the existing 
telecommunications infrastructure and the existing cable TV networks is a situation 
which could, in principle, not be achieved, as illustrated below, at the present stage of 
development of the markets and Community law. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that 
each individual case would have to be judged on the basis of its own merits, this 
existing situation with a double monopoly or double dominant position is a position 
which could, in principle, in the current new regulatory environment not be achieved: 
by an individual undertaking: for example, through the acquisition by a 
national telecommunications operator of the existing nation-wide cable 
TV network. Such a transaction would fail to meet the test for 
permissibility under the EC Merger Control Regulation and/or would 
constitute a prohibited extension or strengthening of a dominant 
position269; or 
269 The latter reasoning would need to be followed with regard to transactions/concentrations which would 
fail to meet the threshold criteria set out in the EC Merger Control Regulation. Article 86 EC of the 
Treaty remains applicable to such transactions even if Regulation 17/62 would no longer apply pursuant 
to Article 22(2) of the EC Merger Control Regulation. However, it is generally admitted that even in 
the absence of an implementing regulation adopted pursuant to Article 87 EC, Article 86 would 
continue to produce its full and direct effect (see the parallel with the reasoning followed by the Court 
of Justice in Ahmed Saeed, cited above, at para. 32, regarding the absence of implementing rules for 
certain practices in the air transport sector). 
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by a structural agreement between undertakings: for example, through the 
creation of a joint venture. Such a joint venture, whether concentrative 
or cooperative, could be expected to fail to meet the standards for 
permissibility and/or exemption under the EC Merger Control Regulation 
and Article 85270, respectively; or 
by a cooperation agreement or concerted practice between undertakings: 
for example, through a market sharing agreement or a price fixing 
agreement between the independent telecommunications operator and the 
independent operator(s) of the cable ·TV networks (who could, 
furthermore, be in a position of joint dominance); or 
by a Member State: for example, through the granting of special or 
exclusive rights extending the dominant position of the undertaking 
concerned. 
In this context, it is necessary in order to achieve equality of opportunities that 
at the time of the entry into force of the liberalization programme not only "new" 
practices, agreements and transactions are examined which occur after that entry into 
force but that also existing and past practices, agreements and transactions are examined 
in the new regulatory environment and technological context. Throughout the years, 
these situations have been sheltered, to a large extent, from the application of the 
competition rules and could not be controlled owing to the still lawful nature of 
national monopoly situations. Now these situations may need to be revisited in order 
to ensure a market structure in which competition is not distorted. In order to achieve 
this goal, certain arguments could be constructed on the basis of existing case law 
which ({Ould be used to carry out an analysis of the legality of existing market 
situations. 
(i) Automatic abuse 
As has been concluded in Section I.A.2 above, the case law of the Court of 
Justice arguably leaves scope to transpose the doctrine of "automatic abuse" into cases 
regarding the application of Article 86 EC to individual undertakings. That doctrine 
applies if an undertaking is placed in a situation in which it cannot avoid abusing its 
dominant position or in which it is led or encouraged to abuse its dominant position. 
In the present context, it does not appear to be necessary to examine the situation in 
which an undertaking has put itself in such a position (in particular, through 
competition based on performance and merits) since it is clear that the positions and 
270 In this respect, it should be noted that the main problem for such a joint venture, which would fall 
within the prohibition of Article 85(1), would be to demonstrate that the inherent restrictions on 
competition, both on the parent companies as well as through foreclosure effects on third parties, to 
which it gives rise would be indispensable and that it does not exclude competition in a substantial pan 
of the goods and services concerned under the conditions for exemption of Article 85(3). 
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situations which are the subject of this study are still the direct consequence of State 
regulations which have brought about the current situations.271 
The recitals to the Cable TV Directive already contain the starting point of the 
doctrine on automatic abuse where it is stated that "[w }here Member States grant to the 
same undertaking the right to establish both cable TV and telecommunications 
networks, they put the undertaking in a situation whereby it has no incentive to attract 
users to the network best suited to the provision of the relevant service, as long as it 
' has spare capacity on the other network. In that case, the undertaking has, on the 
contrary, an interest for overcharging for use of the cable infrastructure for the 
provision of non-reserved services, in order to increase the traffic on their 
telecommunications network" .272 Those considerations should not only apply to an 
undertaking whose position on the market is protected by certain special or extlusive 
rights but also to an undertaking which is as a matter of fact in such a position and is 
not faced with substantial competition on the market. Such an undertaking can also be 
considered to be induced to abuse its dominant position. At least from a theoretical 
perspective, it seems possible to develop a number of other "automatic abuses" which 
would be the result of the situation in which the undertaking with the double dominant 
position finds itself. 273 One of these automatic abuses could be that the dominant 
undertaking will not have sufficient incentives to and will not realise the necessary 
investments and innovations in its two networks but will allocate resources in a manner 
which is different from the most efficient allocation of resources. This would then lead 
to delays in the implementation of new and enhanced technologies thus withholding 
new servic~s and technological innovation from customers and consumers (which would 
not have a possibility of choice as to what network operator to use since the networks 
would be bundled in one hand). 
It is submitted that any argument based on the "automatic abuse" doctrine should 
be carefully constructed and duly supporte~ by economic theory and facts in order to 
have chances of success. In particular, it is submitted ·that it should be demonstrated 
that, on the basis of the facts of the matter, there is a very high degree of likelihood 
that the abuses will indeed occur on the market and that these abuses will almost 
necessarily result from the position of economic strength of the dominant 
271 We consider that there might be certain arguments to differentiate between positions which are the 
consequence of State regulation and positions which result from serious entrepreneurial effort by the 
undertaking concerned. Contrary to what is the case in certain other jurisdictions, EC competition law 
as it stands today does not seem to make such a distinction in any specific manner. 
272 See recital 18 to the Cable TV Directive. See also the types of abuses described in the recitals to the 
Full Competition Directive and, in particular, the fact that the undertaking would always be acting in 
a kind of "conflict of interest" situation. 
m It is submitted that prior to using any allegations of "automatic abuse", it should be carefully examined 
on the basis of economic theory and analysis whether there is a sufficient likelihood that the abuses 
concerned will indeed be automatic and result directly from the market position which the undertaking 
concerned occupies. 
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undertaking.274 In the authors' view, such a demonstration is necessary because 
otherwise it would be argued against such a finding that what is being challenged is not 
an abuse of a dominant position but a dominant position itself. Such a counter-
argument would normally have very considerable chances of success with the European 
Courts as has been discussed above. 
As a general point, the test outlined in the preceding paragraph appears very 
difficult to meet. However, it is understood that economic theory should here be used 
to confirm that tll"e situation in the telecommunications/cable TV sector is very specific 
and will indeed give rise to "automatic abuses" if situations subsist where an 
undertaking controls both the telecommunications infrastructure and the cable TV 
networks in a given country. In the preceding sections, a number of arguments have 
already been outlined which differentiate such a position from positions wlTich have 
already been examined in past case law and administrative practice. 
It also needs to be examined what can be achieved through the application of the 
doctrine on "automatic abuse". In this respect, reference is first made to the discussion 
in Section I.A.2 above in which we examined the results so far obtained through the 
application of the doctrine on automatic/necessary abuse under Article 90 in 
conjunction with Article 86. On the basis of that case law, a line of reasoning based 
on the "abolition of monopoly" argument could be followed in transposing the said case 
law to the case here under Article 86 EC. 
As indicated above, in most of the cases on the combined application of Article 
90 and 86 EC, the result obtained was that the national legislation granting one or more 
monopolies, under the form of special or exclusive rights, to an individual undertaking 
needed to be abolished and that other undertakings had to be allowed to engage in the 
"legally reserved" activity. In the present context, such a reasoning and result would not 
help since there would, in principle, be no absolute legal barriers or exclusive rights 
anymore barring access to market entry. Therefore, a reasoning by analogy would need 
to be followed. 
In such a reasoning, the specific-market position of the dominant undertaking 
would need to be considered as constituting the fact which triggers the automatic abuse 
and also the element which constitutes the virtually absolute barrier to market entry, 
comparable to the exclusive right examined and condemned in the case law on the 
combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC. If a demonstration can be made that 
the position of the dominant undertaking constitutes a virtually absolute barrier to 
market entry by other undertakings (i.e., producing effects similar to those of the 
274 As a matter of fact, it would be advisable to bring a case in wnich it is established that the undertaking 
concerned will not be able to avoid committing abuses. This would then also meet the concerns 
expressed in Section I.A.2 above in which we indicated that it is arguable that an evolution has taken 
place in the case law of the Court and that the test which must be met for the doctrine on "automatic 
abuse" to apply is a test of "necessity and impossibility for the dominant undertaking to avoid abusive 
conduct". 
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exclusive rights at issue in the cases on the combined application of Articles 90 and 86 
EC), then it seems that it should be possible to argue that the only efficient measure 
which can be used to eliminate the situation leading to the automatic abuse would be 
to oblige the undertaking concerned to divest part of its activities or assets in order to 
ensure that provision is made for the entry into the market of a viable competing 
undertaking. 
The above reasoning would clearly be novel in nature but if the Court would 
accept the application of the theory of "automatic abuse" in cases applying Article 86 
to individual undertakings this could be the logical outcome of the matter provided it 
can be demonstrated that there are no other reasonable means which can be used to 
eliminate the anti-competitive situation. 
(ii) Extension of a dominant position and maintenance or strengthening of a 
dominant position 
As indicated in the introduction to this Section, undertakings holding a dominant 
position over both telecommunications infrastructure and cable TV networks are in a 
position which, in the new regulatory environment, in principle, cannot be achieved 
through the combination of the existing networks. In fact, those undertakings have been 
put in such a position because, at the time, no control was exercised on the granting of 
specific rights to these undertakings. For many years, that situation has been "neutral" 
from a competition law perspective since the specific rights concerned were compatible 
with these rules and could not be challenged. 275 In other words, there was basically 
no significant competition which could be restricted within the meaning of the 
competition law provisions of the EC Treaty through the granting or the exercise of the 
rights concerned. 
However, it is in fact at the time of the entry into force of the liberalization that 
this situation is starting to produce its negative effects on competition. In addition, it 
is also at the time that technological developments are resulting in. the possibility of 
increased convergence between the two networks and the services which can be 
provided over and carried by them that the effects of the existing bundling of the two 
networks and infrastructures in one hand produces its full effects on competition. It 
could therefore be possible to construct an argument that the strengthening and/or the 
extension of the dominant undertaking's position occurs at the time of these 
developments in the regulatory and technological environment and therefore need to be 
examined under the competition rules at that time.276 
275 In fact, it were only certain practices (for example, the charging of excessively high practices) by the 
individual undertakings which could be challenged under the competition rules in as far as competition 
law enforcement was not barred by the application of the exception of Article 90(2) EC. 
276 For a more general description of the possible impact of regulatory and technological developments on 
the assessment under EC competition law, see the discussion in Section l.A.3 above. 
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I 
The above reasoning would result in at least one substantial innovation as 
compared with existing case law and practice.:m The factor triggering the application 
of Article 86 EC would not be a conduct by the dominant undertaking (or even an 
assumed conduct by the dominant undertaking such as under the "automatic abuse" 
doctrine) but basically "external events and developments". However, it can be argued 
that there is indeed a certain conduct by the dominant undertaking which needs to be 
examined under Article 86 EC and that this conduct consists of the failure by that 
undertaking to take pro-active measures to avoid the emergence of the anti-competitive 
situation resulting from the strengthening or extension of its dominant position. Thus, 
the failure to take such measures (including the divestiture of certain assets and/or 
activities) could, in such a scenario, be qualified as the conduct (i.e., the abuse under 
Article 86 EC) which strengthens or extends the dominant position of the undertaking 
concerned taking into account the developments in the market and the regulations 
which give rise to the anti-competitive situation. 
The reasoning outlined in the preceding paragraph is novel, is not directly 
supported in the existing case law and administrative practice and would therefore need 
to rely heavily on the concept of"special responsibility" which accompanies the holding 
of a dominant position. 278 Therefore, the chances of succeeding with this reasoning, 
if it would be brought before the European Courts, are virtually impossible to assess. 
However, as we will discuss in Section II.B, certain of the principles established in the 
case law on Article 90 EC could be interpreted as showing a reasoning very similar to 
the above. In such cases, it is the Member State which fails to take a pro-active 
measure to eliminate a situation which has become anti-competitive and against the EC 
competition rules. Although we believe that in the context of the application of Article 
90 EC that argument has greater weight/79 it is not totally excluded that it could also 
be used as a valid argument under Article 86 EC as applied to individual undertakings, 
both public280 and private, and may then serve as a means for achieving the 
objectives of the Treaty. 
277 See the conclusions in Section I.A.l above. 
278 In this respect, it is also helpful to bear in mind, as has been discussed above, that the Court has 
indicated that the "degtee and scope" of the special responsibility of the dominant undertakings depends 
on the specific circumstances of each individual case. 
279 In this respect, it is also worth recalling that the doctrine of automatic abuse itself is one which is 
already well-established under Article 90 EC but less, or even not, known in individual cases on the 
application of Article 86 EC. 
280 It is debatable whether the argument could be stronger when a public undertaking is involved than if 
a purely private undertaking is concerned. Such a thesis would appear to go against the basic principle 
that public and private undertakings are treated on an equal footing in the Treaty. On the other hand, 
the case law of the Court of Justice contains at least some elements from which it appears that private 
and public undertakings are not necessarily always treated in an identical manner under EC law, in 
particular, where such public undertakings can be considered as "emanations of the State" (see, in 
particular, Case C-188/89, Foster and Others v. British Gas, [1990] ECR I-3313, in which the Court 
confirmed that directly effective provisions of directives may be invoked against certain public 
undertakings which are "emanations of the State" and may thus create additional obligations and 
constraints on such undertakings which do not apply to private undertakings). 
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Conclusions on divestiture and considerations related to property rights. 
Divestiture and structural separation 
Any arguments in favor of divestiture would need to be balanced against 
the long-term and short-term effects on the businesses concerned. This balancing 
process could be seen as a specific application of the tests of proportionality and 
reasonableness mentioned above in this Section. The assessment of the possible 
drawbacks on efficiencies and market development of structural measures of divestiture 
is not the purpose of the present study and the weighing process, which goes far 
beyond purely legal considerations, can therefore not- be made in this study.281 It is 
only noted here that it would not be excluded that in different circumstances of fact 
(for example, related to the organisation of the network infrastructure concerned) the 
end-result of the weighing process would lead to different results and that, therefore, 
divestiture could be warranted in some and not in other cases. 
A possible line of defense for the undertakings facing a possible order to divest 
could also be to allege that the EC competition rules cannot affect their property rights 
and cannot, therefore, compel them to sell certain of their assets. This defense would 
most likely be based on Article 222 of the Treaty which provides that "[t}his Treaty 
shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership" and/or on ·the fact that property rights have been recognized by the Court 
of Justice as a fundamental righf82 • 
Most commentators agree that Article 222 of the Treaty essentially expresses the 
neutrality of the Treaty towards national "systems" of property ownership, including 
phenomena such as nationalization and privatization.283 However, Article 222 EC has 
already been used in more specifiG contexts. In particular, the provisions of Article 222 
EC are one of the bases for the well known distinction which has been made in the 
field of intellectual property rights between the "existence of a right" and the "exercise 
of a right", a distinction which was made in fact to reconcile the imperatives .of 
281 An undertaking faced with a possible order to divest could possibly invoke such elements of fact and 
allege that they should be qualified as an objective justification for the situation concerned. As we have 
indicated above, the notion of "objective justification" is recurrent in Article 86 EC and has also been 
used by the Court of Justice in the cases on the combined application of Articles 90 and 86 EC on 
automatic abuse and extension of a dominant position. 
282 See, in particular, the judgments in Nold (Case 4173, [1974] ECR 491) and Liselotte Hauer v. Land 
Rheinland-Pfalz (Case 44179, [1979] ECR 3727). In particular, in the latter case the Court considered 
that "[t]he right to property is guaranteed in the Community legal order in accordance with the ideas 
common to the constitutions of the Member States, which are also reflected in the first Protocol to the 
European Convention for the protection of human rights" (at para. 4). See also Case 41/83, Italy v. 
Commission, [1985] ECR 873, at paras. 21-23. 
283 See, in particular, the Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs in Spain v. Council (Case C-350/92, [ 1995] 
ECR 1-1985, Opinion at para. 29 and references cited in footnote 25). See also the discussion to this 
effect in the context of Article 90 EC (in particular, Opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro in Terminal 
Equipment Directive, cited above, at para. 11). 
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intellectual property rights and those of competition law .284 The distinction between 
the existence of property rights and the exercise or use of property rights is also 
reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice recognizing property rights as a 
fundamental right within the Community legal order which appears to set out a general 
principle that the substance of property rights cannot be affected.285 
On the basis of the case law referred to in the preceding paragraph, it should at 
least be considered that an obligation to divest certain assets or activities, based on the 
EC competition rules, could only be imposed in very exceptional circumstances. In fact, 
in order to have a chance of being able to set aside the fundamental principles 
mentioned above, it would appear to be necessary to bring very strong evidence of the 
fact that the divestiture measure is absolutely indispensable to ensure compatibility with 
the Treaty rules. Even then, it could be considered that there would still need to be a 
weighing process between the degree of protection merited by the right of the 
undertaking to have its property rights protected (''individual/private interest .. ) and the 
need to achieve the specific goals of the Treaty (11 general/public interest .. ). In this 
weighing process, any relevant interests and factors would need to be taken into 
account. One of the elements which could possibly be used to support the favouring of 
the public interest in this context could be the fact that the situation which has been 
created is not the result of own-initiative entrepreneurial efforts but is to a large extent 
a consequence of legal monopoly rights which have been enjoyed throughout the years 
and led to a substantial distortion of competition within the market. 286 
In addition, prior to imposing any obligation of divestiture it would also be 
necessary to verify whether there are no less restrictive means which could be used to 
eliminate the anti-competitive situation. In Section II.A.3, reference has already been 
made to the possibility of considering to require the dominant undertaking to proceed 
with a structural separation. The choice between divestiture and a less restrictive 
284 See, in particular, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, [1966] ECR 299. 
For a more detailed summary of this doctrine, see the Opinion of Advocate-General G,~lman in Magill, 
cited above. 
285 See, in particular, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz in which the Court considered that 
restrictions on property rights "should in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by 
the Community and that, with regard to the aim pursued, they should not constitute a disproponionate 
and intolerable interference with the rights of the owner, such as to impinge upon the very substance 
of the right to property" (cited above, at para. 5, emphasis added). Equally, in Nold the Court had 
considered that property rights are "protected by law subject always to limitations laid down in 
accordance with the public interest. Within the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that 
these rights should, if necessary, be subject to cenain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued 
by the Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is left untouched" (cited above, at 
para. 14, emphasis added). 
286 This kind of reasoning is also reflected in the Draft Notice on access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector where it is stated that, while it is in general "pro-competitive to allow a 
company to retain for its own exclusive use advantages, which it has obtained competitively [. .. ]the 
advantages of the incumbent [telecommunications] operators, although legitimately obtained, were not 
obtained competitive(',' but as a result of legislative intervention." (cited above, at para. 78). 
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solution such as structural separation should be governed by the principle of 
proportionality.287 It is submitted that the practical application of this test should be 
made on the basis of a full economic analysis which is not the subject of the present 
study. 
It can also be noted that there may be another distinction which can be made, 
at least from a conceptual point of view, between the situation of divestiture and that 
of structural separation. In fact, in the foregoing reasoning regarding the arguments 
which can possibly be constructed to result in an obligation to divest, reference has 
been made to two different kinds of abuses: on the one hand, the theory of the 
automatic abuse of a dominant position and, on the other hand, the argument of the 
strengthening of a dominant position. In this respect, it is arguable that a structural 
separation could only eliminate the former type of abuse (principally based on the 
inherent conflict of interest which will exist and which will lead to the automatic 
abuse) and not the abuse based on the strengthening of a dominant position. Also, from 
an economic point of view, it could be verified whether the existence on the market of 
two structurally separated entities which are under a same ownership but under separate 
management does not in fact result in more extensive foreclosure effects (for example. 
on potential service providers) than a situation in which there are at least two owners 
of infrastructure able t~ provide transmission capacity. If on the basis of economic 
theory and analysis this ~ere to be confirmed, this could be considered as additional 
support for the argument that a divestiture measure would be warranted. 
287 See the discussion of the powers of· the Commission to impose remedies for the violation of the 
competition rules in Section l.A.4. 
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II.B Article 90(3)-Approach - Application to Member States 
As discussed in Section I.B above, the Commission has the power under Article 
90(3) to adopt directives and decisions requiring Member States to comply with their 
obligation under Article 90( 1) EC not to enact or maintain in force measures contrary 
to the Treaty, in particular Article 86 EC, in respect of undertakings to which Member 
States grant special or exclusive rights and public undertakings. As also discussed in 
Section I.B, these provisions are the principal legal basis for the power of the 
Commission which it has used to adopt directives aimed at liberalizing competition in 
the telecommunications sector and decisions aimed at removing distortions of 
competition introduced by individual Member States in newly liberalized 
telecommunications markets. These directives and decisions are based in large measure 
on reasoning, under a combination of Articles 90( 1) and 86, based on the doctrines of 
"automatic/necessary abuse", "equality of opportunity" and "illegal 
extension/strengthening of dominance". 
As also discussed in Section I.B, the existing Article 90 directives imply that 
there is still scope for further Commission action under Article 90(3) EC, in particular 
to ensure the effectiveness of these existing directives and to ensure that Member States 
do not enact or maintain in force any measure which results in the de facto continuation 
of the special and exclusive rights which have already been abolished. 
In this section we focus on the possibilities for the Commission to adopt a new 
Article 90(3) directive to address (i) restrictions imposed by the Member States on the 
use of telecommunications capacity for the provision of cable TV services (Section 
II.B.2 below) and (ii) the situation where an undertaking holds dominant positions in 
the markets for telecommunications and cable TV capacities (and/or both services) 
(Section II.B.3 below). We first note, how~ver, the powers of the Commission to act 
on these issues under the review process mandated by the Cable TV and Full 
Competition Directives (Section II.B.1 below). 
II.B. I Powers of the Commission to act under the review process mandated by the Full 
Competition Directive and the Cable TV Directive 
The Commission's Cable TV and Full Competition Directives provide mandates 
for the Commission to review the above mentioned issues. Regarding restrictions on 
the use of public telecommunications networks for the provision of TV capacity, the 
Full Competition Directive notes that some Member States still maintain such 
restrictions and amends Article 9 of the Telecommunications Services Directive to 
provide that the Commission will, by 1 January 1998, carry out an overall assessment 
of the situation with regard to such restrictions. According to the preamble of the 
directive, the purpose of this assessment is to examine these restrictions in the light of 
the objectives of the Cable TV Directive once the telecommunications markets 
approach full liberalization. 
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Regarding the special situation of double dominance over telecommunications 
and cable TV network infrastructures, the Commission provides in the Cable TV 
Directive that it will, before 1 January 1998, carry out an overall assessment of the 
impact where a single operator provides both telecommunications and cable TV 
networks or both services. According to the preamble (recital 20), in the event that no 
competing home-delivery system is authorized by the relevant Member State in the 
meantime, the Commission will reconsider whether separation of accounts (provided 
for in the directive) is sufficient to avoid improper practices and will assess whether 
joint provision ~es not result in a limitation of the potential supply of transmission 
capacity at the expense of the services providers in the relevant area, or whether further 
measures are warranted. 288 
II.B.2 Restrictions imposed by the Member States on the use of telecommooications 
capacity for the provision of cable TV services 
In this section, we review the legal grounds on which the Commission could 
base a new Article 90(3) directive or decision to abolish Member State restrictions on 
the use of telecommunications capacity for the provision of cable TV services. 
It is assumed in this section that the cable TV operator (or operators) which are 
protected by the restrictions imposed on the telecommunications operators hold special 
or exclusive rights granted by the Member State and that as a result such cable TV 
operator (or operators) hold(s) individually (or jointly) a dominant position in the 
markets for cable TV network infrastructure and services.289 Under those 
288 The European Parliament, in its Resolution of 20 April 1993, called upon the Commission to adopt as 
soon as possible the necessary measures to take full advantage of the potential of the existing 
infrastructure of cable networks for telecommunications services and to abolish without delay the 
existing restrictions in the Member States on the use of cable networks for non-reserved services. The 
Cable TV Directive was in part a response. The European Parliament, in its Resolution of 19 May 
1995, asks that particular attention be paid to the free access of competitors to any appropriate network, 
and demands that network operators wishing to provide services keep these functi(ms separated through 
the implementation of a transparent accounting system and do not grant themselves or specific partners 
privileged accesses, tetms or conditions. In the same Resolution (para. 29), the European Parliament 
points out that, with scarce capacities and shortage of frequencies, broadcasting programmes (TV and 
radio) must have priority in decisions on access in relation to telecommunication services and other 
multi-value services, and that networks and frequencies that have been used for broadcasting (TV and 
radio) in the past will in the future also primarily be used for purposes of broadcasting. 
289 In the situation in which the cable TV operator has not been expressly granted a special or exclusive 
right, it can be argued that the Member State's imposition of the restriction on the telecommunications 
operators amounts to a measure granting a kind of "special" right to the cable TV operators within the 
meaning of Article 90(1), because it protects them from competition by telecommunications operators 
in the cable TV sector and the new multimedia sector. This interpretation could be considered as 
consistent with the definition of "special rights" in Article 1(1) of the Telecommunications Services 
Directive, which refers to any legal or regulatory advantages, granted otherwise than on the basis of 
objective, proportional and non-discriminatory criteria, which substantially affects the ability of any 
other undertaking to provide the same service in the same geographical area under substantially the 
same conditions. Unless the restriction works to the advantage of one or more cable TV operators 
holding a single or joint dominant position in the Member State concerned, there is limited scope for 
\0603-00S.DVL [030] 
104 Strictly Confidential 
circumstances, it is submitted that the Commission has the power to adopt a new 
Article 90(3) directive or decision requiring the Member States concerned to abolish 
the restrictions on the use of telecommunications capacity for the provision of cable TV 
ser-Vices, if economic and other evidence support the conclusion that the maintenance 
of such restrictions is likely to deter investments in new multimedia services unless 
competition is ensured in both telecommunications and cable TV markets. 
In adopting such a directive, and depending on the availability of supporting 
evidence, the Commission could apply Article 90( 1) in conjunction with Article 86 
based on the doctrines of the "automatic/necessary abuse" and "equality of opportunity" 
already discussed in Section I.B above. The doctrine of the "automatic abuse of 
dominant position" could be applied, on the grounds that the restriction imposed on the 
telecommunications operators in conjunction with the exclusive or special rights granted 
to the cable TV operators are likely have the effect of inhibiting the emergence of new 
audio-visual-telecommunications applications and multimedia services and of holding 
back technical progress in a country in which the provision of cable TV services is still 
subject to special or exclusive rights. It could do so, for example, by creating a 
situation in which the mere exercise by the dominant cable TV operator of its exclusive 
right to provide cable TV services limits, within the meaning of point (b) of the second 
paragraph of ArtiCle 8~, the emergence of, inter alia, new applications developed hy 
a telecommunications op~rator combining both audio-visual and telecommunications. 
if these new applications cannot be adequately provided on the networks of the cable 
TV operator.290 It could also give rise to some of the other "automatic" abuses (hut 
by the dominant cable TV operator instead of the dominant telecommunications 
operator) described in recitals 12 to 14 of the Cable TV Directive. 
The applicability of the "equality of opportunity" doctrine appears self-evident: 
under this principle as developed by the Court of Justice in France v. Commission and 
the argument that the restrictions violate Article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 86. It could be argued 
that the restriction violates the "equality of opportunity" principle discussed in the text, but neither the 
Commission nor the European Courts have addressed the issue of whether Article 90(1) can be applied 
in conjunction with Article 3(g) in a case in which it appears that Articles 85 and 86 cannot be applied 
in conjunction with those provisions. This reasoning would arguably have as consequence that .@Y grant 
of an exclusive right by a Member State, by eliminating equality of opportunity for other operators. 
would violate Articles 3(g) and 90, but the Court of Justice has held repeatedly that the grant of an 
exclusive right is not as such contrary to the Treaty. The application of Articles 90 and 3(g) under 
circumstances in which the conditions for the application of Articles 85 and 86 are not present also 
appears to run counter to the reasoning in the line of cases applying Articles 3(g), 5, 85 and 86 to 
Member State measures which deprive the competition rules of their effectiveness. Case C-245/91, 
Ohra, [1993] ECR I 5851; Case C-185/91, Reiff, [1993] ECR I 5801; Case C-2/91, Meng, [1993] ECR 
I 5751. According to these cases, a Member State measure cannot infringe Articles 3(g), 5, 85 and 86 
in the absence of any link with conduct on the part of undertakings of the kinds referred to in Articles 
85(1) and 86. Although such an argument would therefore not be without difficulties, it may 
nevertheless be arguable that a Member State measure which infringes the "equality of opportunity" 
principle contrary to Article 3(g) and benefits undertakings holding the special right described at the 
outset of this footnote is a violation of Article 90(1) in conjunction with Article 3(g). 
290 Cable TV Directive, cited above, at recital 13. 
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GB-INNO-BM, a system of undistorted competition can be guaranteed only if equality 
of opportunity is secured between the various economic ·operators.291 The restrictions · 
may inhibit the ability of new telecommunications operators to compete effectively with 
cable TV operators in the provision of telecommunications services, because the latter 
operators may have a competitive advantage due to their ability to obtain higher market 
penetration rates for both telecommunications and cable TV services than operators 
providing only one service. In addition, in a country in which there is a dominant 
telecommunicatio~s operator and the cable TV operator(s) hold(s) (special or) exclusive 
rights, the restrictions may not only have all of the effects already noted above, but 
may also inhibit new telecommunications operators from competing effectively with 
the dominant telecommunications operator in the provision of telecommunications 
services, due to their inability to make their service offers more attractive to customers 
by being able to provide both telecommunications and cable TV services. • 
In adopting a new Article 90(3) directive to address the foregoing concerns, the 
Commission would need to consider carefully the special situation in which the 
incumbent telecommunications operator is dominant in the telecommunications network 
infrastructure and services markets. The Commission would need to balance the benefits 
of exposing the dominant cable TV operator(s) to competition against the benefits of 
possibly preventing the dominant telecommunications operator from extending its 
dominance into another market (cable TV) and a new market (multimedia) or creating 
duopolistic or oligopolistic dominance for the incumbent telecommunications and cable 
TV operators. Depending on the outcome of this balancing test, there may be 
circumstances in which the abolition of the restrictions would be warranted on 
competition · grounds only with respect to new telecommunications operators or in 
which the abolition of such restncttons with respect to the dominant 
telecommunications operator would need to be made subject to conditions aimed at 
ensuring that there is no extension of dominance or creation of duopolistic or 
oligopolistic dominance. 
As the incumbent telecommunications operator is likely to be in a better position 
than new telecommunications entrants _to introduce effective competition into the 
market for cable TV services in a country where the cable TV operator holds a 
dominant position in that market, the principal emphasis would need to be on 
specifying the conditions which should be imposed on the incumbent 
telecommunications operator to allow its entry into the cable TV market. One minimum 
condition should be accounting separation and transparency, as already required under 
certain circumstances under the Cable TV Directive. This should allow an effective 
monitoring and control of certain types of behaviour of the undertaking concerned. If 
this is considered as not sufficient to ensure an equal playing field and safeguard 
against the risk/likelihood of abuses of a dominant position, then more far-reaching 
291 France v. Commission, cited above, at para. 51; RTT v. GB-INNO-BM, cited above, at para. 25; 
Cable TV Directive, cited above, at recital 14; Conditions imposed on the second operator of GSM 
radiotelephony services in Italy, cited above, at paras. 15 and following; Conditions imposed on the 
second operator of GSM radiotelephony services in Spain, cited above, at paras. 19 and following. 
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solutions can be considered including structural separation between the different 
activities of the undertakings concerned. 
II.B.3 One undertaking with dominant positions in the same geographic market in the 
markets for telecommunications and cable TV capacities and/or both services 
In this section, we review the legal grounds on which the Commission could 
base a new Article 90(3) directive or decision to address the special situation in which 
one undertaking holds dominant positions in the markets for telecommunications and 
cable TV. 
It is submitted that the Commission could address this situation in an Article 
90(3) directive or decision by developing a line of reasoning derived from its reasoning 
in the existing Article 90(3) directives. Under this reasoning, it could be argued (if 
supported by economic or other evidence) that the elimination of the restrictions on the 
use of cable TV infrastructure for the provision of telecommunications services, in 
combination with technological changes leading to the convergence of the 
telecommunications and media sectors, resulted in the strengthening of the dominant 
position of the operator concerned in the telecommunications market, by making it 
more difficult for new ·entrants to enter this market, and thereby also resulted in the de 
facto continuation of 'this operator's exclusive rights over telecommunications 
infrastructures and services. If the economic and other evidence supports this argument. 
it could further be argued that the foregoing factors also led to the strengthening of the 
dominant position in the cable TV market and that the strengthening of the operator's 
dominant positions in both the telecommunications and the cable TV markets led to the 
creation of an impregnable dominant position in the new multimedia market which may 
in fact impede the emergence of new audio-visual-telecommunications applications and 
multimedia services. These points are addressed in more detail below. 
II.B.3.1 Strengthening of dominance and "automatic/necessary" abuse 
It can be argued, in line with the reasoning in the preamble to the Full 
Competition Directive, that the fact that one undertaking is dominant over both 
telecommunications and cable TV infrastructure in and of itself prevents new entrants 
from having a free choice as to underlying infrastructure at least until such time as 
other alternative infrastructures are able to compete effectively with the dominant 
operator's telecommunications and cable TV infrastructures. It can be further argued 
on the basis of the preamble to the Full Competition Directive, and the third party 
complaints to which reference is made there, that the continuing absence of a free 
choice of underlying infrastructure will result in a "conflict of interest" which will 
induce the dominant telecommunications operator to abuse its dominant position in the 
relevant telecommunications markets, through its power to determine at will where, 
when and at what cost services can be offered by its competitors and through its power 
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to monitor the clients and traffic generated by its competitors.292 The situation 
therefore threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the liberalization of telephone 
services. It could also be argued, subject to verification and confirmation on the basis 
of economic theory, that this situation is tantamount to the de facto continuation of 
special or exclusive rights in regard to telephone services, because it puts the dominant 
TO in a position to maintain its dominant position indefinitely through the exercise of 
the foregoing power. 
It may also be possible tcr argue that this situation in and of itself strengthens the 
existing dominant position of the telecommunications operator in the market for 
telecommunications infrastructure to a degree which threatens the effectiveness of the 
existing liberalization measures and deprives the abolition of special and exclusive 
rights over telecommunications network infrastructure of its effet utile. In particular, 
it may be possible to argue that the co-existing dominance of the telecommunications 
operator in the market for cable TV capacity strengthens the dominant position in 
telecommunications capacity by making it more difficult for new entrants to establish 
their own infrastructures. This is because it will be more difficult for new entrants to 
justify the substantial investments required for new networks given their doubtful 
ability to spread this investment over a large number of services. 
These same factors may contribute to a strengthening of the dominant position 
in the cable TV market. The strengthening of the dominant positions in both the 
telecommunications and the cable TV markets may in tum lead to the creation of a 
virtually impregnable position for the dominant operator in the emerging multimedia 
market, due to the technological changes resulting in the convergence of the 
telecommunications and media sectors into a "multimedia" sector. The strengthening 
of the dual dominance may thereby inhibit the emergence of new audio-visual-
telecommunications applications and multimedia services and hold back technical 
progress, by resulting in "automatic/necessary abuses" of the strengthened dominant 
position similar to those identified in recitals 11 to 13 of the Cable TV Directive. 
II.B.3.2 Member State "measure" 
The new Article 90 directive could address the foregoing concerns if it 
can be demonstrated that the strengthening of the dual dominance and the . 
"automatic/necessary abuses" are the consequence of a Member State measure. 
A Member State measure can consist of a legislative act, administrative 
direction, and even the exercise of shareholders' rights and non-binding 
recommendations.293 It can be argued that the situation described above is a direct 
292 See the discussion of the Full Competition Directive above. 
293 Derrick Wyatt & Alan Dashwood, European Community Law 553 (3d ed. 1993); Bellamy & Child, 
Common Market Law of Competition para. 13-105 (4th ed., 1993), also referring in a footnote to the 
wide definition given to the word "measure" as used in Article 30 of the EC Treaty and citing to the 
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consequence of the Member State's original grant of an exclusive right to the 
undertaking concerned. However, this grant of an exclusive right has now been 
eliminated. This raises the question whether it can be argued that the concept of the 
enactment or maintenance in force of a Member State measure under Article 90( 1) also 
applies where the situation which gives rise to the likelihood of abusive conduct can 
be said to result from the failure of the Member State to take action to eliminate this 
situation. 
Two separate theories have developed in the context of Article 90 on the issue 
of. whether Article 90( 1) is also violated by the inaction of the State: (i) the theory of 
a special Member State responsibility to supervise the behaviour of State undertakings; 
and (ii) the theory of the failure of a Member State to respond to changes in market 
circumstances. • 
(i) Theory of special responsibility to supervise 
Under the first theery, it is argued that the Member States have a special 
responsibility to supervise the behaviour of public undertakings. The Commission 
publicly supported this position in the Second and Sixth Reports on Competition Policy. 
In its Second Report on Competition Policy, the Commission took the position 
that Article 90 implies a duty on the part of the Member States to act in such a way 
that a State undertaking's "behaviour does not produce effects which, if they resulted 
from actions by the States themselves, would constitute a violation of the Treaty" .294 
In other words,· the failure of the Member State to prevent such behaviour would 
amount to a "measure" within the meaning of Article 90( 1 ). 295 
The Commission took a similar position in the Sixth Report on Competition 
Policy, noting its implications for the Commission's powers under Article 90(3): 
"Article 90(3) allows the Commission to act where a Member State, while possessing 
the necessary authority, fails to cause a 'public undertaking' to put an end to 
objectionable practices, i.e. practices which, had they been engaged in by the State 
following cases: Case 249/81, Commission v. Ireland, [1982] ECR 4005 and Greek Insurance, O.J. 
1985, L 152/25. See also Ehlermann, "Managing Monopolies: The Role of the State in Controlling 
Market Dominance in the European Community," [1993] 2 ECLR 61, at 65. 
294 Second Report on Competition Poli!fy, at para. 129. The Commission indicated that it was examining 
the possibility of demanding, by appropriate directives or decisions under Article 90(3), that the 
Member States, in certain fields where the risk of such behaviour was apparent, should take ·the 
necessary steps to stop the undertakings referred to in Article 90(1) from excluding all or some of the 
products or services of the other Member States when placing their contracts. 
295 In essence, this position equates an undertaking referenced in Article 90(1) to the Member State itself, 
which would have as its logical consequence that these undertakings would become subject not only to 
the competition rules in Articles 85 and 86 applicable to undertakings but also to other Treaty 
provisions applicable to Member States. See Page, "Member States, Public Undertakings and Article 
90," 7 ELR 19, 25-26 (1982). 
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itself, would have constituted an infringement of the Treaty.[ . .] Where a Member State 
has not got the necessary authority to correct objectionable behaviour on the part of 
a 'public-undertaking', the Commission may invoke Article 90 to call on the Member 
State to jill the gap in its relationship with the undertaking in question. The Member 
State must then take the necessary powers and use them to end behaviour incompatible 
with the common market. "296 
It has been argued persuasively that this special responsibility to supervise is 
implicit in the wording of Article 90( I) and is consistent with the obligation to take 
general and particular measures imposed on Member States by Article 5 and with the 
policy of Article 90(1).297 The argument in favour of this position has been stated 
succinctly as follows: "If State responsibility under this paragraph is derived, 
respectively, from the ability to influence public undertakings and from the assumption 
of the risk inherent in the deliberate distortion of competition by a grant of special or 
exclusive rights, it ought to make no difference whether the role of the State has been 
active, in imposing or encouraging certain behaviour, or passive, in failing to correct 
it. Furthermore, this view entirely reflects the steps already taken by the Court in 
relation to State directions or encouragement for enterprises to infringe Articles 85-86 
in situations where no exclusive or special rights are involved. "298 
It is submitted, however, that the Court of Justice has discredited this theory of 
special responsibility at least to some degree in its judgments on the Terminal 
Equipment Directive and the Telecommunications Services Directive. In those 
directives the Commission required the Member States to take the necessary steps to 
ensure that customers could terminate long term contracts for liberalized terminal 
equipment or services which they had concluded with undertakings holding the special 
or exclusive rights abolished pursuant to the directives. 
The Court of Justice held that: "Article 90 of the Treaty confers powers on the 
Commission only in relation to State measures (see paragraph 24) and that the anti-
competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings on their own initiative can be called 
296 Sixth Report on Competition Policy, at para. 274. The Commission used as an example of the latter 
case, if a "public undertaking" systematically favoured national suppliers and the Member State did not 
possess the powers necessary to make the undertaking act in accordance with the principle of the 
common market. 
297 Some legal commentators have nevertheless questioned whether the mere failure of a Member State to 
prevent an undertaking within the meaning of Article 90(1) from acting contrary to the Treaty can 
amount to a "measure", on the ground that an interpretation to this effect would violate the language 
of Article 90(1). Bellamy & Child, cited above, at para. 13-015 and footnote 54; Page, cited above, 
at page 24. According to Page: "the imposition of this additional obligation on Member States stretches, 
at the very least, the literal wording of Anicle 90(1) in that it treats the failure of a Member State to 
intervene where a public undenaking is acting contrary to the Treaty rules as equivalent to the 
"maintenance· in force of a measure and thus as engaging its responsibility to act.· 
298 Wyatt & Dashwood, cited above, at page 554, citing Case 311185, Vereniging van Vlaamse 
Reisbureaus, [1987] ECR 3801 and Gyselen, (1989) 26 C.M.L. Rev. 33. 
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into question only by individual decisions adopted under Articles -85 and 86 of the 
Treaty It does not appear either from the provisions of the directive or from the· 
preamble thereto that the holders of special or exclusive rights were compelled or 
encouraged by State regulations to conclude long-term contracts_ Article 90 cannot 
therefore be regarded as an appropriate basis for dealing with the obstacles to 
competition which are purportedly created by the long-term contracts referred to in the 
directive_ "299 
It follows !rom this holding that Member States are not accountable for the 
b.ehaviour of public or privileged undertakings engaged in on their own initiative; the 
Member States are only accountable if they have compelled or encouraged that 
behaviour. Nevertheless, there remain at least some arguments that this holding does 
not necessarily exclude the possibility for the Member State to infringe Articie 90( 1) 
where it is precisely the failure of the State to act which compels or encourages the 
behaviour. 
In addition, it can still be argued that the State does have a special responsibility 
to supervise the dominant undertaking under circumstances in which the failure to do 
so would result in the de facto continuation of the abolished special or exclusive rights. 
The Commission employed this line of reasoning in recital 19 of the Full Competition 
Directive in regard to the responsibility of the Member States to adopt the necessary 
safeguards to prevent the interconnection of new entrants from being delayed by 
disputes between the new entrants and the dominant telecommunications operator 
regarding interconnection terms and conditions. According to the Commission, the 
':failure by Member States to adopt the necessary safeguards to prevent such a situation 
would lead to a continuation de facto of the current special and exclusive rights, which 
as set out above are considered to be incompatible with Article 90(1) of the Treaty, in 
conjunction with Articles 59 and 86 of the Treaty." It is submitted that the above ruling 
of the Court of Justice does not address. this particular situation in which State 
inactivity leads to. the de facto continu;:ttion of abolished special or exclusive rights. 
(ii) Theory of failure to respond to _changes in market circumstances 
Under the second theory, it has been argued that, under certain circumstances, 
a Member State may infringe Article 90( 1) if it fails to redefine and circumscribe the 
scope of an exclusive right to take account of changes in the market situation occurring 
over time.300 This reasoning is based upon a particular reading of the Corbeau 
299 France v. Commission, cited above, at paras. 55-57. Paragraph 24 states that it is only with regard to 
"measures adopted by the Member States[ ... ] that Article 90 imposes on the Commission a duty of 
supervision which may, where necessary, be exercised through the adoption of directives and decisions 
addressed to the Member States." See also Spain and Others v. Commission, cited above, at paras. 23-
27. 
300 Siragusa, "Privatization and EU Competition Law," Fordham Corporate Law Institute 375, 420 (1995); 
Hancher, Case Note on Corbeau, 31 C.M.L. Rev. 105, 115-16 (1994); Edward & Hoskins, Article 90: 
Deregulation and EC Law. Reflections Arising from the XVI FIDE Conference, 32 C.M.L. Rev. 157, 
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judgment. 301 
The case involved an individual (Mr. Corbeau) who provided postal services in 
and around Liege under service contracts in which he undertook to collect 
correspondence from the sender's address and deliver it by the next morning. Criminal 
proceedings were brought against him for infringement of the legal monopoly of the 
Regie des Postes to collect, transport and deliver correspondence in Belgium. The Liege 
court referred various questions to the Court of Justice concerning the compatibility of 
the Belgian postal monopoly with Articles 90, 85 and 86 and the duty of a Member 
State under Article 90(1) to modify the monopoly to comply with Community law. The 
case before the Court of Justice hinged on whether the Belgian postal monopoly could 
also be applied to new kinds of "value added" services (such as those provided by Mr. 
Corbeau) which did not exist at the time the postal monopoly was granted to the Regie 
des Postes. 
In paragraphs 1 to 12 of the judgment, the Court of Justice confirmed that the 
Belgian postal authority enjoyed exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90( 1) 
and restated the standard proposition that the mere fact that a Member State creates a 
dominant position by granting the exclusive right is not as such incompatible with 
Article 86, although the Treaty nonetheless requires the Member States not to adopt or 
maintain in force any measure which might deprive Article 86 of its effectiveness 
(citing ERT and noting the confirmation of this principle in Article 90( 1) ). The Court 
then (in paragraphs 13 to 19) examined the scope of the postal monopoly under Article 
90(2), stating that what falls to be considered is the extent to which a restriction on 
competition or even the exclusion of all competition from other economic operators is 
necessary to allow the holder of the exclusive right to perform its task of general 
economic interest and have the benefit of economically acceptable conditions. It 
concluded that the exclusion of competition is not justified as regards specific services 
dissociable from the service of general interest which meet special needs of economic 
operators and which call for certain additional services not offered by the traditional 
postal service, provided the provision of these additional services by_ another operator 
does not compromise the economic equilibrium of the service of general economic 
interest. 
The Court's opinion suggests that the grant of an exclusive right is prima facie 
illegal (under Article 90 in conjunction with Article 86) where it leads to the exclusion 
of all other economic operators from the market concerned (as it must do as an 
"exclusive" right), unless this exclusion can be justified on the basis of Article 
90(2). 302 It has been argued, however, that Corbeau instead stands for the proposition 
167-68 (1995). 
301 Case C-320/91, Paul Corbeau, [1993] ECR 1-2533. 
302 Or on the basis of one of the Treaty exemptions for Member States or the "mandatory requirements". 
Hancher. Case Note on Corbeau, cited above, at page 114. 
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that the abuse giving rise to the violation of Articles 90 and 86 lay in the failure of the 
Member State to respond to changes in the market situation by redefining the scope of 
the exclusive right granted to the postal monopoly. 303 In other words, the failure of 
the Member State to respond to such changes and redefine the scope of the exclusive .. 
right would amount to the maintenance in force of a measure which deprives Article 
86 of its effet utile, and therefore violates Article 90( 1) in conjunction with Article 86, 
unless the existing scope of the measure can be justified on the basis of Article 90(2). 
This interpretation has subsequently found support from other legal commentators.304 
II.B.3.3 Possible reasoning in context of dual dominance 
It is difficult to apply the above reasoning directly to the subject of the 
present study, precisely because the relevant exclusive rights have already been 
abolished (or will be in the near future). However, the above reasoning supports the 
argument that changes in economic, social, technological or regulatory conditions may 
under certain circumstances impose a duty on the Member State, in particular under the 
principle of effet utile, to restore effective competition in a market which has been 
removed from such competition pursuant to a Member State measure. A combination 
of this reasoning with the concept of the de facto maintenance of exclusive rights as 
a result of Member State inaction may allow the Commission to proceed against the 
situation of dual dominance under Article 90. Although the logic is complicated (and 
therefore open to challenge on multiple fronts, as is always the case with complicated 
logic), it may be possible to bring the subject of the present study within the scope of 
Article 90 based on the following reasoning. 
303 Hancher, Case Note on Corbeau, cited above, at page 116: "The Court was effectively being asked to 
rule upon the compatibility with Community competition rules of a measure which had conferred an 
exclusive right in general terms on an undertaking, almost forty years previously to a market situation 
which had altered fundamentally with the passage of time. The abuse, if any, lay in the failure on the 
part of the Member State to respond to such changes, by refining [sic] the scope of the initial right. Thus 
inaction could be considered a violation of Article 90(1). This was obviously the essence of the second 
question referred by the national court. If this interpretation is correct, then the first part of the Corbeau 
ruling represents a significant extension of the Court's jurisprudence of the effet utile of the Treaty's 
competition rules to situations where the development of competition is restricted because the market 
itself has changed, and not necessarily as a result of any independent action on the part of either the 
Member State or the statutory monopoly. The first part of the Court's reasoning in Corbeau [paragraphs 
1 to 12] suggests that failure to redefine a right conferring a wide-ranging exclusivity can indeed amount 
to a breach of Articles 90(1) and 86, unless there are objective justifications for maintaining a monopoly 
of this scope. These justifications are to be sought in Article 90(2)." 
301 It found support at the XVI FIDE Conference. See Edward & Hoskins, Article 90: Deregulation and 
EC Law. Reflections Arising from the XVI FIDE Conference, cited above, at pages 167-68. It also 
found support in Siragusa, cited above, at pages 420-23. It should be noted that the Court's judgment 
is also subject to an alternative interpretation, i.e. that it is based on the reasoning that the abuse lay 
in the Member State's (in effect) extending the scope of the exclusive right to cover a new kind of 
service that did not exist when the original grant of the right was made. 
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( 1) A change in market circumstances has occurred, i.e. restrictions on the use of 
cable TV network infrastructure for the provision of telecommunications services 
have been eliminated pursuant to the Cable TV Directive. 
(2) However, there is a special circumstance present, i.e. before such liberalization 
one undertaking held exclusive rights over both telecommunications and cable 
TV network infrastructures, and after liberalization that undertaking continues 
to hold dominant positions in the telecommunications and cable TV markets. 
(3) Instead of opening the telecommunications market to competition, the direct 
consequence of the change in market circumstances is that it in fact strengthens 
the dominant positions of tlre undertaking concerned in the telecommunications 
market (and the cable TV market), because the dual dominance makes it more 
difficult for new entrants to enter this market (see the discussion in the sub-
section above) and because technological changes have also occurred which are 
leading to the convergence of the telecommunications and media sectors into a 
"multimedia" sector. 
( 4) The change in market circumstances resulting from the elimination of the 
restrictions. on the use of cable TV network infrastructures for the provision of 
telecommunications services therefore results in the de facto continuation of the 
exclusive rights over telecommunications infrastructures and services. 
(5) This de facto continuation of exclusive rights and the strengthening of the dual 
dominant positions are the result of Member State measures, consisting of the 
original grants of exclusive rights (giving rise to the dominant positions in both 
markets) and the ·Member. State measures abolishing these exclusive rights 
pursuant to the Commission's Article 90(3) directive. 
(6) - The Member State had a duty, under the principle of effet utile and the principle 
of "equality of opportunity", to take steps to prevent such strepgthening of the 
dominant positions, and the Commission drew the Member State's attention to 
that duty in recital 18 of the Cable TV Directive.305 
(7) The failure of the Member State to take such steps is equivalent to maintaining 
in force a measure granting exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90( 1 ). 
A number of the steps in the above reasoning are more or less identical with the 
arguments developed in Section II.A above with regard to an infringement of Article 
86. As under Article 86, the reasoning is based upon both the strengthening and the 
automatic abuse of a dominant position. In the context of Article 90, these elements are 
305 "Given the disparities between Member States, the national authorities are best able to assess which 
measures are the most appropriate, and in panicular to judge whether a separation of the activities is 
indispensable." 
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combined with a State measure which consists of the failure to take the steps which are 
necessary in order to abolish the de facto continuation of exclusive rights. 
II.B.3.4 Application of the findings in a graduated approach 
The result of the above seven-step reasoning, which is subject to the 
different qualifications and reservations which have been indicated above, should be 
that a Member State which fails to take the necessary measures to eliminate the anti-
competitive situation (which results from "State measures" as interpreted above) fails 
to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty (and, in particular, under Article 90 in 
conjunction with Article 86 EC). For this reason, the Commission should have the 
power to adopt a directive under Article 90(3)306 which specifies the obligations of 
the Member States in this respect. Some of the obligations which could be considered 
under a graduated approach are discussed below. 
(i) Generalised principle of accounting separation 
It is first recalled that Article 2 of the Cable TV Directive imposes a specific 
obligation of accounting separation only where an operator having an exclusive right 
to provide telecommunications network infrastructure also provides cable TV network 
infrastructure. Therefore,_ this obligation could become largely ineffective after full 
infrastructure liberalization. 
However, as has been indicated in the above seven-step reasoning, it is arguable 
that the failure of a Member State to take specific measures at the time of liberalization 
to eliminate the situati~n in which one undertaking is dominant over both 
telecommunications and cable TV infrastructure would lead to a situation in which de 
facto exclusive rights continue to exist. Moreover, it has been indicated that such a 
situation could, on the basis of the above seven-step reasoning, be brought within 
Article 90 of the Treaty (i.e., the de facto exclusive right would be the consequence of 
a "State measure"). On the basis of this reasoning, it could be c<:mcluded that the 
Commission could include in an Article 90(3) directive obligations of accounting 
separation and transpare.ncy on the dominant undertaking for the same reasons as those 
underlying the identical obligations which are currently imposed on the 
telecommunications operators which benefit from de jure exclusive rights. 
(ii) Divestiture and structural separation 
Both structural separation and divestiture could be considered as possible 
measures to eliminate the anti-competitive situation at issue. One of these measures 
could therefore be included in an Article 90(3) directive and would then work through 
to the undertakings concerned via the implementation of the directive into the national 
legal order. The question of which of the two measures could be imposed should be 
306 Equally, there should be the possibility for the Commission to adopt a decision under Article 90(3). 
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examined on the basis of the same criteria as those which have been indicated above 
in Section II.A. 
In the context of Article 90, it is also necessary to examine whether the principle 
of subsidiarity could not affect the analysis of the choice to be made between the two 
measures. In this respect, it is recalled that in the preamble to the Cable TV Directive 
(recital 19), the Commission stated its view that full structural separation of the 
telecommunications and cable TV network infrastructures would be preferable to 
accounting separation as a means of addressing the anti-competitive effects which could 
result. However, it expressly left the issue of separation of the activities to the 
judgment of the national authorities, as being "best able to assess which measures are 
most appropriate". The Commission expressly indicated that it would reconsider 
whether further measures are warranted in particular if no competing home-delivery 
system is authorized by the relevant Member State (recital 20). 
The foregoing raises the issue of whether the Commission's statement was an 
application of the principle of subsidiarity under Article 3b of the Treaty and whether 
this would have as consequence that the Commission could intervene against a Member 
State under Article 90 only if no competing home-delivery system is authorized by the 
relevant Member State.307 Under the subsidiarity principle, the Community shall take 
action in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community. The Commission has taken the position that the 
general rules on competition, aimed at guaranteeing a level playing field in the internal 
market, fall, at least to a large degree, within the block of exclusive powers to which 
the principle of subsidiarity does not apply. 308 Among the competition rules, the rules 
applicable to Member States clearly fall within the Community's exclusive competence, 
as it is not possible for Member States to b~ required to monitor themselves or each 
other. 309 It follows that the above statement made by the Commission in the preamble 
to the Cable TV Directive cannot have any effect on the Commission's duty and power 
of supervision under Article 90 of the Treaty and should, therefore, not have a 
significant impact on the choice of the measure discussed above. 
307 The Commission could take the position that mere authorization of a competing home-delivery system 
would in any event not suffice to address the anti-competitive effects which may arise and that, even 
if a competing home-delivery system has been authorized, the Commission will still reconsider whether 
further measures are necessary to ensure that effective competition exists. Support for this position can 
be found in the British Telecommunications judgment of the Court of Justice under the so-called 
"Utilities Directive" (Council Directive 90/531/EEC of 17 September 1990 on the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sections, 0 .J. 
1990, L 29711) under the public procurement rules. Case C-392/93, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, Ex 
Parte British Telecommunications, [1996] ECR 1-1654, at paras. 31-35. 
308 Commission communication of 27 October 1992 on the subsidiarity principle, Bull EC 10-1992, page 
116, at page 121. 
309 XXIVth Report on Competition Policy 1994, page 29. 
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Finally, it can be noted that at least one Member State, namely the Netherlands, 
has already taken a number of steps to ensure a limitation of cross-ownership by the 
incumbent TO (KPN) over both telecommunications and cable TV infrastructure as 
well as to introduce a form of structural separation between those two activities. It is 
understood that the limitations on such cross-ownership have been required by the 
Dutch State in the context of the granting of a regional infrastructure license for the 
provision of telecommunications services to Casema (a cable operator which was owned 
in an indirect manner for 77% by KPN). In particular, KPN was required to reduce its 
ownership of 77% in Casema to a maximum level of 20%. In addition, specific 
obligations were developed to ensure that there would be no influence by the incumbent 
TO on the commercial behaviour of the cable TV operator and specific Chinese walls 
needed to be put in place in order to ensure that there would be no direct or indirect 
exchange of commercially sensitive information between the incumbent TO and the 
cable TV operator which would be granted the telecommunications infrastructure 
license. 
* * * * * 
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